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ABSTRACT 
 
AMERICAN RECONSTITUTION: 
HOW THE STATES STABILIZE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
Robinson Woodward-Burns 
Rogers M. Smith 
 
The American Constitution is exceptionally stable. Americans have proposed and ratified 
only one national constitution with only twenty-seven amendments. In contrast, the 
American states have proposed 354 constitutions, held 250 conventions, and ratified 146 
constitutions with at least 5,900 amendments. Why is the federal Constitution so much 
more stable than the state constitutions? Many scholars cite the federal Constitution’s 
higher procedural barriers to revision. But this dissertation asserts that ongoing state 
constitutional revision resolves national constitutional controversies, preempting federal 
constitutional amendment and quieting national inter-branch conflict. The dissertation 
tests this claim in two ways. First, it compares all attempted federal and state 
constitutional revision since 1776, drawing on an original dataset of all proposed state 
constitutions to show that federal and state constitutional revision are closely associated 
over time. Second, the dissertation disaggregates this trend by topic, offering case studies 
in which state constitutional revision preempted or resolved national constitutional 
conflicts. Since the states constrain the scope of national constitutional controversies, one 
cannot fully understand the political development of the national branches or Constitution 
without the states.  
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PART I: CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY  
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CHAPTER 1: EXPLAINING FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVISION 
 
“The question of the relation of the States to the Federal Government is the cardinal 
question of our constitutional system. At every turn of our national development we have 
been brought face to face with it, and no definition either of statesmen or of judges has 
ever quieted or decided it.” 
Woodrow Wilson, 1908
1
 
 
I. Question: What Determines Constitutional Duration? 
 
 Constitutions vary in duration. Some last a year, while others last centuries. Why 
is this, and what ought to be done about it? 
 This question is particularly important in the United States, home to the world’s 
first and oldest formal written national constitution.
2
 Americans have proposed and 
ratified only one national constitution and passed only twenty-seven national 
amendments in the 230 years since the Constitution’s drafting. In contrast, the American 
states have proposed 354 state constitutions, held 250 conventions, and ratified 146 
constitutions and 5,900 amendments. The average state constitution lasts only 64 years.
3
 
                                                 
1
 Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1908), 173. 
2
 The question is much older than the United States. Plato and Aristotle prescribed constitutions to calm 
Greek factions, Machiavelli revived Roman institutions to reconcile warring Florentine classes, and Hobbes 
and Locke bound the English crown and republicans to a common contract. Inspired by these constitutions, 
Madison framed a document to survive “the mortal diseases under which popular governments have 
everywhere perished.” Theorists return to the question because it is central to politics – constitutions shape 
formal institutions and statutes and informal civic norms – and because it remains unsolved. Madison’s 
mortal diseases plague modern national constitutions, which last on average only nineteen years. For the 
quote see Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist: With Letters of Brutus, ed. 
Terence Ball (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1788), 40. For the estimate of nineteen years see 
Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions (Cambridge ; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 129. 
3
 The federal Constitution is also the tersest and perhaps most stable written constitution in the world, too 
extreme an outlier to represent other national constitutions. While the state constitutions resemble many 
national constitutions, this project does not speculate on constitutions outside the United States. For the 
comparison of American state to other national constitutions, see Mila Versteeg and Emily Zackin, 
“Constitutions Unentrenched: Toward an Alternative Theory of Constitutional Design,” American Political 
Science Review 110, no. 4 (2016). This dissertation uses a dataset including all 146 ratified state 
constitutions to calculate that a ratified state constitution on average lasts 64 years. This figure is roughly 
affirmed by Hammons. Christopher W. Hammons, “Was James Madison Wrong? Rethinking the American 
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What explains the difference? Why is the federal Constitution so much more stable than 
the state constitutions and what does this mean for American constitutional development? 
 The federal Constitution is stable for a few well-known reasons.
4
 Almost all 
proposed amendments have fallen short of the supermajority requirements in Article V. 
Amendments must first clear two-thirds of both congressional houses or both houses of 
two-thirds of state legislatures, and then clear three-quarters of the state legislatures for 
ratification. Between 1788 and 2014, only twenty-seven of 11,792 proposed amendments 
passed.
5
 
 Additionally, the Constitution’s brevity and ambiguity might allow activist federal 
judges to fundamentally reinterpret the document, achieving constitutional reform 
without amendment. But judges rarely use this power. The president and Congress 
nominate and confirm sympathetic and restrained judges, can strategically constrain 
federal courts’ jurisdiction, and may keep contentious issues off the federal docket to 
prevent constitutional reinterpretation.
6
 And even an activist judiciary cannot unilaterally 
enforce its decisions without executive enforcement and congressional financing.
7
 So the 
courts usually use their interpretive power to resolve or preempt constitutional disputes 
                                                                                                                                                 
Preference for Short, Framework-Oriented Constitutions,” The American Political Science Review 93, no. 4 
(December 1, 1999): 837–49, doi:10.2307/2586116. For the number of state amendments, see G. Alan Tarr, 
Understanding State Constitutions (Princeton University Press, 1998), 24. 
4
 A stable constitution is one that is infrequently amended, replaced, or reinterpreted. 
5
 See Michael G. Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself: The Constitution in American Culture (St. 
Martin’s Press, 1986), 11; “Amending America: Proposed Amendments to the United States Constitution, 
1787 to 2014,” National Archives and Records Administration Data Catalog, 2016, 
http://www.archives.gov/open/dataset-amendments.html. 
6
 Robert Alan Dahl, “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,” 
Journal of Public Law 6 (1957): 279; Mark A. Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative 
Deference to the Judiciary,” Studies in American Political Development 7, no. 01 (1993): 35–73, 
doi:10.1017/S0898588X00000687. 
7
 Gerald N Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, 2nd ed (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
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that might otherwise force constitutional amendment or crisis, gradually easing 
America’s eighteenth-century Constitution into new contexts. 
 Instead, the public might reinterpret the Constitution. Bruce Ackerman describes 
America as a “dualist democracy,” with entrenched representatives passing ordinary 
statutes and the people in rare moments of crisis electing radicals to amend or reinterpret 
the Constitution to legally bind these entrenched representatives.
8
 But these radical, 
landslide majorities and constitutional realignments, circumventing ordinary politics, are 
by definition exceptional. Larry Kramer trusts popular mobs to circumvent legislators, 
judges, and formal amendment and assert new, informal interpretations of the 
Constitution.
9
 Yet this rarely results in formal amendment. Further, most ordinary 
Americans subscribe to the same core constitutional commitments, shying from rejecting 
these hallowed values for radical new constitutional readings.
10
  
 But the state constitutions complicate this story. American scholars largely 
neglect the 146 state constitutions for the federal one, missing almost all of American 
constitutional revision. Far easier to amend or replace, the state constitutions include 
many more provisions on citizenship, the franchise, education, police powers, and 
economic and positive rights. Myopic focus on the federal Constitution, designed for 
                                                 
8
 These radicals win landslide election during times of unusual crisis, gaining the massive legislative 
majorities – sometimes extralegally – needed to revise the Constitution. For example, Northern voters 
elected a Republican majority to the Thirty-Ninth Congress, which in December of 1865 excluded 
representatives from all Confederate states save Tennessee. This granted Republicans four-fifths of 
congressional seats, enough to score the 13
th
 and 14
th
 Amendments, constraining subsequent conservative 
Democratic congresses. Though procedurally legal, this violated Article V’s spirit of consensual revision, 
and the antebellum Constitution’s commitment to slavery. Bruce Ackerman, We the People: 
Transformations, vol. II (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1998), 15–17, 99–119. 
9
 Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 
10
 Americans interpret these shared values in diverse and sometimes conflicting ways, but rarely escape 
them. On veneration for the federal Constitution, see for example Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of 
Itself; Sanford Levinson, “Pledging Faith in the Civil Religion; Or, Would You Sign the Constitution?,” 
William and Mary Law Review 29 (1988 1987): 113. 
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inflexibility and permanence, exaggerates the stability of civic inclusion, constitutional 
reform, and American politics generally. 
 A few factors unique to the state constitutions explain their relative instability. 
First, the state constitutions are easy to amend, and so are packed with politically 
motivated, contentious provisions, which are subject to continuous repeal or replacement. 
Further, while the federal Constitution enjoys broad public veneration, most Americans 
ignore or denigrate their state constitutions and have few reservations with state 
constitutional revision. Finally, state constitutions are perennially embroiled in 
citizenship law disputes, and thus are subject to frequent revision. 
 But most importantly, the state and federal constitutions evolve jointly. Many 
scholars describe federal and state constitutional revision in isolation, and misread each. 
The aim of this project is to integrate accounts of federal and state constitutional 
development. 
 This dissertation proposes a new determinant of American constitutional change – 
constitutional decentralization. State constitutional reform addresses national 
constitutional controversies, averting federal amendment. Specifically, presidents, 
members of Congress, and federal judges can defer divisive and complicated 
constitutional issues to the states. Reformers thwarted by Article V might also take their 
cause to the state legislatures. These wedge issues may split state legislative parties, or 
state legislators may capitulate to reformers, proposing constitutional revisions that clear 
the states’ relatively low bar to reform. Even if they are unsatisfied with this revision, 
reformers may find their cause trapped at the state level, where constitutional reform can 
be slow, piecemeal, or unsuccessful. Controversy is often resolved or quarantined at the 
6 
 
state level, quieting calls for national constitutional reform and preventing national 
amendment. 
 The state constitutions vent pressure for national constitutional reform, and thus 
can guide the timing, nature, and scope of American constitutional and political 
development. There are three implications to this. National coalitions defer controversies 
not only to the courts, but also to the states. Armed with unique police powers, the states 
affect state and national policy in ways courts cannot. Second, in postponing or resolving 
national disputes, the states may quietly temper conflict between the national branches. 
Neglecting the states risks misunderstanding national constitutional development. Third, 
the states guide national constitutional realignments. States do not always lag behind 
national realignments, but sometimes lead them. Additionally, constitutional devolution 
can postpone change, explaining the periodicity of American constitutional realignments. 
Since state constitutional revision stabilizes the federal Constitution, ignoring the state 
constitutions, as most scholars do, misunderstands the federal Constitution. 
 Finally, state constitutional instability solves an old normative dilemma in 
American constitutionalism. The federal Constitution claims popular authorization, but 
forbids almost all Americans from directly engaging in the amendment process. Only the 
people’s representatives assembled in Congress, the state legislatures, and in 
constitutional conventions can vote on proposed amendments, and Article V’s 
supermajority requirements have blocked almost all reformers from calling these bodies 
to a vote. The Constitution lacks popular legitimacy. Yet ordinary Americans have 
revised their state constitutions through initiatives, referenda, legislative amendments, 
7 
 
legislative conventions, popular conventions, and extralegal popular tactics. State 
constitutional revision makes American constitutionalism more legitimate. 
 The state constitutions are a quiet but main engine of American constitutional and 
political development. This dissertation expounds this claim in two parts. Part I ventures 
a theory of American constitutional development. This first chapter recounts common, 
independent explanations of national constitutional stability and state constitutional 
instability. The second chapter challenges these, asserting that state constitutional 
instability and reform quiets national controversies, securing national constitutional 
stability and guiding American constitutional development. The third chapter gives a 
brief overview of all attempted state and federal constitutional revision. Part II tests this 
claim against American constitutional development. The fourth chapter recounts how 
Revolutionary-era state constitutional framers resolved questions over legislative 
sovereignty and design, frontier regulation, and slavery, preempting these debates at the 
federal Convention. In the antebellum era, state constitutional reform prevented and 
resolved national constitutional controversies over slavery, banking, and suffrage reform, 
as explained in the fifth chapter. The final chapter shows how crises over territorial 
slavery, fugitive slaves’ rights, black citizenship, and state sovereignty escalated into the 
Civil War, and how postwar state constitutional revision settled national debates and 
shaped Reconstruction constitutional order. State constitutional reforms quiet some 
national constitutional controversies and reforms while entirely preempting others. Thus 
one cannot fully understand national constitutional and political development in America 
without studying the states. 
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II. Federal Constitutional Stability 
 
 Scholars give several explanations for the federal Constitution’s stability. First, 
the document is notoriously difficult to amend. Article V requires a proposed federal 
amendment receive a two-thirds majority in both congressional houses or in two-thirds of 
the state legislatures, and then pass three-fourths of the state legislatures or ratifying 
conventions. All legal efforts to reform Article V have failed, and themselves would have 
to clear these difficult supermajority requirements.
11
 Further, Congress has set strict 
deadlines for a proposal to clear these hurdles, killing some proposals that waited for 
ratification.
12
 As in the past, partisan polarization in Congress and the state legislatures 
currently precludes consensus and thus amendment. 
 Generations of scholars have attributed the Constitution’s stability to Article V’s 
supermajority requirements. In 1902, the reform-minded political scientist John William 
Burgess lamented that the Constitution’s great “error lies in the artificially excessive 
majorities required in the production of constitutional changes,” which block the 
innovative, experimental “impulse in democratic societies.”
13
 His progressive colleague 
Herman Ames agreed that Article V raises “insurmountable constitutional obstacles” 
before necessary constitutional reforms, concluding that the “majorities required are too 
large.”
14
 Writing in 1929, Michael Musmanno reiterated Ames’ conclusion, as did Lester 
                                                 
11
 Janice C. May, “Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited,” Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism 17, no. 1 (January 1, 1987): 154–55. 
12
 Such was the fate of the Equal Rights Amendment and the District of Columbia Voting Rights 
Amendment. In 1921, the Supreme Court in Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 376 (1921) upheld the seven-
year ratification window set by Congress. 
13
 John William Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law: Sovereignty and Liberty, 
vol. I (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1902), 151. 
14
 Herman Vandenburg Ames, The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States during 
the First Century of Its History (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1897), 301–4. John R. Vile 
summarizes the progressives’ special dislike for the Article V process. See John R. Vile, The Constitutional 
Amending Process in American Political Thought (New York: Praeger, 1992), 137–56. 
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B. Orfield in 1942, Charles Leedham in 1964, Clement Vose in 1972, and Alan Grimes in 
1978.
15
 Recently Michael Kammen, Bruce Ackerman, and Robert Dahl have reaffirmed 
this story.
16
 As Michael J. Lynch noted “more than 10,000 proposals have led to a mere 
twenty-seven amendments. The obvious limiting factor is the special majority required in 
Congress.”
17
 Even after passing Congress, a proposal requires ratification by both houses 
of three-fourths of the states. Since the 1791 ratification of the Bill of Rights, the states 
rejected six of twenty-three amendments subject to a ratification vote. Sanford Levinson 
concludes: “Article V constitutes what may be the most important bars of our 
constitutional iron cage… [it] has made it next to impossible to achieve such adaptation 
where amendment is thought to be necessary.”
18
 
 But Article V alone cannot explain the Constitution’s endurance. Surveying all 
national constitutions ratified since 1789, Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton find that 
inflexible constitutions cannot adjust to survive unexpected crises. They also find the 
United States Constitution to be the least flexible of all national constitutions, suggesting 
                                                 
15
 See Michael Angelo Musmanno, Proposed Amendments to the Constitution: A Monograph on the 
Resolutions Introduced in Congress Proposing Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of 
America. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1929); Lester B. Orfield, The Amending of the 
Federal Constitution (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1942); Charles Leedham, Our Changing 
Constitution (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1964); Clement E. Vose, Constitutional Change: Amendment 
Politics and Supreme Court Litigation Since 1900 (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1972); Alan 
Pendleton Grimes, Democracy and the Amendments to the Constitution (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 
1978). For a review of these and other scholarly works on Article V, see David E. Kyvig, Explicit and 
Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776-1995 (University Press of Kansas, 1996), ix–xviii. 
16
 Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself; Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations, vol. I 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1993); Robert Alan Dahl, How Democratic Is the American 
Constitution? (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 2001), 144–45; Kramer, The People Themselves, 
251. 
17
 Per Lynch, only seven amendments have failed ratification by the states after being proposed by 
Congress, suggesting that the barrier to amendment is not the states but Congress. Michael J. Lynch, “Other 
Amendments: The Constitutional Amendments That Failed,” Law Library Journal 93 (2001): 309. 
18
 Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (And How We 
the People Can Correct It) (Oxford University Press, 2006), 159–66. 
10 
 
that Article V would threaten the Constitution’s endurance.
19
 How, then, has the 
Constitution survived? 
 In lieu of amendment, the Constitution’s brevity and according ambiguity allow 
federal judges leeway to reinterpret the document. In reinterpreting or negating a core 
value, judges can fundamentally change the Constitution.
20
 But federal judges rarely do 
so. Per Robert Dahl, presidents and Congress appoint likeminded federal judges to affirm 
existing statutes and constitutional interpretations.
21
 Moreover, since the president leads 
national coalitions, presidents often determine whether to defer constitutional issues to 
the courts, keeping some issues off the federal docket.
22
 Presidents leading new, unified 
congressional coalitions can seize constitutional interpretation from the courts.
23
 
                                                 
19
 Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions, 81–83, 99–101, 140–41. 
20
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political institutions to determine in accord with existing norms. See Gary Jacobsohn, Constitutional 
Identity (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010), 226–38. Many provisions in the American 
Constitution are the latter sort. For more on constitutional identity and fundamental reinterpretation, see 
Gary Jacobsohn, “Constitutional Identity,” The Review of Politics 68, no. 03 (June 2006): 361–397, 
doi:10.1017/S0034670506000192; Gary Jacobsohn, “Rights and American Constitutional Identity,” Polity 
43, no. 4 (October 2011): 409–31, doi:10.1057/pol.2011.10; Jacobsohn, Constitutional Identity, 2010. 
21
 Dahl, “Decision-Making in a Democracy.” Dahl notes the Supreme Court overturned only eighty-six 
congressional statutes between 1790 and 1957, only fifteen of which were major policies overruled within 
four years of passage, and almost all of these were reversed by congressional legislation. Dahl explains the 
president and Congress restrain the Court through frequent appointment and foreknowledge of nominees’ 
preferences, excluding hostile nominees. Dahl’s study downplays the Court’s independence by excluding 
the activist New Deal and Warren Courts, so the real question is not whether federal judges uphold existing 
constitutional readings, but when. See Jonathan D. Casper, “The Supreme Court and National Policy 
Making,” The American Political Science Review 70, no. 1 (March 1, 1976): 50–63, doi:10.2307/1960323. 
As Lasser notes, the Court does not always quiet controversies. Lasser notes three cases in which 
reactionaries on the Court issued a decision that exacerbated national polarization and the need for 
realignment. William Lasser, “The Supreme Court in Periods of Critical Realignment,” The Journal of 
Politics 47, no. 04 (November 1985): 1174–1187, doi:10.2307/2130812.  Dredd Scott is one such example. 
22
 Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to George Bush 
(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1993); Keith E. Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial 
Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History (Princeton 
University Press, 2009). 
23
 Per Dahl and Funston, the Court, appointed by the old regime, opposes a reconstructive president or 
Congress until these bodies appoint new, allied justices and shift the Court. Dahl, “Decision-Making in a 
Democracy”; Richard Funston, “The Supreme Court and Critical Elections,” The American Political 
Science Review 69, no. 3 (September 1, 1975): 795–811, doi:10.2307/1958390. Adamany agrees the Court 
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Alternately, when a contentious, crosscutting issue threatens to split a waning coalition, 
the president can defer the issue to the courts, which will dismiss or slow appeals and 
quiet constitutional controversies, helping preempt amendment.
24
 In either case, the 
courts will likely avoid radical constitutional reinterpretation. And the few activist judges 
that defy the president and Congress, lacking the power of the sword and purse, cannot 
unilaterally enact constitutional reform.
25
 
 One might trust ordinary citizens to circumvent federal officials and reinterpret, 
protest, or block repugnant constitutional provisions, reforming the Constitution.
26
 For 
example, Revolutionary mobs captured Stamp Act officials in order to abrogate the Act, 
and antebellum abolitionists hid fugitive slaves to vacate the Constitution’s Fugitive 
Slave Clause.
27
 But Americans are constitutionally pious, accepting the dominant, shared, 
popular constitutional dogma. The risk of American mobs is not so much their violence 
as their conformity. Public circumvention of ordinary politics is thus rare, reserved for 
crises and moments of exception.
28
 And even in these moments, popular mobs and 
                                                                                                                                                 
may initially oppose realignment coalitions, stripping new presidents and congresses of constitutional 
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24
 Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty.” 
25
 Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope. 
26
 This school of “popular constitutionalism” rests on Aristotle’s insight that a people and its constitution 
are distinct – a people can outlast a constitution, and vice versa – but are interdependent. See Aristotle’s 
Politics III.3, 5-8, 1277b, IV.11 1295a, VIII, which describes the politea, or constitutional regime, as a 
city’s formal rules distributing property and public office and informal way of life. A single polity can 
shuffle between various types of regime. Similarly, Hanna Pitkin takes “constitution” as a verb describing 
an adversarial, discursive process pitting competing values against each other. A constitution is “the 
unintended, collective by-product of our myriad private activities…constituting is not just doing what one 
pleases.” Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, “Idea of a Constitution, The,” Journal of Legal Education 37 (1987): 168. 
27
 Kramer, The People Themselves; Jason A. Frank, Constituent Moments: Enacting the People in 
Postrevolutionary America (Duke University Press, 2010); Elizabeth Beaumont, The Civic Constitution: 
Civic Visions and Struggles in the Path Toward Constitutional Democracy (Oxford University Press, 
2013). See Article IV, Section 2, Clause 3. 
28
 For example, Larry Kramer traces American popular constitutionalism to the Glorious Revolution, when 
Englishmen and colonists protested, rioted, and fundamentally revised their constitutional customs. This 
moment is exceptional, perhaps only matched in Anglo-American law by the American Revolution. 
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activists eschew the formal process of amendment, explaining the resilience of the 
written Constitution. 
 Similarly, Bruce Ackerman describes America as a “dualist democracy,” with 
entrenched representatives passing ordinary statutes and the people infrequently electing 
radicals to amend or reinterpret the Constitution to legally bind these entrenched 
representatives. For example, the Reconstruction Republicans, like later New Deal 
Democrats, “provoked a fundamental reworking of constitutional identity,” through the 
Reconstruction Amendments and Social Security Act.
29
 These parties won landslide 
election during times of unusual crisis, gaining the landslide legislative majority needed 
to revise the Constitution. But these coalitions too are exceptional. 
 This stability further increases veneration. James Madison hoped the people 
would interpret the Constitution rarely, only on “certain great and extraordinary 
occasions… [for] frequent appeals would in great measure deprive the government of that 
veneration which time bestows on every thing, and without which perhaps the wisest and 
freest governments would not possess the requisite stability.”
30
 The Constitution, thanks 
to Article V and judicial review,
31
 ages largely unamended and earns public veneration, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Additionally, since American popular constitutionalism grew from English practice, it relies on ideas of 
shared constitutional custom, tradition, and gradualism. Kramer credits the English constitution with the 
“capacity to improve without changing,” adding “Details, applications, even institutions might change, but 
the fundamental law itself remained constant and retained its essential substance.” Kramer, The People 
Themselves, 14–15. 
29
 Unlike Jacobsohn, Ackerman does not assert revising core commitments changes constitutional identity. 
This leaves Ackerman’s idea of identity murky. See Ackerman, We the People, II:8; John E. Finn, 
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Constitutional Identity, 2010; Jacobsohn, “Rights and American Constitutional Identity.”. 
30
 Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, The Federalist, 245–46, 309. 
31
 In Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton stripped colonial legislatures and popular conventions of the power 
of constitutional review, granting it to the unelected federal judiciary, hoping the people would defer to 
judges. Hamilton claimed “the will of the legislature declared in its statutes stands in opposition to that of 
the people declared in the constitution, [and] judges ought to be governed by the latter, not the former.” 
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requires from public officials an oath of fealty, and forbids mandatory religious oaths to 
other idols.
32
 Veneration cools popular passions for amendment,
33
 which increases 
stability, in turn increasing veneration. Madison designed the federal Constitution to 
ossify as it aged.
34
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Legislators follow passing majoritarian passions, against the aim of the permanent Constitution and thus 
against popular will. Life tenure insulates the judiciary from these majoritarian passions, allowing impartial 
judicial review in accord with true constitutional aims and the true, enduring popular will. The judiciary 
thus tempers and modifies popular agitation for constitutional reform. To Hamilton, judges understand the 
popular will better than the people themselves, or their elected representatives. Popular constitutional 
revision is not only misguided, but also defies true popular will. Similarly, Rousseau asserts the 
majoritarian “will of all” is not the true, unanimous general will, but rather an impermanent and inaccurate 
representation of the general will. In this sense Rousseau, like Madison and Hamilton, constrains popular, 
majoritarian politics. See Ibid., 377–83. On the Social Contract II.3-4, IV.2. 
32
 See Article II, Section 1, Clause 8, and Article VI, Section 3. 
33
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toward the public good. Charles Beard and Robert Dahl popularized Federalist 10 as the main thesis of The 
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Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule, ed. John Ferejohn, Jack N. Rakove, and Jonathan Riley 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001), 42–46. 
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 Madison got his wish, for Americans have long worshipped their Constitution. For example, on July 4, 
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 This is not to say Americans agree in interpreting constitutional commitments. 
Rather, political opponents legitimize their claims by upholding the same Constitution, 
and often the same clause. In the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause’s loose 
guarantee of “life, liberty, and property” antebellum slaveholders saw a right to their 
property in slaves, and these slaves saw a right to their freedom.
35
 American 
constitutional discourse and development is fraught and adversarial, but rarely escapes 
the bounds of the Constitution. 
 The federal Constitution’s inflexibility, brevity, and age and public veneration 
encourage judges and citizens to reinterpret their Constitution, rather than amend or 
replace it. But popular and judicial reinterpretation tend to affirm existing constitutional 
commitments or aspirations. Since national popular constitutionalism and judicial review 
often work within existing constitutional commitments, they rarely fundamentally realign 
the federal Constitution, helping explain the Constitution’s stability. 
III. State Constitutional Instability 
 
 Most scholars ignore the state constitutions. Early American political scientists 
chronicled state constitutional development until turning to political behavior in the mid-
twentieth century.
 36
 Despite the recent return to historical institutionalism and American 
                                                                                                                                                 
pocket Constitutions. In modern America’s fairly pluralist, secular society, the Constitution remains one of 
the few objects of common worship. Thomas C. Grey, “The Constitution as Scripture,” Stanford Law 
Review 37, no. 1 (1984): 1–25, doi:10.2307/1228651; Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself; May, 
“Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited,” 168; Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution; 
Sanford Levinson, Framed: America’s 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance (Oxford University 
Press, 2012). 
35
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Declaration a promise of equality compatible with abolition, and Jefferson Davis found a right to 
proslavery succession. 
36
 For this history see Donald S. Lutz, “The Purposes of American State Constitutions,” Publius 12, no. 1 
(January 1, 1982): 27–31, doi:10.2307/3329671. For Progressive-era accounts of the state constitutions, see 
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political development, no comprehensive causal account of state constitutional duration 
has been written.
37
 Similarly, many legal scholars overlook the states, genuflecting to the 
federal Constitution, which exceeds the state documents in power, gravitas, and stability. 
The state constitutions, with their thousands of obscure provisions and ten thousand 
proposed amendments are dauntingly long and unwieldy. Thus most literature on 
American constitutionalism disregards the state documents for the federal one.
38
 
 This is a problem. Almost all constitutional revision in America happens at the 
state level. Further, the federal and state constitutions evolve interdependently, so to 
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Making in the United States,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 2, no. 
2 (November 1, 1891): 1–57, doi:10.1177/000271629100200201; Amasa M. Eaton, “Recent State 
Constitutions,” Harvard Law Review 6, no. 2 (1892): 53–72, doi:10.2307/1321703; Walter Fairleigh Dodd, 
“Judicial Control over the Amendment of State Constitutions,” Columbia Law Review 10, no. 7 (November 
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James Quayle Dealey, Growth of American State Constitutions from 1776 to the End of the Year 1914 
(Boston: Ginn and Company, 1915); Walter Fairleigh Dodd, “The Problem of State Constitutional 
Construction,” Columbia Law Review 20, no. 6 (June 1, 1920): 635–51, doi:10.2307/1111866; John Donald 
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ignore the states is to misunderstand the federal Constitution. The dominant 
understanding of national constitutional development is incomplete. 
 Much of national constitutional politics begins with the states. Popular, grassroots 
organizing usually grows from state politics and constitutions,
39
 as do citizens’ identities 
and cultures,
40
 municipal regulations, and some public ideologies. Against previous 
readings, state constitutions are not parochial, but spark national trends, not 
particularistic, but reflect reasoned convention debate, not ill-designed and contradictory, 
but often functional.
41
 Finally, the flexibility of state constitutions allows policy 
experimentation. This variation helps explain why some constitutions endure while others 
fail. With the contemporary Congress polarized and gridlocked, the states, often 
operating under single-party governments, have recently resolved constitutional issues 
over gun regulation and same-sex marriage that the federal branches alone could not. 
Especially now, the state constitutions matter for national politics. Myopic focus on the 
federal Constitution, designed for inflexibility and permanence, exaggerates the stability 
of American constitutionalism as a whole. 
 The state constitutions literature is sparse. Most accounts are narrow and 
descriptive, shying from explaining constitutional development and endurance.
42
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Historians and lawyers chronicle particular eras, like the Revolution,
43
 particular states, 
regions, and cultures, like the South,
44
 particular ideas, like republicanism,
45
 or particular 
policy issues, like positive rights.
46
 In isolating eras, regions, ideas, and policies, these 
scholars may miss how the interaction of these orders drives American political 
development. Others trace the interaction of these ideas, policies, regions, and levels of 
government over state constitutional history.
47
 For example, Julie Novkov and Emily 
Zackin argue that state constitutionalism shapes national debates over family and 
marriage regulation and over positive rights.
48
 But these accounts focus on a single issue 
                                                                                                                                                 
State Constitutions,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, July 22, 2015, 1532440015594663, 
doi:10.1177/1532440015594663. 
43
 See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Norton, 1972); Gordon S. 
Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (Random House Digital, Inc., 1992); Donald S. Lutz, 
Popular Consent and Popular Control: Whig Political Theory in the Early State Constitutions (Louisiana 
State University Press, 1980); Marc W. Kruman, Between Authority and Liberty: State Constitution-
Making in Revolutionary America (UNC Press Books, 1997); Willi Paul Adams, The First American 
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area in which states have affected federal policy, and they may miss cases when state 
revision preempts federal change, systematically understating the state constitutions’ 
effect on the federal one. 
 Three characteristics of state constitutions make them unstable. First, the states 
have more and easier paths to reform than does the federal Constitution. Consider state 
amendments. All state legislatures have fewer members than Congress and so can more 
easily coordinate to propose amendments.
49
 In most state legislatures this is a two-thirds 
supermajority, but fifteen states require only a simple majority to propose an amendment. 
Legislators can also deputize an expert constitutional commission to amend the 
constitution, or can submit a constitutional referendum to voters. Failing that, in eighteen 
states voters can circumvent the legislature and amend the constitution through an 
initiative.
50
 One can propose an initiative with as little as three percent of the number of 
votes cast in the last election,
51
 and in all but one state, ratification requires only a simple 
majority of voters. In contrast, ratification of a federal amendment requires three-quarters 
of the states. Failing a state amendment, one can call a convention to replace the 
constitution. This takes only a simple majority in fifteen states and to a two-thirds 
majority in others, affirmed in all states by a simple majority popular vote. Fourteen 
states require such votes at least once every twenty years. In all but three states, voters 
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ratify convention votes by only a simple majority. Finally, six states do not fully specify 
the procedure for calling a convention.
52
 Historically, even fewer states specified the 
means of constitutional change,
53
 allowing frequent, extralegal popular conventions and 
amendments. Of the ninety-six nineteenth-century constitutions, twenty-seven were made 
without legal authority.
 
 
 This flexibility permits frequent state constitutional reform, partly explaining state 
constitutional instability.
54
 Specifically, the ease of constitutional revision tethers state 
constitutions to swings in popular politics,
55
 such that when state legislative control 
changes, state constitutions change.
56
 Dragged into tumultuous ordinary politics, these 
documents have short lives relative to their federal counterpart.
57
 And in general, states 
with lower barriers to amendment or replacement face more frequent revision. For 
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Zackin, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places, 59–61. 
56
 James Madison offered an additional explanation, worrying that the state constitutions’ flexibility would 
muddle the constitutional text, preventing the veneration and cooperative enforcement that preserves 
constitutions. He complained “We daily see laws repealed or superseded, before any trial can have been 
made of their merits; and even before knowledge of them can have reached the remoter districts within 
which they were to operate. See James Madison, “The Vices of the Political System of the United States,” 
in Writings, ed. Jack Rakove (Library of America, 1999), 75. 
57
 Friedman, “State Constitutions in Historical Perspective,” 36; Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 
20–23. 
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example, the fourteen states that require periodic votes calling for a constitutional 
convention undergo especially frequent change.
58
 
 Further, this flexibility lets state legislators stock their constitutions with partisan 
pork-barrel provisions.
59
 When new parties enter the state legislature, they can easily 
repeal these provisions, or quickly supersede them with new, additional clauses. 
Consequently, all state constitutions are longer than the federal one, and on average are 
quadruple the federal length. Alabama’s Constitution, at 376,000 words, is the world’s 
longest,
60
 and is fifty times longer than the federal Constitution, which, just under 7,600 
words, is the world’s shortest. 
 This textual specificity may further decrease the average state constitution’s 
duration.
61
 These detailed, overtly-partisan provisions are vulnerable to replacement or 
supersession after eventual switches in state legislative control. Consequently, longer 
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 Half of these states have had at least five constitutions, exceeding the average of three. See Dinan, The 
American State Constitutional Tradition, 11. 
59
 These long, quasi-statutory state constitutions include contentious provisions regulating crime, education, 
or finance, which invite revision. May, “Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited,” 164–70; Lutz, 
“Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment,” 357–59. 
60
 Berkowitz and Clay put the average state constitution at 28,000 words. See Daniel Berkowitz and Karen 
Clay, “American Civil Law Origins: Implications for State Constitutions,” American Law and Economics 
Review 7, no. 1 (April 1, 2005): 69. Note however that Georgia’s 1945 Constitution was 500,000 words. 
Vermont’s 1793 7,600-word document was the briefest constitution ratified by any state. The few New 
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exceptionally brief 1780 Constitution was a model for the federal Constitution. Akin to higher law 
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Sturm, “The Development of American State Constitutions”; Daniel J. Elazar, “From the Editor of Publius: 
State Constitutional Design in the United States and Other Federal Systems,” Publius 12, no. 1 (January 1, 
1982): 1–10, doi:10.2307/3329669; Lutz, “The Purposes of American State Constitutions”; Fritz, 
“Alternative Visions of American Constitutionalism,” 35–36; Zackin, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong 
Places, 22–27. 
61
 Conceptually, flexibility and specificity are distinct, such that a flexible constitution could be pithy, 
rather than long and specific. For this reason, Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton address flexibility and 
specificity separately. But historically, flexible state constitutions have been longer and more specific than 
the federal Constitution. And the states with longer constitutions tend to have easy amendment processes, 
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state constitutions are replaced or amended more frequently.
62
 And while the brief federal 
Constitution allows judges interpretive leeway, the state constitutions’ incredible 
specificity limits the power of state judges.
63
 Further, these state judges are constrained 
by legislators’ constitutional amendments,
64
 and by federal statutory and constitutional 
law. With this state judicial review partly blocked, reformers have even more reason to 
attempt state constitutional amendment. Finally, Madison accused the state constitutions 
of a prolixity and “luxuriancy of legislation” that failed “to mark with precision the 
duties” of citizens.
65
 With state citizens ignorant of the legal checks on their elected 
representatives and their parties, government might frequently change hands between 
self-interested representatives or factions, bringing new constitutional clauses. 
 Second, because Americans do not venerate their state constitutions, they likely 
have fewer reservations with state constitutional revision. Only fifty-two percent of 
respondents to a 1991 survey knew the states have constitutions, thirty-seven percent 
were unsure, and eleven percent believed the states did not.
66
 Respondents to a 2014 
survey, when informed they had a state constitution, approved of it, but this approval 
reflected respondents’ pride in their state more than their political knowledge. Approval 
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had little association with the constitution’s content, suggesting public knowledge of the 
state constitutions is fairly superficial.
67
 And this approval did not reach levels of 
approval for the federal Constitution.
68
 While the handful of New England constitutions 
resemble the national document in endurance and popular admiration, most state 
constitutions are closer to the Southern model – overtly partisan, neglected by their 
citizens, and short-lived.
69
 To the extent that American states have a constitutional 
culture,
70
 it is one of revision – Louisiana, with a French civil law tradition, has had 
eleven lengthy documents, enough for a Louisiana lawyer to quip that “Constitutional 
revision in Louisiana, whether in conventions or by amendment, has been sufficiently 
continuous to justify including it with Mardi Gras, football, and corruption as one of the 
premier components of state culture.”
71
 The other nine states first organized under 
French, Spanish, and Mexican civil law customs also have unusually high amendment 
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and replacement rates relative to other states,
72
 further distinguishing the states from the 
gradualist common law tradition of federal constitutional reform. 
 Finally, constitutions backed by widespread consent should endure.
73
 Recent 
rational choice theorists have revived this contractarian account of constitutional 
endurance, asserting that common enforcement,
74
 checks on government,
75
and broad 
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1997): 247–51, doi:10.2307/2952354. But Weingast also notes that authoritarian regimes can be stable, so 
long as the sovereign transgresses against some, but not all subjects. Weingast, “The Political Foundations 
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incentives shift from enforcement to resistance. Since constitutions rest on subjects’ fickle perceptions and 
24 
 
distribution of benefits increase constitutional duration.
76
 Evidence suggests inclusive 
national constitutions endure. Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton propose that broad 
participation in drafting and ratification publicizes the terms of coordination of 
enforcement, and widespread distribution of goods garners broad support, boosting 
stability. Additionally, inclusive electoral participation keeps citizens culturally invested 
in a constitution.
77
 
 State constitutions are the center of disputes over citizenship and civic exclusion. 
In drafting the Tenth Amendment, Congress allowed the states unique and sometimes 
exclusive constitutional power to regulate and limit state citizenship, the franchise, 
office-holding, legislative district apportionment, and police powers including morality 
and religion, temperance, education, labor rights, environmental rights, gender and 
sexuality rights, disability rights, and racial classifications. State constitutions were the 
                                                                                                                                                 
fears of violation, “constitutions are necessarily delicate.” This is opposed to Hobbes’ claim that the 
sovereign uses fear to compel obedience and secure the regime. It is closer to Locke’s assertion that a 
regime that respects rights will likely not be overthrown. Constitutions are self-enforcing, and thus stable, 
when many subjects favor enforcement. 
76
 There are two shortcomings of Weingast’s model of a constitution as a self-enforcing pact. For Weingast, 
liberal constitutions’ stability benefits subjects, who join to support liberal constitutions. The initial 
constitutional contract spurs a matching civic and constitutional culture. Weingast, “The Political 
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during the Revolution, state framers were as much concerned with empowering the sovereign people 
through frequent elections as with restraining the executive. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 
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 See Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions, 78–81, 97–99. There are 
caveats to this contractarian account. Framers of Jim Crow state constitutions so successfully 
disempowered Southern blacks through disenfranchisement and physical intimidation that these exclusive 
constitutions endured. Some state constitutions might survive by further excluding already disempowered 
groups. Additionally, modern state constitutions are not social contracts formed and maintained for 
common security and survival. Since the stakes for state constitutional revision are lower in the modern era, 
there may be greater incentive for revision. And contrary to the contractarian expectation that citizens form 
constitutions in order to weather crises, Americans tend to repeal their state constitutions in moments of 
crisis, further suggesting the contractarian theory of national constitutions may not apply to subnational 
constitutions. 
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battleground on which, for example, the franchise was won by white males, then 
suffragettes, then lost by Jim Crow blacks, to be regained by black civil rights litigants. 
 These citizenship struggles and exclusions likely destabilize state constitutions.
78
 
State constitutional duration reflects local coalition politics. Elites may grant 
constitutional rights either to compromise with progressive allies or to legally entrench 
their waning power.
79
 According to this entrenchment theory, constitutions are 
conservative documents which elites use to bind progressive legislatures or courts. Yet at 
the state level this is likely not the case.
80
 State constitutions’ open conventions, staffed 
by novices and outsiders, states’ referenda, easy amendment, and elected judiciaries 
invite popular reforms. That is, state constitutions’ popular revision process is actually a 
source of instability. Further, exclusive state citizenship provisions prompt contention, 
repeal, and further revision.
81
 For example, in 1790, ten of thirteen states used property 
qualifications to exclude adult white males from the franchise. These men rallied, 
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proposing at least forty-six state constitutional reforms, so that by 1855, only three of 
thirty-one states maintained such qualifications.
82
 
 In conclusion, the federal Constitution’s inflexibility and widespread veneration 
discourage amendment and popular and judicial reinterpretation. The state constitutions, 
with their flexibility, cultures of revision, and civic controversies, face frequent 
amendment. But these explanations alone are incomplete, for the national and state 
constitutions develop together. The federal government has broad authority over state 
constitutions – Congress and the president can defer enabling acts that recognize state 
constitutions, while federal courts and constitutional amendments invalidate or reinforce 
provisions of state constitutions and steer state judicial review.
83
 Further, innovations in 
federal governance can obviate state constitutions. The federal government strategically 
enforces and relaxes these constraints, relegating thorny issues to the states and 
controlling the scope of conflict.
84
 For example, the federal framers, unable to agree on 
regulation of virtue, crime, citizenship, and education, delegated morality legislation to 
the states, requiring only “a republican form of [state] government.”
85
 Thwarted at the 
national level, reformers target the state constitutions, which are flexible and have many 
special policy prerogatives. Nineteenth-century temperance and morality crusaders first 
reformed the state constitutions, building the national coalition that eventually scored the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. These national coalitions carry policies and 
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ideas across state borders, so that reforms diffuse across states.
86
 Pennsylvania’s populist 
1776 Constitution, for example, inspired constitutional provisions in Vermont, Maryland, 
and Georgia.
87
 Federal deference to the states may destabilize state constitutions. This 
interaction is the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2: HOW STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION STABILIZES THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
 
 “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, 
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” 
Louis Brandeis, 1932
88
 
 
I. Model 
  
 The federal Constitution creates national and state governments, enumerating 
specific powers of the national government and denying many of these to the states. The 
Tenth Amendment reserves non-enumerated powers to the states and their constitutions, 
to the exclusion of the national government. But since the federal Constitution is short 
and ambiguous, many powers delegated to the national government are not expressly 
denied to the states, allowing broad concurrent authority. This lets the federal government 
defer some constitutional controversies to the states, the subject of this chapter.   
A petitioner seeking to reform concurrent powers picks the venue, national or state, that 
offers the greatest chance of success. A smarter petitioner bends the rules to repeatedly 
guide his or her cause to a friendly venue. Since the rules for arbitration are themselves 
contested or unclear,
89
 the authority and operation of the national and state constitutions, 
courts, and legislatures is often disputed, with petitioners strategically constructing and 
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 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). 
89
 The federal framers, deeply divided over the scope of national and state powers, largely avoided defining 
each. On May 31, 1787, James Madison proposed Congress veto state legislation to clarify national and 
state powers, but the Convention rejected his proposal on July 17
th
 and August 23
rd
, and the issue remained 
unresolved. The federal Constitution’s brevity also allows political contestation over the boundaries 
between federal and state authority. In cases of conflicting federal and state law, the Constitution’s 
Supremacy Clause instructs judges to uphold the national Constitution and national statutes over state law, 
but does not define when a conflict occurs. The Clause itself may apply to federal or state judges, each of 
which may be biased, preventing impartial arbitration. See Article VI, Clause 2. See also Fehrenbacher, 
Constitutions and Constitutionalism in the Slaveholding South, 33–38. 
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moving between each. Put very simply, reformers can attempt federal or state 
constitutional revision, which can stabilize or destabilize the federal Constitution. 
Consider Table 1. 
 Venue to address constitutional dispute 
Decentralized/states Centralized/national 
Federal 
Outcome 
Stability/resolved 1. Slavery 1800-50 2. Power over post office, post-1787 
Instability/unresolved 3. Slavery 1850-65 4. Coinage/monetary policy 1870-90 
Table 1: Paths and Examples of American Constitutional Development. 
 
 Analysis of American constitutionalism often ignores cells one and three above, 
focusing on the federal Constitution in cells two and four. Scholars have thoroughly 
documented how the national courts, Congress, and executive have exacerbated or 
resolved national constitutional debates. These national conflicts are important, if over-
studied. This dissertation studies all four cells, showing how disputants strategically 
choose their venue, national or state, and how this encourages national constitutional 
stability or instability. 
 Specifically, this dissertation argues that when Americans leave disputes to the 
states, the states usually resolve these issues, preserving the national Constitution. State 
constitutionalism has quieted and stabilized national constitutional politics.
90
 In studying 
the states, this dissertation does not deny the importance of national actors, or claim that 
all cases of national constitutional change involve the states. Rather, this study explains 
how state constitutional revision often preempts or resolves national conflicts, shaping 
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the choices of national actors. Paradoxically, to understand national constitutional 
politics, one cannot study solely the national Constitution. This chapter outlines how 
federal and state constitutional reform interact, concluding by exploring the implications 
of this interaction. 
 The following model demonstrates how constitutional decentralization can abate 
pressure for national constitutional reform. National controversies emerge, allowing state 
constitutional revision to resolve the controversy, usually preventing national partisan 
and constitutional change. 
1.National 2. State 3. National 
1a.  
Change in 
population, 
technology, 
economics 
1b. 
Contention 
over 
Constitution  
1c. 
Deference 
to states 
2a. 
Constitutional 
and partisan  
contention 
2b. 
Constitutional 
revision 
3a.  
Constitutional 
and partisan 
accord 
3b.  
Constitutional 
stability 
Figure 1: The States’ Role in American Constitutional Reform. 
 
This model applies only to American constitutionalism, and only imperfectly. In a 
particular context, this process may occur partially or completely, once or repeatedly, for 
one issue or for many.
91
 Given America’s diverse, incomparable regimes and eras, this 
model is not a universal or complete account of American constitutional politics, but can 
explain constitutional change on particular issues in a given context.
92
 
 Consider each step in the model. American constitutional conflict grows from a 
broader dilemma in modern liberal constitutionalism. Constitutions have usually two 
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main purposes. One is to entrench stable rules for the common good.
93
 Another is to 
create a polity and an according common space to enact democratic citizenship.
94
 These 
functions are opposed. The former restrains the polity and the latter empowers it to 
reconstitute itself, posing the old normative dilemma between common stability and 
democratic autonomy. It also helps explain constitutional change – polities slowly 
outgrow and break their inflexible constitutional restraints. 
 This tension is particularly clear in American constitutionalism, as the 
Constitution’s preamble and the Declaration of Independence encourage democratic 
constitutional reform while Article V supermajority requirements entrench the national 
Constitution against popular revision. As noted in Figure 1, demographic, economic, and 
technological trends, especially, slowly delegitimize the entrenched constitutional order 
(1a). New populations grow and petition for legal inclusion, trying to translate their 
constituent authority into a constitutional amendment.
95
 But constitutions by nature and 
design entrench law against reform, legally and inflexibly bounding the polity. This 
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across multiple elections. The Constitution exceeds statutes in publicity, rallying allied voters, and allows 
high-profile litigation that draws voters and dismantles hostile citizenship laws. 
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designed, necessary unresponsiveness to changes in civic membership exacerbates the 
boundary problem,
96
 legally excluding some members of the polity, who, to gain legal 
inclusion, must be citizens. If threatened by outsiders’ push for inclusion, national parties 
can appoint conservative judges to uphold the constitutional status quo, ossifying the 
Constitution and exacerbating the problem. Inflexible national constitutions cannot adjust 
to survive unexpected crises,
97
 and thanks to Article V, the United States Constitution is 
the world’s least flexible constitution.
98
 Blocked from achieving a national amendment, 
reformers may turn to the courts for reinterpretation. But legislators and executives 
confirm judges who uphold the constitutional status quo,
99
 and activist judges cannot 
unilaterally enforce their decisions.
100
 Popular majorities can instead elect radical 
legislators,
101
 or abrogate contentious constitutional provisions,
102
 but Americans so 
venerate their Constitution that this is exceptional and rare. 
 Without constitutional amendment or reinterpretation, reformers’ petitions can 
become grievances and constitutional controversies (1b). Those lacking full citizenship 
rights can expansively interpret egalitarian provisions like the Equal Protection Clause or 
can propose new amendments.
103
 The gap between evolving civic aspiration and 
inflexible legal reality plagues all laws, but none more than constitutions, which express 
civic aspirations and face special public attention and scrutiny. Reformers can chase the 
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inclusive textual ideal through cyclical constitutional rewriting, but can never achieve full 
civic inclusion, such that each revision is imperfect, planting the seed for its successor. 
Alternately, a single constitutional commitment or aspiration can yield dueling 
interpretations.
104
 Organizers turn to the same shared, authoritative constitutional values 
to turn out their base and build coalitions, but interpret these values in incompatible ways. 
Finally, separate and opposed constitutional commitments and clauses may clash.
105
 
 Article V puts all proposed amendments before Congress, and the executive and 
federal courts also field constitutional controversies. These national actors have several 
reasons to avoid contentious issues and to defer them to the states. First, the states’ broad, 
traditional police powers to regulate health, safety, morals, and welfare encourage 
national actors to defer these to the states. National actors that read their powers narrowly 
have more incentive to recognize state authority. Second, constitutional controversies can 
split the national parties. Reformers can strategically phrase their constitutional appeals 
and grievances to internally divide parties, to seize new factions for their cause and form 
dissident coalitions and third parties.
106
 Civic identities are especially powerful divisive 
tools.
107
 Alternately, members of Congress may be overburdened and may avoid thorny 
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legal debates over federalism. Finally, Congress may avoid proposing an amendment that 
the states are unlikely to ratify. 
 Congress, the president, and the federal courts have many constitutional tools to 
defer issues to the states (1c). Several clauses in the federal Constitution encourage this. 
The Tenth Amendment grants the states expansive authority over any constitutional 
power not prohibited to them or expressly delegated to the federal government.
108
 The 
Elections Clause lets states regulate the time, place, and manner of elections.
109
 Under the 
Guarantee Clause’s vague requirement of “republican government” in the states, the 
Congress, executive, and federal courts have upheld deference to the states and 
occasionally found grounds to threaten to force state constitutional revision.
110
 The Full 
Faith and Credit Clause also allows Congress to intervene in conflicts between states, 
forcing states to address particular constitutional issues.
111
 And citing the Territories 
Clause, Congress used enabling acts to force territorial legislatures to address divisive 
national constitutional issues until the early twentieth century.
112
 The broader the 
                                                                                                                                                 
twentieth century that shunned radicalism and communism. Writing in a more contentious time, Walter 
Dean Burnham, Samuel Huntington, and Bruce Ackerman claim excluded groups periodically vie for and 
achieve civic inclusion via intense organizing and realignment within the major parties, culminating in a 
critical election and new, stable, egalitarian constitutional vision. Rogers Smith also debunks Hartz and 
Huntington’s liberal thesis, asserting civic exclusion often drives instability and political and constitutional 
change. See Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political 
Thought since the Revolution (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1955); Walter Dean Burnham, Critical 
Elections: And the Mainsprings of American Politics (W. W. Norton & Company, 1970); Samuel P. 
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108
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 For example, Democratic and Whig congressional leadership united to silence antislavery radicals in 
both parties by devolving slavery regulation to the territories, citing a reading of the Territories Clause 
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interpretation of these provisions, the more effective the states can be at seizing and 
national controversies. Put differently, national coalitions quiet threatening issues by 
forcing them on the states, controlling conflict by limiting its national scope.
113
 Censoring 
ideas and rhetoric preserves some coalitions and disarms others, quietly setting the 
rhetorical agendas that shape policymakers’ preferences.
114
 
 The states can tackle national controversies by proposing state constitutional 
reforms (2a).
115
 There are several ways states and territories can claim authority over 
national issues. Congressional, presidential, and federal judicial deference can shift 
controversies to the states, pressuring moderates and letting opportunistic state radicals 
push constitutional debates and reforms on previously neglected topics.
116
 National 
reformers, thwarted by barriers to national constitutional amendment and reinterpretation, 
may propose state constitutional reforms.
117
 Sometimes state reformers may push 
constitutional reforms that are uncontroversial at the national level, but have the potential 
                                                                                                                                                 
popularized by Lewis Cass and Stephen Douglas. See Article 4, Section 3, Clauses 1 and 2. Congress also 
used the Clause and enabling acts to condition territories’ admission on revision of the territorial 
constitution. 
113
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to preempt national debates and reforms. Or state officials may unilaterally seize 
authority over a constitutional issue, even without federal deference. And some clauses of 
the federal Constitution grant the states special or exclusive authority over nationally 
contentious issues.
118
 A fracturing state coalition may refuse constitutional change, 
exacerbating the standing controversy and speeding the coalition and constitution’s 
demise. A new legislative coalition then may push for state constitutional amendment or 
replacement.
119
 
 Since state constitutional reform is relatively easy, many proposed reforms pass 
(2b). All state constitutions have a lower amendment threshold than the federal 
Constitution,
120
 and in many states one can propose amendments through popular 
initiatives and referenda, such that almost two-thirds of proposed state constitutional 
amendments have been ratified. Failing amendment, states can propose new constitutions 
through a host of easily methods, and almost half of proposed constitutions have cleared 
these hurdles.
121
  Further, state courts can reinterpret their state constitutions.
122
 
Alternately, ordinary Americans do not venerate their state constitutions as they do their 
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national Constitution, and so have fewer reservations with reinterpreting, nullifying, or 
abrogating state constitutional provisions.
123
 
 This frequent revision increases state constitutional length and decreases public 
veneration, encouraging further revision.
124
 Easy and frequent addition of new clauses 
may make a state constitution seem more like an ordinary statute and unworthy of 
popular veneration. Accordingly states with higher revision rates have especially low 
levels of constitutional veneration.
125
 Citizens who do not venerate their constitution 
likely have fewer qualms with amending or replacing it, further decreasing veneration.
126
 
An easy amendment process also yields a long, particularistic, specific document. This 
specificity loads a document with contentious provisions, decreasing veneration and 
encouraging further revision, further eroding veneration. Once begun, the revision cycle 
is difficult to end. Unless the revision satisfies all parties, losers push for more 
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revision.
127
 Constantly vulnerable to revision, a state constitution survives only as long as 
a coalition can support it. 
 State reforms resolve national constitutional conflicts in chiefly two ways (3a).
128
 
In cases of preemptive resolution, state legislators and framers first seize and address a 
national constitutional issue, preventing the federal branches from later intervening or 
proposing amendments in this area. Alternately in cases of joint resolution, the federal 
and state governments jointly propose amendments addressing the same constitutional 
issues. However, since state amendment is much easier, usually reform only occurs at the 
state level. Further, state revisions may appease reformers and quiet calls for both state 
and federal constitutional revision.
129
 Both types of resolution stabilize the federal 
Constitution (3b). 
 Consider four cases that can lead to preemptive and joint resolution. First, 
national leaders can defer to the states by citing states’ Tenth Amendment powers or the 
effectiveness of the states’ constitutional regulations, preempting new constitutional 
conflicts or jointly resolving existing ones.
130
 And national elites can retrench their 
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constitutional platform by imitating state innovations through congressional statute, 
preempting amendment. Relatedly, second, the diversity of state constitutional 
provisions, especially on morality, creates a patchwork nation that lets Americans pick a 
state that suits their lifestyle. Diversity for mobile Americans means more choices and 
greater satisfaction, preventing federal amendment. Alternately, third, a local or regional 
movement that scored state constitutional reform may not be prepared to capture a 
national majority. Movements might fizzle out locally, preempting national debate.
131
 
And similarly, fourth, splitting a national movement across fifty states may fracture and 
kill the national movement, producing many disparate state reforms. The states’ 
seemingly parochial, localist, diverse amendments can actually present a coherent, 
locally-tailored, viable solution to a rising or existing national controversy, preempting or 
resolving these controversies.
132
 These parochial provisions allow federal constitutional 
stability. Oddly the state constitutions’ parochialism makes them nationally significant. In 
sum, with national controversy quieted, there is little incentive to launch a difficult 
national campaign to pass a federal amendment, so the federal Constitution remains 
stable. The states preemptively and jointly resolve national controversies.
133
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 For example, arid Western states carefully regulate water use, but there is little incentive for Western 
reformers to make this a national cause. 
132
 For example, Florida’s Constitution regulates the catching of saltwater finfish, a seeming obscure and 
unimportant provision, but is part of a broader and nationally-important tradition of local fishery regulation. 
See the Florida Constitution of 1968, Article X, Section 16. 
133
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excluded are also politically constructed, usually in response to states’ failure to regulate these areas 
effectively. Revolutionary-era states could constitutionally coin money, but could not coordinate coinage, 
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 There are exceptions. Rarely, state revision can exacerbate national controversies, 
requiring federal action. Deference to the states can incubate constitutional debates in 
some states. Under the Tenth Amendment, states can introduce new policies and laws 
that federal courts and the Congress cannot consider.
134
 This state experimentation could 
arm national coalition radicals with new, viable, tested constitutional platforms.
135
 
Alternately state politicians might see their constitution undermined by a neighboring 
state, and pursue national constitutional reform to strong-arm their neighbors.
136
 Or, when 
the national constitutional controversy aligns with sectional tensions, deference to the 
states can exacerbate these regional divides and further inflame the issue. Acting in their 
short-term interest, national party leaders may continue to defer the issue to the states, 
even though this promises eventual discord.
137
 Unresolved conflict can destabilize 
national coalitions, allowing partisan realignment and reinterpretation or amendment of 
the federal Constitution,
138
 and widespread political change.
139
 But since national actors 
                                                                                                                                                 
issues, the states structure national authority even when they do not directly intervene in a conflict, as the 
next section shows. 
134
 These are the police powers over health, safety, morals, and welfare. Additionally, states have special 
legal prerogative over elections and citizenship law. For example, Novkov shows state constitutional and 
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the constitutional status quo? That is, can a mass partisan realignment occur without a constitutional 
realignment? It is possible, but unlikely. A national realignment coalition holds an exceptional majority of 
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use deference to quiet controversies, this should be rare. And even in rare cases when 
state revision fails to preempt federal amendment, this state revision can quiet debates 
around the amendment, easing its passage. 
II. Implications for American Constitutional Development 
 
 This model upsets the conventional approach to American constitutional 
development which focuses on the federal Constitution. First, scholars ignoring the states 
miss almost all American constitutional revision, which happens at the state level.
140
 
More importantly, state constitutionalism mediates how national actors affect the federal 
Constitution. Constitutional reformers are opportunistic, simultaneously working at the 
national and state level. Often these paths intersect, so to study one path in isolation is to 
misinterpret it. 
 To clarify: imagine American constitutionalism simplified to only courts and 
states. Figure 2 illustrates such a system. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Congress – a realignment coalition is defined in part by its unusually large legislative majority – and thus 
likely meets the two-thirds supermajority of a national convention or of both congressional houses required 
to propose a federal amendment. These national majorities are often backed by reformist state majorities 
(2a), which may meet the three-fourths supermajority required for state legislatures or conventions to ratify 
the proposed amendment. But these are exceptionally high thresholds that may thwart realignment 
coalitions. Coalitions have other options, like passing quasi-constitutional statutes like the Social Security 
Act, designed to last generations, or packing the judiciary and revising the federal Constitution through 
judicial review. Given the difficulty of revising the Constitution, it is unlikely a surviving but waning 
coalition (3a), falling short of a realignment coalition’s supermajority, could realign the Constitution.  
139
 National constitutional realignment destabilizes national politics generally. Constitutions undergird 
ordinary politics, statutory legislation, enforcement of laws, civic culture, and political legitimacy, so 
constitutional instability affects citizens’ very beliefs and safety. National realignment also affects the 
states, as the federal Supremacy Clause, congressional enabling acts, and judicial review force lagging 
states to match these federal reforms. Deference to the states initially quiets national conflict but may 
eventually backfire, provoking national conflict. Similarly, Graber shows legislative deference to the 
judiciary works in the short run but may eventually backfire. Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty,” 
65–68. 
140
 As stated, Americans have proposed only a single federal constitution with only twenty-seven 
amendments, but have proposed at least 354 state constitutions, ratified 146, proposed at least 9,500 state 
constitutional amendments, and ratified at least 5,900. 
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Figure 2: The Courts and States in National Constitutional Reform 
 
In ignoring the states, scholars sometimes attribute outcomes to the judiciary which may 
actually be caused by state constitutional revision. The many accounts of judicial review 
that ignore the states cannot explain all that they claim to explain. That is, most accounts 
of national judicial and constitutional development are fundamentally flawed. 
 For example, Robert Dahl, Mark Graber, and Keith Whittington assert judges 
usually preserve existing readings of the Constitution, while William Lasser and David 
Adamany disagree.
 141
 Both camps miss that national actors defer controversies to the 
states. If judges are the impartial, apolitical arbiters they claim to be, then judges too may 
defer some political questions to political bodies like state legislatures and 
conventions.
142
 If judges are instead partial and political, then they likely strategically 
devolve some issues to the states to avoid inter-branch confrontation.
143
 Judges can defer 
political questions to the states by refusing to grant a writ of certiorari to hear a case. 
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Studying only cases that go before the courts, courts scholars systematically miss the 
many cases the courts refuse and quietly defer to the states. Selecting issues over which 
the courts have power, these studies may consistently exclude cases of federal deference 
to the states, missing an important part of judges’ reasoning and of national constitutional 
development. 
 When we integrate the states, many cases of national constitutional action or 
inaction attributed to the courts could instead or additionally be explained by state 
revision.
144
 Courts scholars are correct that judicial review can prompt national 
constitutional stability or instability. But they often miss that deference by Congress, the 
president, and the courts to the states spurs state constitutional and statutory revision.
145
 
American state legislatures, voters, and conventions have amendment power the courts 
lack. These amendments are written with political aims, have plenary legal power, 
structure executives and legislatures to enforce these policy aims, and can constrain state 
judiciaries.
146
 Relatedly, federal deference to the state constitutions likely explains the 
lively positive rights tradition observed by Brennan, Hershkoff, and Zackin.
147
 Further, 
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“Introduction: Sub-National Constitutionalism and Constitutional Development,” 17–18. Yet constitutional 
deference to the states reflects national coalitions’ political tactics and intentions, as much as these legal 
incentives. 
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the courts, lacking the power of the purse and the sword, can rarely force unilateral policy 
change.
148
 The states, not the courts, may drive national constitutional change or stability. 
Put differently, national constitutionalism is often stable after judicial review, but not 
solely because of judicial review. The judiciary’s effect on national constitutional 
development is significantly conditioned on the states. 
 Describing popular constitutionalism without the states would be equally 
misguided. According to Bruce Ackerman, citizens assemble and elect representatives to 
revise the federal Constitution, while Larry Kramer emphasizes how popular mobs block 
the implementation of federal constitutional provisions.
149
 Scholars like Elizabeth 
Beaumont, Douglas Reed, and Jason Frank study informal practices and moments of 
constituent power, catching popular constitutionalism at both national and local levels.
150
 
This dissertation builds on these accounts, explaining the interaction of state and national 
popular constitutionalism. 
 The model has three implications for American constitutional and political 
development. First, as stated, the judiciary’s effect on constitutional stability is 
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significantly conditioned on the states. Relatedly, the federal and state judiciaries are 
perhaps less influential than they seem, undermining the literature damning unelected 
judges for impeding popular majorities.
151
 
 Second, the federal branches sometimes defer to the states to postpone or prevent 
inter-branch conflict.
152
 Studying only the federal branches risks missing how state 
constitutional revision quietly mediates and directs federal inter-branch conflict, and 
national constitutional development generally. Further, describing only the unbending 
federal Constitution, some scholars of American political development place political 
agency in actors and coalitions’ behavior, and little in constitutional law.
153
 This 
dissertation suggests the inverse. The national constitution’s inflexibility, particularly to 
citizenship reform, strains national coalitions and constrains presidential leadership, 
while the state constitutions’ flexibility invites political reform. Constitutional law and 
structures have some agency in determining the timing and nature of inter-branch conflict 
and political realignment. 
 As a corollary, the states retain a role in interpreting the national constitution. The 
federal framers wrote an “incomplete text” that intentionally deferred many controversies 
over citizenship, the franchise, slavery, and other issues to the states.
154
 Consequently 
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through the Tenth Amendment the states elaborate non-enumerated provisions of the 
Constitution and through Article V they amend enumerated provisions. Antebellum states 
even nullified and interposed provisions of the national constitution. The states’ role is 
also political, arming national coalitions with solutions to federal constitutional 
controversies. Whittington for example describes the historical contest between 
departmentalist and judicial modes of interpretation, but largely misses this third mode of 
state interpretation, which mediates and directs the interaction of the other two. 
 Finally, states mediate national realignments. V.O. Key’s midcentury studies 
claimed the states lagged behind federal reforms, especially in the South, and especially 
on race.
155
 Subsequent scholars ignored the states, tracing national realignments to 
national institutions like the presidency,
156
 national parties,
157
 or to national ideologies 
like liberalism.
158
 No current model integrates the states.
159
 This project suggests some 
states precede and incite federal coalition and policy realignment, while other states 
follow. Conservative state coalitions can constitutionally entrench the local status quo, 
postponing the state realignments that spark national change. Even after national coalition 
and policy realignments, these states can block policy implementation.
160
  
Realignment theorists like Burnham, Sundquist, and Huntington posit realignments are 
periodic, but as Mayhew notes, they struggle to explain why, relying “on suggestions and 
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metaphors rather than on sustained argument.”
161
 One metaphor describes “pressure 
buildup” against old, inflexible institutions, as popular majorities revise political systems 
based on the “dead issues of the past.”
162
 Constitutions explain the periodicity of 
realignments. Article V frustrates all but the most committed movements, which 
gradually build at the state level until they clear this national threshold, scoring national 
constitutional and policy realignment.
163
 The following chapter explains these trends in 
more detail. 
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CHAPTER 3: TRENDS IN FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 
 
“[T]he State constitutions furnish invaluable materials for history. Their interest is all the 
greater because the succession of constitutions and amendments to constitutions from 
1776 till to-day enables the annals of legislation and political sentiment to be read in 
these documents more easily and succinctly than in any similar series of laws in any other 
country. They are a mine of instruction for the natural history of democratic 
communities.” 
Lord Bryce, 1888
164
 
 
 
 Previous chapters proposed that the state and national constitutions develop in 
tandem. The first section of this chapter explains how to observe proposals for federal 
and state constitutional reform. The second section applies this method to demonstrate a 
positive and statistically significant association between attempts at federal and state 
constitutional reform. The third section disaggregates federal revision by issue area and 
state revision by revision procedure, era, and region. This gives an overview of American 
constitutional federalism, tentative evidence for the dissertation’s theory, and a guide to 
subsequent chapters. 
I. Observing Constitutional Change 
 
 This dissertation argues that broad demographic, economic, and technological 
changes spur groups to organize and contest for constitutional reform. National political 
actors may defer these controversies to the states, or clever reformers may circumvent 
national venues and seek state and local legal reform. State constitutional revision often 
resolves these national controversies, averting national constitutional reform. Table 2 lists 
the steps in this process and the means used to observe each step. 
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 1. National 2. State 3. National 
Concept 1a.  
Change in 
population, 
technology, 
economics 
1b. 
Constitutional 
contention 
1c. 
Deference 
to states 
2a. 
Constitutional 
contention 
2b.  
Constitutional 
revision 
3a.  
Coalition 
(in)stability 
3b.  
Constitutional 
(in)stability 
Measure Demographic, 
census 
measures, 
etc. 
Congressional 
1) proposals 
for federal 
constitutional 
amendments 
2) records 
Records of 
federal 
branches 
Legislative 1) 
proposals for 
constitutional 
amendments, 
replacements, 
2) turnover 
1) Ratified 
constitutional 
amendments, 
replacements,  
2) statutes, 
court cases 
Congressional 
1) proposals 
for national 
constitutional 
amendments, 
2) turnover 
1) Ratified 
constitutional 
amendments, 
2) landmark 
judicial 
decisions 
Table 2: Observing National and State Constitutional Contention and Change. 
 
 To observe broad demographic, economic, and technological change (1a), this 
dissertation uses secondary sources on American political history and development. To 
observe agitation for federal constitutional reform (1b), this dissertation studies all federal 
amendments proposed in Congress. Why Congress? Under Article V, all proposed 
revisions to the federal Constitution must be submitted to Congress, either by members of 
Congress or by the states. As Michael Kammen noted, knowledge of these proposals, “of 
their stimuli, and of the controversies they generated, is woefully limited.”
165
 In 
aggregating primary and secondary sources on the proposed federal amendments, this 
dissertation fills that gap. Two sources together list nearly all proposed federal 
amendments.
166
  In 2015, John R. Vile compiled an encyclopedia listing by year the 
number of proposed amendments and most common amendment topics.
167
 A 2016 
dataset by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) lists proposed 
amendments by date, sponsor, congressional committee and chamber, and resolution 
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number.
168
 The NARA data covers more years than Vile’s, with more information on 
each year, including descriptions of each proposal in each year. The Vile data strongly 
confirm the accuracy of the NARA data.
169
 For only eight of the years 225 observed in 
both the NARA and Vile data, the NARA data differ significantly from the Vile data.
170
 
For these eight years, when possible the dissertation uses the original congressional 
record to correct inaccuracies in the NARA data, and subsequently relies on the corrected 
NARA data.
171
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and 2009. For 1861, Vile lists 121 proposals, Ames’ congressional record, 122, and the original NARA 
data, 167; however, since these additional NARA observations are confirmed by additional information, the 
dissertation does not delete them, and keeps the uncorrected 167. For 1945, Vile lists 116 observations, the 
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 But the number of proposals per year alone cannot indicate significant 
constitutional revision. A single amendment can change a constitution’s identity, 
effectively creating a new constitution, even if the old one legally endures.
172
 Conversely, 
a slew of amendments may be insignificant.
173 
Put differently, a constitution’s identity 
exists through its normative commitments.
174
 Significant constitutional change – a 
change in constitutional identity – occurs only when these provisions are revised. 
 Normative provisions give America’s federal Constitution its identity.
175
 This 
poses five challenges for observing significant constitutional change. First, not all textual 
provisions are normative commitments that define constitutional identity, so some 
amendments are only minor revisions, like the Twentieth Amendment, setting January 
20
th
 as Inauguration Day. A comprehensive survey of all proposed or ratified 
amendments will be skewed by the mass of insignificant proposals. Some individual 
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Hale explained: 
“particular variations and accessions have happened in the laws, yet they being only partial, and successive, 
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175
 For Hale and the old English common lawyers, all amendments originated from the English people and 
their customs and principles, and so most amendments maintained the English Constitution’s identity. But 
this coherence is difficult in a modern heterogeneous country with different principles across groups and 
eras. In a modern, pluralistic country, values change, and when this change periodically extends to revising 
core constitutional values – as it should in a democracy – the identity of the constitution changes. Thus, an 
amendment might follow the legal procedure for revising the constitution, but might violate core normative 
commitments, fundamentally changing the constitution. Kramer, The People Themselves, 9–18. 
52 
 
proposals have been submitted repeatedly, inflating proposal rates; for example, there 
have been over a thousand proposals for an equal rights amendment.
176
 The political 
scientist William S. Livingston rightly observed that a simple count of proposed 
amendments 
“is of little significance. Many of the proposals were identical, or at least were 
concerned with the same questions; many were trivial; many were ridiculous; and 
many were unnecessary. But the most significant explanation of the large number 
of proposals is the unlimited right of American Congressmen to introduce as 
many resolutions as they like.” 
 
Since congressmen often pander to their narrow base by proposing amendments, many 
proposals “command no public support whatsoever” with the broader nation.
177
 A simple, 
aggregate count of amendment proposals alone cannot indicate national pressure for 
constitutional reform. 
 One might answer this issue by identifying the federal Constitution’s core, 
nationally-shared commitments, giving more weight to, say, Bill of Rights provisions, 
and to proposed or ratified amendments to these provisions. But, second, the 
constitution’s commitments are themselves a subject of dispute and thus are unclear.
178
 
Relatedly, third, commitments are contested, such that a single clause can have 
contradictory meanings.
179
 Fourth, given America’s common law tradition, constitutional 
commitments exist in in diverse places, in the formal constitutional text but also in 
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179
 Antebellum Americans read the Due Process clause to protect slaves’ liberty and slaveholders’ right to 
property in slaves, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause to allow free blacks to travel the South and 
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statutes,
180
 as well as legal and informal practices.
181
 Finally, commitments do not inhere 
in single clauses, but shade into each other. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. stated 
“great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and 
white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading 
gradually from one extreme to the other.”
182
 In sum, simple revision counts cannot affirm 
or refute this dissertation’s theory, which aims to observe not only aggregate change, but 
also normatively and politically significant change. 
 Normative commitments exist in constitutions, statutes, precedents, and practices, 
so to identify major constitutional changes one must also look to all these sources.
183
 
Therefore this dissertation uses the NARA data to find proposals, after which it uses case 
studies to trace these through the congressional record and secondary literature to assess 
their importance.
184
 It supplements this with judicial records, executive speeches, and the 
writings of constitutional framers, as well as the broader public, which claimed and 
reinterpreted the written constitution. Similarly, to observe the national branches’ 
deference to the states (1c), the dissertation looks to the congressional record, as well as 
to judicial decisions and presidential speeches, letters, and decrees. 
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 State constitutional amendment and replacement is largely the legal prerogative of 
the state legislatures.
185
 Hence, contention for state constitutional revision within a state 
(2a) should be concentrated in the legislature.
186
 Political contention within a state can be 
observed as the change in a party’s share of the legislature, as recorded by Michael 
Dubin.
187
 To identify cases of contention specifically over constitutional issues, this 
dissertation observes the number and nature of proposals for new state constitutions.
188
 
The dissertation assembles a dataset of state constitutional proposals, merging five 
incomplete lists of proposals for new state constitutions,
189
 checking each against the 
others.
190
 To catch any observations not included in these five lists, and to verify and 
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expand information on each observation, this dissertation surveys and codes every 
reference to a state constitutional proposal in every volume of the Oxford Commentaries 
on the State Constitutions of the United States, a series on the constitutional history every 
state.
191
 To resolve any remaining ambiguities, the dissertation refers to The 
Constitutionalism of the American States, an edited volume on the constitutional history 
of every state, and also refers to additional secondary sources, and to primary source 
documents, including convention and legislative minutes, newspaper articles, and private 
correspondence, sometimes obtained through archival research. Given this, the 
dissertation should include nearly all proposed and ratified American state 
constitutions.
192
 Studying failed proposals avoids selection bias toward successful 
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Press as the Reference Guides to the State Constitutions of the United States. 
192
 The dataset includes state assemblies which the authority to propose an entirely new constitution. Thus 
it excludes five kinds of proposals for new state constitutions. First are the constitutions of overseas federal 
territories and the District of Columbia’s 1982 and 2016 constitutional conventions and constitutions for 
the state of New Columbia. See May, “Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited,” 157. Second 
are the few state constitutions drafted under a sovereign foreign government, including the 1812 East 
Florida Constitution drafted under Spanish control. Third are the periodic state-sponsored votes on whether 
to call a constitutional convention, as these votes consider whether to propose a constitution, but 
themselves are not proposals for a new constitution. Fourth are the 41 “limited” conventions, commissions, 
and committees assembled exclusively and explicitly to amend but not replace a constitution, to collect 
information, and/or to prepare for a constitutional convention without proposing a draft constitution. To 
identify these cases, the dissertation refers to a list of limited commissions and conventions compiled by 
Albert Sturm. See Sturm, Thirty Years of State Constitution-Making, 1938-1968, 35–36, 65–66, 110, 113, 
132–55. All but four of these assembled between 1944 and 1973. For a list of these 41 excluded proposals, 
see Error! Reference source not found. in the appendix. Last are the few private constitutional assemblies 
ormed without legal authority, as sanctioned by the state legislature, and/or without local territorial control. 
To identify or exclude these observations, this dissertation uses the Reference Guides to the State 
Constitutions of the United States. 
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constitutional proposals.
193
 To the author’s knowledge, this is the most complete list of 
proposed American state constitutions.
194
 A list of all 354 proposals is included in the 
appendix. 
 This dissertation observes state constitutional revision (2b) as the number of 
constitutions ratified and enforced within a state. Not all proposals result in the 
ratification of an entirely new document, as some proposals are split into amendments 
and only partially ratified, and even fully ratified proposals may not be the sole 
constitution enforced in a state.
195
 When coding proposals for a new constitution, this 
dissertation considers a proposal successfully passed only if it is completely ratified and 
effectively enforced as a state’s sole constitution. The dissertation also observes all state 
constitutional amendments proposed and ratified since 1776.
196
 
 But as stated, a simple count of attempted and successful constitutional 
replacements or amendments cannot reveal which revisions matter. Some states propose 
many constitutions but ratify few,
197
 and even states that regularly replace their 
                                                 
193
 For example, between 1912 and 1945, only Louisiana ratified a new constitution. But in these years the 
states held over a dozen conventions, including Ohio’s nationally-significant 1912 Convention, which 
bolstered Theodore Roosevelt’s presidential bid, rallying progressives. Dinan, The American State 
Constitutional Tradition, 16. 
194
 Dinan’s thorough survey of constitutional conventions, likely the most comprehensive published list of 
state constitutional proposals, counts 233 conventions. This dissertation includes Dinan’s observations, but 
also several conventions he does not include, as well as commissions and committees, for 354 total 
observations. See Dinan, The American State Constitutional Tradition. 
195
 Rhode Island had two opposed constitutional conventions and two subsequent governments in 1841, as 
did Kansas after 1855, as did Civil War border states like Virginia. And some territorial and frontier 
constitutions, though establishing the territory’s sole, legitimate government, went largely unenforced. 
Delegates to an 1859 convention in Denver met for a single day at the Apollo Hall tavern to draft a 
constitution for the Jefferson Territory, Colorado’s extralegal predecessor. Voters approved the 
constitution, but the Jefferson legislature local faced resistance from miners committees around Denver and 
Pikes Peak. See Dale A. Oesterle and Richard B. Collins, The Colorado State Constitution: A Reference 
Guide (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 2–6. 
196
 The dissertation uses the Wallis data for ratified state amendments and the Rise of Modern 
Constitutionalism data for proposed but unratified amendments. Dippel, “The Rise of Modern 
Constitutionalism, 1776 - 1849”; John Wallis, “The NBER - Maryland State Constitutions Project,” 2006, 
www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu. 
197
 New Hampshire has held seventeen conventions, but kept its 1784 Constitution. 
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constitutions might only rarely change their core normative constitutional commitments. 
Framers can revise or add many provisions without changing meaning, either as empty 
elite concessions to riled citizens, or from inexperience or lack of imagination in drafting, 
or from inability to find alternatives to old, successful, path dependent, or sticky 
constitutional rules. 
 State framers and judges have long affirmed that state constitutional identity 
inheres in core normative provisions.
198
 The New Jersey Supreme Court declared “Not all 
constitutional provisions are of equal majesty… The task of interpreting most if not all of 
[the New Jersey Constitution’s] ‘great ordinances’ is an evolving and on-going 
process.”
199
 State constitutional commitments are drafted, revised, and interpreted by 
state convention delegates, special commissions, judges, legislators, governors, voters 
casting ballots in referenda and initiatives, and by extralegal mobs, meetings, and 
committees. The methods vary by era,
200
 so the significance of the same reform can vary 
by era. Identifying significant state constitutional change requires studying the complex 
                                                 
198
 In 1780 Massachusetts’ framers forbade legislators from making laws that were “repugnant or contrary 
to this constitution,” suggesting that some core provisions of the Constitution ought to be impervious to 
legislative amendment. See the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Frame of Government, Chapter I, 
Section I, Article IV. For a similar provision, see the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, Form of 
Government, Section 2. 
199
 See Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 370 A.2d 825 (1977) and Robert Forrest Williams, The New Jersey 
State Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 42. See also the North Carolina Supreme 
Court in Corum v. University of N.C., 413 S.E.2d 276, 289 (N.C. 1992). However, in Omaha National 
Bank v. Spire 223 Neb. 209, 389 N.W. 2d 269 (1986), the Supreme Court of Nebraska considered whether 
an amendment to the Nebraska Constitution violated a core principle of the state’s Constitution, and hence 
whether the amendment was unconstitutional. The Court implied the Nebraska Constitution had no core 
provisions, that all provisions of the Nebraska Constitution were equally important in adjudicating a case, 
and accordingly the amendment was valid. While all provisions may be equally important in adjudicating a 
constitution, they are not equally important in identifying a state constitution. If the Nebraska Constitution 
were revised to include a bicameral legislature for the first time in nearly a century, it would become a 
fundamentally different document. For a general comment on state constitutional identity, see James Gray 
Pope, “An Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation,” Rutgers Law Journal 24 (1993 1992): 985; 
Robert A. Schapiro, “Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law,” Virginia Law Review 84, no. 
3 (April 1, 1998): 389–457, doi:10.2307/1073668. 
200
 Major nineteenth century revisions came through conventions, while modern reformers use Progressive 
reforms like referenda 
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interactions of all of these bodies over time. This dissertation follows this ongoing 
process through records kept by state constitutional convention delegates, legislators, 
judges, governors, and newspapers, backed by secondary sources and some archival 
research.  
 Finally, observing stability in national constitutional politics (3a) and the federal 
Constitution (3b) is possible, but difficult. One might observe constitutional stability as 
the proportion of federal amendment proposals ratified, with fewer ratifications 
indicating relative stability in a given era. But only 0.002% or twenty-seven of the 11,797 
proposed amendments have cleared Article V and been ratified, so this proportion is so 
low as to be meaningless. Rather, this dissertation observes the significance of ratified 
amendments as they are interpreted in congressional and federal court records. 
II. Comparing National and State Constitutional Change since 1787 
 
 As stated in the previous chapter, there are at least two ways that state 
constitutional reform can preclude federal reform. In cases of preemptive resolution, 
states can seize and address a national constitutional issue, preventing the federal 
branches from intervening in this area. Alternately, in cases of joint resolution, the 
federal and state governments together address the same constitutional issue, while the 
states alone revise their constitutions. 
 This section examines the joint resolution claim. This claim has two testable 
propositions. First, attempts at federal constitutional revision, measured as the number of 
proposed federal constitutional amendments, should be positively associated with 
attempts at state constitutional revision, measured as the number of proposed state 
constitutions and state amendments. Second, a high proportion of these state 
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constitutional proposals should be ratified, while few federal amendments proposals 
should be ratified. 
 As expected, the aggregate numbers of federal and state proposals are closely 
associated. To further examine this association, this dissertation regresses separately four 
measures of attempted state constitutional reform – the total number of proposed state 
constitutions, of partly or fully unratified state constitutions, of fully ratified state 
constitutions, and of ratified state constitutional amendments – as independent variables 
on the number of attempted federal amendments as a dependent variable.
201
 The data was 
sorted into one-year bins and five-year bins,
202
 yielding the following eight bivariate 
linear regressions. 
                                                 
201
 Since this section only claims there is a positive and significant association between two variables, the 
dissertation uses a simple bivariate linear regression to test this association. This is not a causal prediction, 
so the regression does not include control variables. Subsequent case studies trace this causal process. 
Pearson correlation tests also affirm the regression results, revealing a moderate to strong positive 
correlation between federal amendment proposals and total proposed state constitutions (0.43), unratified 
state constitutions (0.64), and ratified state amendments (0.76), for five year bins. See Table 18 in the 
appendix. 
202
 There are several arguments against using one-year bins alone. Members of Congress propose more 
federal constitutional amendments in the first year than the second year of a given Congress, inflating 
variation between individual years. See Figure 9 in the appendix demonstrating this. Similarly, many state 
legislative sessions last more than a year. Finally, proposal and ratification of a federal amendment or state 
constitution takes several years, and so we should expect a lag between the variables. The dissertation 
compensates for these issues by smoothing the data by sorting it into five-year bins. 
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State 1: Fed. 
Pro. 1yr 
2: Fed. 
Pro. 1yr 
3: Fed. 
Pro. 1yr 
4: Fed. 
Pro. 1yr 
5: Fed. 
Pro. 5yr 
6: Fed. 
Pro. 5yr 
7: Fed. 
Pro. 5yr 
8: Fed. 
Pro. 5yr 
Total Const. 
Proposals 
12.13*    18.65*    
(2.704)    (5.792)    
Unratified 
Const. 
Proposals 
 27.19*    39.07*   
 (3.654)    (6.926)   
Ratified Const. 
Proposals 
  -2.921    -4.639  
  (5.093)    (11.91)  
Ratified 
Amendments 
   0.577*    0.0005 
   (0.108)    (0.0004) 
Constant 34.20* 27.46* 53.67* 30.613* 105.2 74.68 250.8* 0.280 
 (6.635) (5.967) (6.246) (7.699) (57.69) (45.10) (56.61) (0.145) 
Observations 228 228 228 196 50 50 50 42 
Table 3: Association between Federal Amendment Proposals and State Constitutional Proposals, 1791-
2014. 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.01 
 
 There is not a statistically significant relationship between the number of federal 
proposals and ratified state constitutions, shown in columns 3 and 7. However, columns 
1-2 and 4-6 show that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship for the 
total number of state constitutions proposed, for the number of partly or fully unratified 
state constitutions, and for the number of ratified state amendments.
203
 That is, it is highly 
unlikely that there is no association between these measures of federal and state 
constitutional reform. This supports the prediction of a positive, significant association 
between attempted federal and state constitutional reform. 
 Figure 3 demonstrates this association over time, focusing on the number of 
proposed federal amendments and proposed state constitutions. This shows that federal 
and state proposals are positively associated, increasing together after the 1787 
Constitutional Convention, during and after the Civil War, and through the civil rights 
movement of the 1960s. These three moments were the high points for attempted state 
                                                 
203
 The theory makes an assertion about the statistical significance and direction of the association between 
state and federal proposals, and as such, the magnitude of the coefficients for each regression is less 
important. Note also there is not a statistically significant relationship between federal and state 
amendments (column 8). 
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constitutional revision.
204
 Relatedly, after some national partisan realignments,
205
 state 
constitutional replacement jumps.
206
 
 
Figure 3: Proposed Federal Amendments and State Constitutions by Five-Year Bins, 1791-2014. 
 
 Figure 4 shows the rolling correlation between the number of federal and state 
proposals for 1787 to 1995.
207
 The correlation between the number of state and federal 
proposals shows distinct and sustained plateaus around the Civil War and the civil rights 
                                                 
204
 For some five-year intervals, the number of proposed state constitutions exceeds the overall mean for 
five-year intervals (7.08), and several sequential intervals exceed the mean by at least a standard deviation 
(6.83). These sequential intervals occur during the founding, Civil War, and civil rights movement. For 
example, between the Civil War’s start in 1861 and Reconstruction’s end in 1877, the states proposed 74 
constitutions, almost a fifth of the total proposed in American history, with fifteen in 1861 alone. Equally 
important is the number of proposals weighted by the number of existing states. For example, between 
1787 and 1791, the fourteen states proposed six constitutions, while between 1912 and 1916, also a five-
year span, the United States saw also six proposals, but these were diluted across forty-eight states. This 
pattern of periodic peaks holds, even when weighted by the increasing number of states over the course of 
American history, suggesting that national expansion does not drive this pattern in state constitutional 
revision. See the appendix for time series plots and tables showing periods of increased state constitutional 
revision. 
205
 Scholars like V.O. Key and Walter Dean Burnham suggest that parties periodically splinter over divisive 
issues and reorganize as new parties, culminating in a critical election. See Key, “A Theory of Critical 
Elections”; Burnham, Critical Elections; William N. Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham, eds., American 
Party Systems: Stages of Political Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); Sundquist, 
Dynamics of the Party System. For a critique of this field, see Key, “Secular Realignment and the Party 
System”; Carmines and Stimson, Issue Evolution; Mayhew, Electoral Realignments. 
206
 During the Revolution, Civil War, and civil rights movement state revision exceeded expected levels. 
These three realignments took 49 years total, only a fifth of American constitutional history. Yet nearly half 
of all state constitutions were proposed and ratified in these three moments. A quarter of American state 
constitutions were proposed or ratified during the Civil War crisis alone. 
207
 Correlation is measured by rolling twenty-year intervals, sorted by start year. Each twenty-year span has 
relatively few observations. As such, this is only an approximate measure of association. 
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movement.
208
 During these two periods, attempts at federal and state revision 
simultaneously spiked, explaining the increased association. Correlation also increased 
during the 1980s and 1990s, as the number of federal and state proposals declined 
together.
209
 Similarly, the number of federal amendments is associated over time with the 
number of unratified and ratified state constitutions, and with ratified state amendments, 
as shown by Figure 10 and Figure 11 in the appendix. 
 
Figure 4: Correlation between Proposed Federal Amendment Proposals and State Constitutions by Rolling 
Twenty-Year Intervals, 1787-1995. 
 
 As mentioned, of the 11,797 proposed federal amendments, only twenty-seven 
(0.002%) have been ratified. But the states have passed 146 of the 354 proposed state 
constitutions (41%). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the number of state constitutions proposed is 
closely positively associated with the number of state constitutions ratified, with a 
gradual decline after the progressive era when states introduced unelected expert 
constitutional commissions that could propose but not ratify new documents.
210
 
                                                 
208
 Jacob Cohen defines weak correlations between social science variables as those around 0.1, moderate 
around 0.3, and strong around 0.5 Jacob Cohen, Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences 
(Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1988), 79–81. 
209
 They also diverge periodically, though for shorter periods. This occurred in the 1890s when Congress 
incorporated many Western states with new constitutions, but proposed relatively few federal amendments, 
and during the Great Depression and after the civil rights movement, the two nadirs of state constitutional 
revision. 
210
 Correlation between the number of proposed and ratified state constitutions is high (0.76), and tracks 
very closely both before Reconstruction (0.90 for 1776 to 1876) and after (0.62 for 1876 to 2016). The 
proportion of constitutions ratified decreases during the 1960s with the widespread adoption of 
commissions. After the 1990s the proportion flat-lines, as states recently have neither proposed nor ratified 
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 In sum, the number of federal amendment proposals is positively and significantly 
associated with the number of proposed state constitutions, unratified state constitutions, 
and state constitutional amendments. That is, when Congress proposes more federal 
amendments, the states often propose more state constitutions and amendments. Many of 
these state proposals pass, while very few federal amendment proposals do. This 
tentatively supports the dissertation’s claim of joint resolution, in which the states and 
Congress together propose constitutional reform, and that usually the states alone achieve 
reform.  
 There are a few shortcomings of this test. This does not confirm or deny the claim 
of preemptive resolution in which the states quiet calls for federal amendment. This is 
best observed through case-by-case process tracing. Additionally, during the founding, 
Civil War, and civil rights periods, the states did not avert federal amendment,
211
 but 
rather addressed and helped resolve the same controversies facing the national 
government. For example, between 1788 and 1800, most proposals for federal 
amendments and for state constitutions addressed rights provisions and the structure of 
government.
212
 Between 1860 and 1870, most federal proposals concerned slavery and 
suffrage,
213
 as did many proposed state constitutions, especially in the South.
214
 And 
                                                                                                                                                 
new constitutions. See Figure 10 in the appendix for the number of state constitutions proposed and 
ratified. 
211
 Multiple federal amendments were ratified during the Founding (10), Civil War (3), and civil rights era 
(4). 
212
 See Edward Dumbauld, “State Precedents for the Bill of Rights,” Journal of Public Law 7 (1958): 323; 
Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787; Lutz, Popular Consent and Popular Control; 
Donald S. Lutz, “The State Constitutional Pedigree of the U.S. Bill of Rights,” Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism 22, no. 2 (March 20, 1992): 19–45; Kruman, Between Authority and Liberty; Adams, The First 
American Constitutions; John R. Vile, Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments, Proposed 
Amendments, and Amending Issues, 1789-2002, Second (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003), 540–41. 
213
 Vile, Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments, Proposed Amendments, and Amending Issues, 1789-
2002, 544–45. 
214
 Ralph A. Wooster, The Secession Conventions of the South (Princeton University Press, 1962); Michael 
Perman, The Road to Redemption: Southern Politics, 1869-1879 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
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between 1960 and 1970, many proposed federal amendments and state constitutions 
addressed electoral district apportionment, voting rights, and equal rights provisions.
215
 
Even when the states do not avert federal reform, they can aid in resolving national 
constitutional crises. Finally, note that this association supports the dissertation’s causal 
story, but alone cannot affirm it. And as explained, these proposal measures alone cannot 
identify significant state or federal constitutional change, and can only offer provisional 
evidence for the dissertation’s theory. This requires case studies, elaborated in the 
following chapters. 
 So far this section has compared the number of proposals for state constitutions 
and federal amendments. How do state proposal rates relate to congressional or Supreme 
Court politics? This dissertation suggests that Congress and the Supreme Court often 
defer national constitutional controversies to the states. When congressional interparty 
polarization is high, we might expect members of Congress will be unable to compromise 
to resolve national controversies, and will instead defer conflict to the states. Polarization 
should be positively associated with attempts at state revision. The evidence for this is 
limited. The correlation between interparty polarization and the number of state 
constitutional proposals, though moderate, is negative for the House (-0.37), and weaker 
for the Senate (-0.21).
216
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Carolina, 1984); Richard M. Valelly, The Two Reconstructions: The Struggle for Black Enfranchisement 
(University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
215
 Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 153–57; Vile, Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments, 
Proposed Amendments, and Amending Issues, 1789-2002, 552–53. 
216
 Polarization for each chamber is measured as the interparty difference in means on the first dimension of 
Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE scores. For these correlations, state proposal data is sorted into 
two-year bins to match the two-year length of each meeting of Congress, as observed in Poole and 
Rosenthal’s data. Data is for 1879 to 2013. See Figure 12 in the appendix for a time series plot comparing 
polarization and state proposals. 
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 We might expect when the Supreme Court is burdened with more cases, it will 
push some of these issues on the states, such that caseload and attempts at state 
replacement should be correlated. Evidence suggests this is not so. The correlation 
between the Supreme Court caseload and the total number of state proposals is weak 
(0.08).
217
 This disjunction is particularly pronounced in the late twentieth century. When 
Earl Warren became Chief Justice in 1953, the Court docket caseload was 1,463 cases. 
When he retired in 1969, it was 4,202. In 2013, it was 8,580.
218
 Since the end of the 
Warren Court, the states have proposed only twenty-one new constitutions and ratified 
eight, a relative decline, and have instead favored piecemeal amendment.
219
 This is not to 
suggest that the modern Supreme Court has displaced the states as the main site for 
resolving national constitutional disputes. Rather, piecemeal state amendments and state 
court decisions act as a parallel track to the federal judiciary for resolving national 
disputes. Sometimes the states move prior to the federal courts, cuing the federal courts’ 
rulings. Again, recall that in legalizing same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges 
(2015),
220
 the Supreme Court deferred to prior changes in public opinion and state 
constitutional reform. 
III. Trends in Federal and State Revision 
 
 This section concludes this chapter, disaggregating trends in attempted federal 
amendment by topic and then trends in state constitutional revision first by procedure, 
                                                 
217
 Correlation is for 1879-2013. 
218
 The Supreme Court disposes the majority of these cases (7,547 of 8,808 cases in 2013). The majority of 
the remaining cases are in forma pauperis direct appeals to the Supreme Court by prison inmates, to which 
the Supreme Court will not grant cert. 
219
 See Figure 13 in the appendix for a time series plot comparing the Supreme Court caseload and attempts 
at state constitutional replacement. 
220
 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015). 
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then by region, and finally by era, previewing subsequent chapters. Proposals for federal 
amendments cluster around specific issue areas. To code proposed federal amendments 
by issue area, this dissertation derives a list of twenty-four common amendment topics 
from a similar list by John R. Vile,
221
 combined with and checked against a list of the 
most frequent terms appearing across all amendment descriptions in the NARA 
dataset.
222
 Search terms were generated for each topic,
223
 and amendments with 
descriptions including these terms are coded as matching the topic, for up to two topics 
per amendment.
224
 Of the 11,797 proposed amendments, 10,324 (88%) match at least one 
topic.
225
 
 The following time series plots disaggregate proposed amendments by topic. Note 
that some issues like congressional powers are perennial, steady topics for reform, while 
other topics, like prohibition, peak and decline. The latter pattern is particularly common 
for topics in the 1960s and 1970s, as members of Congress proposed federal amendments 
                                                 
221
 Vile’s list catches a few topics, like banking, that appear relatively infrequently in the NARA dataset, 
but are nevertheless important to American constitutional development. In developing his Encyclopedia, 
Vile listed topics with as much “completeness as possible, but with no pretense to absolute accuracy.” Vile, 
Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments, Appendix D. 
222
 The National Archives and Records Administration amendment catalog includes for each proposed 
amendment a brief description taken often exactly from the aforementioned congressional catalogs of 
proposed amendments. For many amendments this official description, though perhaps not the full 
amendment text, may be the best summary available. This dissertation identifies the most common words 
to appear across all descriptions, excluding words like “of” and “the” not related to policy issues, duplicates 
of words like “right” and “rights”, and words appearing less than fifty times across all 11,861 proposals, 
yielding a list of the most common policy-related words. 
223
 See Table 10 in the appendix for a list of topics, search terms, and their frequency. Skimming 
amendment matches for a search term confirms that search terms are narrow enough to usually exclude 
false positive matches for a topic. 
224
 Only two topics are coded per amendment, such that if amendments consistently matched for more than 
two terms, these additional matches could possibly be excluded, resulting in a systematic undercounting of 
amendments matching these additional topics. But because of the brevity of NARA’s amendment 
descriptions, almost no amendments matched for more than two search terms. This dissertation confirmed 
this by comparing the number of amendment descriptions including a given term to the number of 
amendments coded for that same term. For all topics, these were exactly or almost exactly equal, showing 
that this coding method does not systematically exclude any topics it aims to code. 
225
 Further, 4,287 proposals match for two. Of the 1,471 amendment proposals not matching for any topic, 
the dissertation searched for most frequently-occurring words. No word appearing more than fifty times 
had policy significance (i.e. many words were propositions like “of”), suggesting the search does not 
systematically fail to code these remaining amendment proposals. 
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to override Warren and Burger Court decisions on school prayer, state legislative 
apportionment, abortion, and school busing. Note also that fifteen of twenty five topic 
areas including 5,646 amendment matches are coded as topics that are expressly 
concurrent constitutional powers.
226
 That is, about half of proposed federal amendments 
relate to issues that could also be regulated by state constitutional reform. These plots, 
demonstrating the main issues for attempted federal amendment in each era, preview and 
guide the case selection for national constitutional issues and controversies to study in 
subsequent chapters. 
                                                 
226
 Note that this count of fifteen is conservative, as the remaining ten topics could be interpreted to concen 
concurrent powers. Note also that an amendment can match for up to two topics, such that this cunt of 
amendment matches is likely greater than the absolute number of amendments. 
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Figure 5: Proposed Federal Amendments by Topic Area, 1788-2014 
 
 Turning now to attempted state revision, the state constitutions, unlike the federal 
Constitution, allow multiple procedures for constitutional replacement or amendment. All 
American state constitutions have been proposed or ratified by three types of bodies: 
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constitutional commissions, legislatures, and constitutional conventions.
227
 State revision 
rates vary by procedure, as seen in Table 4.
228
 
  Convention Commission Legislature Total  
  Count Pct. Count Pct. Count Pct. Count Pct. 
Ratified 135 92 4 3 7 5 146 100 
 Without popular vote 46 94 0 0 3 6 49 100 
 With popular vote 89 92 4 4 4 4 97 100 
Unratified 115 55 72 35 21 10 208 100 
 Voters reject part, approve part 38 81 9 19 0 0 47 100 
 Voters reject whole 32 82 5 13 2 5 39 100 
 Whole rejected without vote 7 21 20 61 6 18 33 100 
 No data 38 43 38 43 13 15 89 100 
Total 250 71 76 21 28 8 354 100 
Table 4: Methods and Outcomes of American State Constitutional Change, 1776-2017. 
 
 The preferred method of revision has changed over time. During the Revolution 
and founding, temporary mobs, committees of safety and correspondence, and 
insurrectionary provincial congresses called for or reassembled as state constitutional 
conventions.
229
 But during the Jacksonian era, professional parties organized within the 
state legislatures and called overtly partisan legislative committees and conventions to 
draft constitutions. Progressives later tried to replace these with piecemeal amendments 
                                                 
227
 There are three minor caveats to this classification. First, in October 1776, the Connecticut legislature 
passed a statute making the state’s 1662 colonial charter the state constitution. Rhode Island’s legislature 
resolved in May 1776 to declare independence from Great Britain while maintaining its colonial charter. 
See Adams, The First American Constitutions, 64–66. These documents were drafted by a colonial 
government but ratified by an American state legislature, and are exceptions to this tripartite classification. 
Second, Pennsylvania’s 1776 Constitution, replaced in 1790, potentially allowed constitutional replacement 
by a special Council of Censors. Vermont’s 1777 Constitution, modeled on the 1776 Pennsylvania 
Constitution, did the same, as did subsequent Vermont constitutions until the mid-nineteenth century. 
However, in practice, these bodies passed piecemeal revisions rather than wholesale constitutional 
replacements. Finally, in some cases all three kinds of constitution-making bodies (legislatures, 
conventions, and commissions) have had to submit their proposals to the state’s governor, legislature, or 
voters. 
228
 Additionally, older states tend to propose and ratify more constitutions – perhaps unsurprisingly, state 
age correlates closely with the number of constitutions proposed (0.55) and ratified (0.59). State age is 
measured as the number of years in the Union. See the appendix for Figure 18 on state age and rates of 
attempted and successful constitutional revision. Ratified constitutions vary considerably in age. The 
average state constitution lasts 64 years without replacement. But many exceed this. Vermont’s 
Constitution dates to 1793, New Hampshire’s to 1784, and Massachusetts’ – the world’s oldest standing 
written constitution – to 1780. Conversely, South Carolina’s 1776 Constitution survived only two years, 
and the 1778 South Carolina Constitution yielded to five more constitutions. 
229
 Unlike legislatures, which represented parochial, temporary interests, these special conventions could 
claim to represent the common will and could frame constitutions to bind the whole polity. 
70 
 
passed by constitutional initiatives, referenda, and apolitical, appointed expert 
commissions. These unelected commissions, drawn by governors and legislatures, 
studied existing constitutions and sometimes proposed new ones, but lacking popular 
authorization, could not ratify these proposals, deferring the ratification to future 
conventions and legislatures. Legislatures could accept or reject a commission’s 
proposals piecemeal, and consequently almost all commissions resulted in partial 
amendment rather than wholesale constitutional replacement.
230
 When Baker v. Carr 
(1962) called for apolitical reapportionment of legislative districts,
231
 legislators again 
selected commissioners, preferring appointed commissions to conventions of popularly 
elected, autonomous delegates. Accordingly, commissions eclipsed conventions in the 
mid-twentieth century. The rise in commissions, as well as the natural aging of 
constitutions, led to an increase in the number of ratified amendments in the twentieth 
century.
232
 Figure 6 summarizes these trends. 
                                                 
230
 Florida is the sole state that allows a commission to submit a proposed constitution directly to voters. 
The state used this method to pass its 1968 Constitution. Three other ratified constitutions were drafted 
almost entirely by commission. These are Georgia’s 1945 Constitution, Georgia’s 1976 Constitution, which 
essentially reorganized the 1945 Constitution, and Virginia’s 1970 Constitution. Note that some 
“preparatory” commissions can set the organization and agenda for subsequent constitutional conventions. 
Even if these commissions do not directly result in a proposed constitution, they are influential in the state 
constitution-making process. For more on the history and authority of constitutional commissions, see 
Sturm, Thirty Years of State Constitution-Making, 1938-1968, 33–49; Sturm, “The Development of 
American State Constitutions,” 84–86. 
231
 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
232
 See Figure 11 in the appendix for a time series plot of the number of ratified state constitutional 
amendments. 
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Figure 6: Modes of State Constitutional Proposal, 1776-2017. 
 
 Constitutional revision and design also vary regionally.
233
 State framers have 
generally disfavored the federal model, instead referring to compendia of previous state 
constitutions.
234
 Between 1781 and 1894, over seventy editions of state constitutional 
compilations were printed, and these were used in nearly every nineteenth century 
convention.
235
 Most often, framers borrowed from recently-drafted documents and 
neighboring states, so constitutions tend to resemble their neighbors in design and 
duration,
 236
 resulting in five distinct regional constitutional cultures. Each region has a 
distinct tradition of constitutional design and revision.
237
 
                                                 
233
 Nineteen states have had a single constitution, while Louisiana has had eleven. The average number of 
constitutions ratified by each state is three. But not every proposal is successful, and some states have seen 
many more unsuccessful proposals than others. For maps indicating the number of constitutions proposed 
and ratified by each state, see Figure 16 in the appendix. 
234
 Dinan, “Court-Constraining Amendments and the State Constitutional Tradition,” 14–16; Tarr, 
Understanding State Constitutions, 98–99. 
235
 Christian G. Fritz, “The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Preliminary Observations on State 
Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth-Century West,” Rutgers Law Journal 25 (1994): 975–78. 
236
 Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 98–99. 
237
 For yearly rates of state constitutional proposals and ratification in each region, see Figure 15 in the 
appendix. 
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Region Constitutions States 
 Proposals Pct. Ratified Pct.  
New England 56 16 13 9 CT MA ME NH RI VT 
Mid-Atlantic 73 21 33 23 DE IL IN MD NJ NY OH PA WI MI 
South 123 35 72 49 AL AR FL GA KY LA MS NC SC TN TX VA WV 
Great Plains 39 11 17 12 IA KS MN MO ND NE OK SD 
West 63 18 11 8 AK AZ CA CO HI ID MT NM NV OR UT WA WY 
Total 354  146   
Table 5: American States and Rates of Constitutional Proposal and Ratification by Region, 1776-2017. 
 
 New England constitutions, like the federal document, are brief, old, and widely 
venerated. John Adams drafted Massachusetts’ 1780 document, the world’s oldest written 
constitution, which became a model for subsequent New England constitutions.
238
 These 
documents include broad provisions on morality,
239
 due process, and equality.
240
 In 
contrast, early Mid-Atlantic conventions drafted longer documents, like Pennsylvania’s 
1776 and 1790 Constitutions, which avoided morality legislation, allowing cultural 
pluralism and pursuit of private economic ends.
241
 Virginian and Pennsylvanian farmers 
                                                 
238
 The Massachusetts Constitution’s tripartite government inspired delegates to New Hampshire’s 1784 
Convention. See Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 339–43. The Massachusetts 
document, with Connecticut’s 1818 Constitution, inspired Maine framers in 1819. See Marshall J. Tinkle, 
The Maine State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 1–6; Tarr, 
Understanding State Constitutions, 98. The short constitutions of Vermont, Rhode Island, and Connecticut 
too resemble the Massachusetts document. See Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Article III. 
239
 Like many New England states, Massachusetts’ Constitution established a commonwealth with shared 
“piety, religion, and morality,” backed by temperance and lottery legislation. See the 1780 Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, Article III. 
240
 For example, in 1783 Massachusetts’ Supreme Judicial Court used the state due process clause to 
abolish slavery, as did later New England courts and legislatures. Vermont’s 1777 Declaration of Rights, 
Chapter I, Section 1 was the nation’s first state law banning slavery. Massachusetts’ 1783 Jennison case 
abolishing slavery was reported in 1867 as Commonwealth v. Jennison, Rec. I783, fol. 85. See William 
O’Brien, “Did the Jennison Case Outlaw Slavery in Massachusetts?,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 
Third Series, 17, no. 2 (April 1, 1960): 220, doi:10.2307/1943353. Initially lacking constitutional equality 
and due process protections, Connecticut and Rhode Island provided for gradual emancipation by statute in 
1784. Two years later, New Hampshire’s legislature interpreted the state due process clause to ban slavery. 
Maine entered the Union as a free state in 1819. See Arthur Zilversmit, The First Emancipation: The 
Abolition of Slavery in the North (University of Chicago Press, 1967), 105–8, 116–17; David Menschel, 
“Abolition without Deliverance: The Law of Connecticut Slavery 1784-1848,” The Yale Law Journal 111, 
no. 1 (October 1, 2001): 164 n3, doi:10.2307/797518; Gregory Ablavsky, “Making Indians ‘White’: The 
Judicial Abolition of Native Slavery in Revolutionary Virginia and Its Racial Legacy,” University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 159, no. 5 (April 1, 2011): 1501–2. 
241
 Like Pennsylvania’s 1776 and 1790 delegates, many Mid-Atlantic framers brokered compromises 
between Englishmen and Scots-Irish and Germans immigrants, between Protestants and Catholics, and 
between urban and rural settlers, creating longer documents. 
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settled Ohio, comprising seventeen of the thirty-five delegates to the first Ohio 
convention in 1802, drawing heavily on the Pennsylvania 1790 Constitution.
242
 From 
Ohio, Jacksonian frontiersmen spread the Mid-Atlantic model through the Great Lakes 
region to Indiana in 1816, Illinois in 1818, Michigan in 1835, and Wisconsin in 1848.
243
 
 Southern framers drafted distinctively long, quasi-statutory constitutions to 
reconcile white planters and small farmers while systematically excluding blacks. 
Virginia’s 1776 Constitution was the first regional model, and George Nicholas, who 
drafted the document, presided over the 1792 Kentucky Convention.
244
  From Virginia 
and Kentucky the model diffused through the antebellum South.
245
 The Civil War, 
Reconstruction, and Jim Crow yielded a slew of constitutions in the mid-nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.
246
 Of the eighteen states to ratify four or more constitutions, twelve 
are Southern, and Southern states account for half of the states with an average 
                                                 
242
 It also reflected the as well as the 1796 Tennessee Constitution and 1799 Kentucky Constitution. See 
Steven H. Steinglass and Gino J. Scarselli, The Ohio State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Greenwood 
Press, 2004), 2–4, 7–8, 10, 15–16. 
243
 Ohio and Kentucky offered models for delegates to Indiana’s 1816 Convention. Illinois framers, like 
Ohio’s and Indiana’s, drew elements of its 1818 Constitution from the Northwest Ordinance, including 
Article VI, abolishing slavery, though Illinois allowed de facto slavery until 1845. Michigan framers too 
borrowed from the Ordinance, but also New York and Connecticut’s constitutions. Similarly, Wisconsin 
settlers too came from New York and New England. See Paul Finkelman, “Evading the Ordinance: The 
Persistence of Bondage in Indiana and Illinois,” Journal of the Early Republic 9, no. 1 (1989): 21–51, 
doi:10.2307/3123523; Susan P. Fino, The Michigan State Constitution: A Reference Guide, annotated 
edition edition (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 4–8; Jack Stark, The Wisconsin State Constitution: 
A Reference Guide (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997), 4–8; Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the 
Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age of Jefferson (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 58–80. 
244
 Seventy-five of the 107 sections of the Kentucky Constitution of 1792 were derived, sometimes 
verbatim, from the Pennsylvania 1790 Constitution. See Robert F. Ireland, The Kentucky State 
Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1999), 2. 
245
 Delegates to Louisiana’s 1812 Convention merged the French civil code with elements of Kentucky’s 
1799 Constitution. Virginia’s 1776 Constitution was also a model for the 1776 North Carolina Constitution. 
Tennessee, carved from North Carolina’s Appalachian claims, in turn drew on the North Carolina 
document in 1796. And from the Tennessee and Kentucky Constitutions came the Mississippi Constitution 
of 1817, which inspired framers in Alabama in 1819 and Arkansas in 1836. See Lewis L. Laska, The 
Tennessee State Constitution: A Reference Guide (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 2–7; Lee Hargrave, 
The Louisiana State Constitution: A Reference Guide (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 2–3; John W. 
Winkle, The Mississippi State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 2–
5; Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 129. 
246
 Only with the Jim Crow constitutions of the 1880s and 1890s did Southerners find relative constitutional 
stability. See Figure 15 in the appendix for an account of Southern constitutional revision. 
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constitutional duration below the national average.
247
 This regular turnover likely dulled 
Southerners’ sense of constitutional veneration.
248
 
 Great Plains constitutions, framed in the Populist and Progressive eras,
249
 allow 
piecemeal popular initiatives and referenda, which has almost entirely preempted 
wholesale constitutional replacement.
250
 Similarly, Western constitutions have endured 
through partial amendment. California’s 1849 Convention was the first in the West, and a 
model for Oregon in 1857 and Nevada in 1864.
251
 And Wyoming framers in 1889 looked 
to the work of nearby Coloradans, Idahoans, Montanans, and North Dakotans.
252
 Many 
Western and Rocky Mountain state constitutions dealt with the same resource concerns 
over soil aridity, mineral extraction, and water allocation, and with political concerns 
over labor, railroads and corporations, Mormonism, and federal authority.
253
 
 Finally, consider revision in each era in greater detail. At the behest of the 
Continental Congress, the states ratified twelve constitutions between 1776 and 1778. 
Many of these were quickly drafted as expressly temporary instruments to declare 
independence from Great Britain and structure government, legal rights, and national 
                                                 
247
 In twenty-six states, the average constitutional duration was below the national average. Thirteen of 
these states are Southern. 
248
 According to a 2014 survey, of the thirteen Southern states, in ten, the average of respondents’ 
admiration for their constitution was below the national average. Texas, Florida, and West Virginia were 
the exception. See Stephanopoulos and Versteeg, “The Contours of Constitutional Approval,” 21–25. 
249
 All but three of the seventeen constitutions of the states in the Great Plains region were ratified between 
1846 and 1907. Note also Minnesota’s first framers in 1857 drew on the Northwest Ordinance, but the state 
entered the Union with the Great Plains states, and thus is categorized with them, rather than the original 
and older Old Northwest states. See Mary Jane Morrison, The Minnesota State Constitution: A Reference 
Guide (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 3–5. 
250
 Regional constitutional stability is fairly high, with only two states revising their constitutions more than 
once. 
251
 California delegates drew on conventions in Michigan in 1835, New York in 1846, and Iowa. 
Oregonians looked also to conventions in Ohio (1849), Maine, Indiana, and Iowa. Idahoans used 
California’s 1849 and 1878 Constitutions. See David Schuman, “The Creation of the Oregon Constitution,” 
Oregon Law Review 74 (1995): 611; Fritz, “American Constitutional Tradition Revisited,” 975–84. 
252
 They also referred to recent constitutions framed in Pennsylvania and Illinois. Tarr, Understanding State 
Constitutions, 98. 
253
 Gordon Morris Bakken, Rocky Mountain Constitution-Making, 1850-1912 (Greenwood Press, 1987); 
Bridges, “Managing the Periphery in the Gilded Age.” 
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sovereignty during the Revolution.
254
 During the 1790s, many states, including 
Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Georgia, replaced these temporary constitutions, conforming 
to the federal model. The era produced twenty-five constitutions of average duration,
255
 
roughly a sixth of those ratified in American history.  
 The federal Constitution deferred suffrage regulation to the states, so Jeffersonian 
state legislatures and conventions revised their constitutions to extend near-universal 
suffrage to white males. This state-level revision tripled the electorate,
256
 facilitating 
Jackson’s landslide 1828 victory, the collapse of the reigning Democratic-Republicans, 
and the rise of the Democratic and Whig parties. Between 1828 and 1861, states proposed 
sixty-six new constitutions and ratified twenty-eight.
257
 Twenty-one of these were 
Southern or Mid-Atlantic states that were grappling with slavery, postponing the slavery 
crisis and helping preserving the Jacksonian party system. 
 Eventually, state constitutional revision exacerbated sectionalism.
258
 Southern 
states seceded by redrafting their constitutions in 1861. These gave way to new, 
egalitarian Reconstruction state constitutions in 1864 and another set three years later,
259
 
                                                 
254
 In 1776, Pennsylvanians drafted a unicameral system with a weak executive and broad rights and 
participation. Vermont and Georgia imitated this design the following year. At John Adams’ behest, the 
Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1776 drafted a more conservative model, pitting a governor against 
an upper and lower house, as in Britain, and against an independent judiciary. Adams replicated this design 
in Massachusetts in 1780, which became the model for the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, and the 
national Constitution of 1787.  
255
 On average, a constitution framed in this era lasted sixty years. Ten constitutions from the Revolution 
and the founding era lasted less than twenty-five years. All but three of these were the initial, experimental 
state constitutions framed between 1776 and 1778. 
256
 Richard P. McCormick, “New Perspectives on Jacksonian Politics,” The American Historical Review 
65, no. 2 (January 1, 1960): 288–301, doi:10.2307/1842870. 
257
 State constitutions framed in this era were not especially durable, lasting an average of fifty-three years. 
Most constitutions framed in this era lasted less than fifty years, nine lasted twenty-five years or less, while 
only five lasted more than a century. 
258
 Northerners and Westerners passed antislavery state constitutions and elected Republicans, unbalancing 
the House and Electoral College and exacerbating Southern anxieties that a dominant North would abolish 
slavery in the territories or states. 
259
 The twenty-two Reconstruction constitutions were exceptionally inclusive documents, framed by 
majority or plurality black conventions, enfranchising black voters at yet-unseen levels that would not be 
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which quieted debates around the framing and ratification of the federal Reconstruction 
Amendments. As the era ended, Midwestern populists in Nebraska in 1870, Illinois 
in1870, and Missouri in 1875 revised and replaced their constitutions to constrain 
corporations. Midwestern Populist and Western Progressive territories faced strict federal 
oversight in drafting constitutions for admission to the Union, much like their ex-
Confederate counterparts. Though only a quarter century, this period yielded fifty-two 
constitutions, a third of the total ratified in American history.
260
 
 In the 1880s and 1890s, Populist, Progressive, and Western states protected 
economic and positive rights, well before the Progressive federal amendments of 1913-
1920. Southern Redeemers also constitutionalized Jim Crow in this era. Most of these 
Jim Crow constitutions were passed in the late 1880 and early 1890s, as Southern 
Democrats organized locally before sweeping Congress in 1892 and scoring Plessy v. 
Ferguson (1896).
261
 Virginia’s 1902 Constitution, for example, repudiated the biracial 
partisan order built under the state’s 1869 Constitution. 
 This led to a national lull in state constitutional replacement in the interwar years. 
Between 1924 and 1945, only two states replaced their constitutions.
262
 There are three 
reasons for this. First, by 1912 all of the territories within the continental United States 
                                                                                                                                                 
matched for another century. For example, Virginia’s 1869 Reconstruction Constitution, was backed a 
racially inclusive order, including the Readjuster coalition between blacks and poor whites. Conversely, 
many Reconstruction constitutions disenfranchised and alienated local ex-Confederates who caucused with 
Northern moderates to repeal these constitutions and retrench the old constitutional order. The 
Reconstruction constitutions lasted an average of thirty years, and only fourteen years when discounting the 
outlying constitutions of North Carolina (1868), Tennessee (1870), and Arkansas (1874). 
260
 On average, a constitution framed in this era lasted fifty-three years. Twenty-eight of these constitutions 
lasted less than twenty-five years. Of these, eighteen were Southern Reconstruction constitutions. 
261
 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
262
 These were Louisiana (1921), Missouri (1945), and Georgia (1945). 
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had achieved statehood.
263
 Second, Progressive innovations like the referendum, 
initiative, and expert constitutional commission superseded wholesale replacement by 
convention. Third, Southern constitutions ossified in the interwar years. The handful of 
Southern states had accounted for over half of the constitutional replacement in 
antebellum, Civil War, and Reconstruction America.
264
 But with the end of 
Reconstruction, Redeemers and ex-Confederates entrenched their power through durable 
state constitutions and statutes that disenfranchised Republican, black, and biracial state 
coalitions.
265
 This new, white, solidly-Democratic electorate locked Southern states under 
Democratic control for generations. Southern legislatures, insulated from interparty 
competition, called no new conventions and Southern state constitutional replacement 
flat-lined.
266
 The South, once the hotbed of constitutional replacement,
267
 was now quiet, 
and aggregate American state constitutional replacement declined. Additionally, with the 
Great Depression, Democrats swept Congress and the White House, regulating state 
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 Progressive and eugenicist congressmen were wary of granting statehood to the handful of territories 
outside the continental United States, particularly to those seized during the Spanish-American War, 
arguing their populations were unsuited to American liberal constitutionalism. Similarly, in the Insular 
Cases (1901), the Supreme Court selectively extended rights under the national Constitution to these 
populations 
264
 Southern states accounted for a major part of nineteenth-century revision. Between 1826 and 1906, the 
thirteen Southern states framed 48 of America’s 87 state constitutions (55%), and drafted 67 of the total 
137 proposed constitutions (39%). 
265
 Virginia’s 1902 Constitution, which disenfranchised the biracial populist Readjustors, exemplifies this 
trend. 
266
 Between Virginia’s 1902 Constitution and the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, only two Southern 
states replaced their constitutions. These were Louisiana in 1913 and 1921 and Georgia in 1945. Florida 
broke this lull by replacing its constitution in 1968. Jim Crow constitutions became firmly entrenched for 
generations. Though there was intraparty legislative competition and extralegal rioting in the South, these 
conflicts did not lead to extralegal, popular state constitutional conventions, as they had in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Perhaps this was because by the late nineteenth century, Southern 
states had developed powerful police forces and mobs to punish extralegal mobbing. 
267
 For example, Alabama’s 1901 Constitution is still in force. It has at least 892 amendments. National 
Democratic leaders like capitulated to Jim Crow constitutionalism, for fear of splitting the party. Wilson 
advanced the Jim Crow program in the federal government and Franklin Roosevelt left the Redeemer state 
constitutions untouched.  
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commerce and welfare programs, sometimes to the exclusion of the states.
268
 But in other 
cases, the states retained constitutional authority over welfare programs.
269
 
 Finally, in the 1960s all three federal branches aggressively intervened in state 
regulation of education, criminal justice, and voting and apportionment law.
270
 Between 
1960 and 1977, states attempted to replace their constitutions at levels unseen since 
Reconstruction. Ten states ratified new constitutions, though only five of these were 
states were Southern, suggesting perhaps that Civil Rights-era concerns plagued Northern 
and Western constitutions. And during the 1960s and 1970s, every region in the United 
States saw a spike in proposals for a new state constitution.
271
 Relatedly, Baker v. Carr 
(1962) forced widespread state legislative redistricting. Across the Sunbelt, conservatives 
organized municipalities and states around constitutional amendments, laying the 
                                                 
268
 The New Deal Congress first passed the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and Agricultural 
Adjustment Act (AAA) of 1933. Four of the Supreme Court’s reactionary Republican appointees – Pierce 
Butler, James McReynolds, George Sutherland, and Willis Van Devanter – led the court to strike down the 
NIRA as an overextension of federal commerce powers in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495 (1935), and the AAA as an invasion of traditional state powers in United States v. Butler, 297 
U.S. 1 (1936). But after Roosevelt threated to pack the Court with sympathetic justices, the Court 
capitulated, recognizing federal commerce power to regulate intrastate economic production in National 
Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1 (1937), and in Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). The importance of Roosevelt’s threat is a matter of debate. West Coast Hotel 
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) is often read as the Court’s capitulation to Roosevelt’s court packing 
threat, the famous “switch in time that saved nine.” However, it is not clear that Roosevelt’s plan 
influenced the justices’ meetings on this case, nor is it clear the threat influenced subsequent cases on New 
Deal programs. In the NLRB case, Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter still opposed federal 
authority to establish the NLRB, and none of the four allowed expansion of federal commerce power in 
Wickard, as all four had retired. 
269
 In Steward Machine Company v. Davis (1937), the Court upheld the Social Security Act of 1935, 
arguing the Act recognized and enabled states’ preexisting welfare statutes and positive constitutional 
rights, balancing national authority and devolution. And in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell 
(1934), the Court deferred to a Minnesota statute granting beleaguered lessees a two-year moratorium 
extension on home loan payments, one of many such state laws and constitutional provisions. See Steward 
Machine Company v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) and Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 
U.S. 398 (1934). 
270
 On federal intervention in state education policy and desegregation, see Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965, and Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). On 
criminal justice, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). On redistricting, see for example Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 
(1962), Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. 
271
 See Figure 15 in the appendix. 
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groundwork for Reagan’s 1980 election. These culture wars still affect state 
constitutional revision, making study of the state constitutions as timely as ever. 
 The gradual backlash to Civil Rights-era reforms also began with the states. Local 
grassroots organizing for Goldwater and Nixon in the Sunbelt states eventually realigned 
national partisan politics and vaulted Reagan into the White House.
272
 The contemporary 
national parties, now trapped by legislative gridlock, defer to the states on contentious 
issues like regulation of abortion, capital punishment, gun control, drug control, and 
voting and elections. Facing many disparate and narrow issues, the states have turned to 
specialized amendments, rather than wholesale constitutional replacement – Rhode Island 
was the last state to replace its constitution, in 1986. These many state amendments and 
cases still influence national constitutional politics. For example, thirty-six states had 
legalized same-sex marriage by amendment or federal or state ruling before the Supreme 
Court followed suit in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015).
273
 Subsequent chapters further 
explain these patterns by era, beginning with the American Revolution. 
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 Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton University Press, 
2002); Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton 
University Press, 2006). 
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 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015). 
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Part II: Constitutional Development  
81 
 
CHAPTER 4: THE FOUNDING ERA, 1760-1799 
  
 
“It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this 
country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether 
societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from 
reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political 
constitutions on accident and force.” 
Alexander Hamilton, 1787
274
 
 
 
 In the mid-eighteenth century, American colonists contested British slave law, 
frontier regulation, and understandings of legislative sovereignty. Their petitions for 
constitutional reform unanswered, colonists revolted, proposing thirty-four new state 
constitutions between 1776 and 1799 and ratifying twenty-four, a fifth of the total ratified 
in American history. The national constitutional order was equally unstable, as 
Americans ratified the Articles of Confederation in 1781 and the federal Constitution in 
1788. Congress saw 310 federal amendments proposed in its first two-year session, far 
exceeding the antebellum average of twenty-three per session,
275
 and ratified ten 
proposals as the Bill of Rights in 1791, adding the Eleventh Amendment in 1795, 
accounting for nearly half of all federal amendments to date. 
 What explains this state and federal constitutional instability? The Revolution was 
a moment of crisis. Colonists scrambled to declare independence and form war 
governments by ratifying fifteen constitutions between 1776 and 1780. The collapse of 
the Articles and the ratification of the 1787 Constitution pushed the states to propose 
another fourteen new constitutions to match the federal model by 1799. Opening The 
Federalist, Alexander Hamilton recognized the risk that Americans would “depend, for 
their political constitutions, on accident and force.”  
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 Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, The Federalist, 1. 
275
 Between 1787 and 1860, Congress saw on average 11.74 federal amendment proposals per year. 
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 But Americans were not victims of circumstance. In May 1776, the Continental 
Congress deferred constitutional framing to the state conventions, which rejected British 
oversight and constitutional custom.
276
 In the four years after Congress’ May resolutions, 
fourteen states had called as many conventions, in what Gordon Wood calls “the most 
creative and significant period of constitutionalism in modern Western history.”
277
 State 
framers designed constitutions deliberately, using a growing pamphlet literature on 
English Whig mixed constitutions, ancient Saxon democracy, Roman republicanism, and 
Greek confederations. In May 1776, Carter Braxton reminded the delegates to Virginia’s 
Constitutional Convention that “Various are the opinions of men on this subject,” 
allowing “all the candor and deliberation due to its importance.”
278
 State conventions 
proceeded thoughtfully and purposefully. Massachusetts, for example, took four years to 
design and ratify its first constitution. 
 In resolving controversies over slavery, the frontier, and legislative sovereignty 
and design, state framers preempted these debates at the federal Convention. As James 
Wilson noted and later Hamilton put it, federal framers could now go about “establishing 
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 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 127–29; Kruman, Between Authority and 
Liberty, 1–4, 15–20. But for the colonial framers’ reliance on English constitutionalism, See Ibid., 7–14. 
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 New Hampshire and South Carolina had two conventions each, while Connecticut and Rhode Island 
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 Similarly, delegates to Pennsylvania’s June 1776 Provincial Conference reminded the state’s voters of 
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good government from reflection and choice.”
279
 John Dickinson and George Mason 
similarly instructed federal delegates to rely on prior state constitutions’ legislative 
design and rights provisions.
280
 In sum, state constitutional design quieted national 
constitutional controversies, tempering the instability of the emerging national 
constitutional order. In sum, while Revolution led to significant state and national 
constitutional revision, state framing helped stabilize national constitutionalism. 
 This chapter proceeds chronologically in three parts, first introducing colonial 
debates in the 1760s over Parliamentary sovereignty, slavery, and frontier regulation, 
which escalated into rebellion. Second, the chapter shows how the Continental Congress 
in 1776 deferred these questions to the state constitutional conventions, which limited 
state legislative sovereignty through bicameralism and gubernatorial and judicial 
oversight, reapportioned legislatures to appease frontiersmen, and settled on diverse 
slavery regulation. Finally, delegates to the 1787 Philadelphia Convention imitated these 
state legislative designs and avoided the difficult slavery question by deferring to existing 
state regulations. 
I. The Colonial Era and Revolution, 1760-1776 
 
 On the eve of the American Revolution, Edmund Burke reflected on the collapse 
of Britain’s colonial administration. Addressing the House of Commons, he called 
Americans 
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 At the federal Convention, James Wilson reminded the drafters Americans were “the first instance of a 
people assembled to weigh deliberately and calmly, and to decide leisurely and peaceably, upon the form of 
government by which they will bind themselves and their posterity.” James Wilson, The Substance of a 
Speech Delivered by James Wilson, Esq.: Explanatory of the General Principles of the Proposed Fœderal 
Constitution; ... in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania, ... 24 Nov. 1787 (Philadelphia: Thomas 
Bradford, 1787), 5. 
280
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a people who are still, as it were, but in the gristle, and not yet hardened into the 
bone of manhood. When I contemplate these things; when I know that the 
Colonies in general owe little or nothing to any care of ours, and that they are not 
squeezed into this happy form by the constraints of watchful and suspicious 
government, but that, through a wise and salutary neglect, a generous nature has 
been suffered to take her own way to perfection.
281
 
 
Salutary neglect was the rule of British administration.
282
 Far removed from the Crown 
and Parliament, Americans grew accustomed to liberty.
283
  
 Colonists’ resistance to active British administration provoked constitutional 
conflict, which colonists addressed three ways. First, they sometimes used judicial 
arbitration. But ordinary colonists knew that biased local elites controlled colonial courts. 
So when they felt they did not get a fair shake, colonists rioted. When rioting escalated 
into the Revolutionary War in 1775, colonists found a third, untested means of 
constitutional reform, framing new constitutions and governments for their colonies.
284
 
Colonists thus relied on diverse and conflicting sources of constitutional authority and 
change. This in turn prevented colonists from resolving controversies over slavery, the 
frontier, and legislative sovereignty and taxation. This section first outlines these three 
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controversies, and then explains how these escalated into war, forcing the beleaguered 
Continental Congress to push these issues on the new states. 
A. Colonial Constitutional Controversies 
 
 In 1606, King James I chartered the Virginia Company to settle the Chesapeake, 
establish plantations, and spread Christianity. Colonists landed at Jamestown the 
following year, then settling across the eastern seaboard.
285
 After wresting control of the 
Delaware from the Dutch in 1667, England held the North American coast from 
Massachusetts to Florida,
286
 and the Crown quickly issued charters splitting the fifteen 
hundred miles of coastline into manageable colonies.
287
 Proprietary charters established 
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 Food shortages, disease, and the first few hard winters killed all but sixty of the three hundred settlers, 
but after 1610, the hardy survivors ventured from their fort at Jamestown, building villages with homes, 
schools, churches, farms, and plantations. The first Africans arrived aboard a Dutch warship in 1619, bound 
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and Plymouth colonies with charters in 1629. The colonists grew in number, attacking the Pequots in 1637, 
the Narragansetts in 1643, and the Wampanoags in the devastating King Philip’s War of 1675-6, crippling 
New England’s Indian population.  
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 The English spread until they abutted Dutch settlements along the Hudson River. The embattled Dutch 
also clashed with Swedes to the south, claiming the Swedish Fort Christina at the mouth of the Delaware in 
1655. Their success was brief. Dutch holdings separated New England from Maryland, chartered in 1632, 
and Virginia. English marines overran the tiny wooden Dutch fort in 1664, and the Netherlands ceded its 
North American claims three years later, connecting the northern and southern English colonies. 
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 Connecticut was chartered in 1662, Rhode Island and the Carolinas in 1663, New Jersey in 1664, and 
New York was carved from Dutch holdings the same year. Pennsylvania’s proprietary charter followed in 
1681, granting William Penn and his heirs “full and absolute power, licence and authoritie” over the 
colony’s land, “to time hereafter forever.” Penn assumed the governorship and strong-armed the colony’s 
legislators, who stripped some of his power with a new charter the following year. By 1701, Pennsylvania 
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new governments exclusively for a few of the Crown’s allies.
288
 Some colonial 
proprietors, governors, or trustees held power indefinitely,
289
 voting was often reserved 
for freemen, disenfranchising those who were dependent on others or had little property 
and material stake in their community.
290
 Colonists clashed with their governing elites 
and with the Crown, particularly when James II revoked several colonial charters in 
1686.
291
 William and Mary ended these revolts by issuing restoring standing charters and 
                                                                                                                                                 
only Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Maryland had written charters, while 
the other colonies relied on customary constitutions. 
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 For example, the 1606 Virginia Charter, imitating the corporate charters of contemporary London firms, 
gave the Company a monopoly over trade and the use of force. Note however the Massachusetts Bay and 
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forever.” Similarly, the 1669 Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina granted to the colony’s proprietors 
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Locke and the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, was only partially implemented. 
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 Colonial laws disenfranchised lacking property – the poor and landless, servants, women, slaves, and 
transients – but also Jews, Catholics, blacks, and Indians, who might serve an authority besides the 
Protestant Crown. The Carolina Charter of 1669, for example, rejected “numerous democracy.” Though 
note that even Pennsylvania’s 1681 Charter, which granted Penn primary authority, admitted “Any 
government is free to the people under it (whatever be the frame) where the laws rule, and the people are a 
party to those laws.” And in Virginia after 1736, men with multiple landholdings could vote once for each 
estate. Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 5–6. 
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issuing a new one to Massachusetts Bay in 1691.
292
 Only after 1721, when Robert 
Walpole became Prime Minister, did the colonies return to salutary neglect. 
 In the mid-eighteenth century, demographic changes forced new controversies 
over the status of slaves, the regulation of the frontier, and the extent of legislative 
sovereignty. Abolition was a thorny issue. As plantations spread up the fertile 
Chesapeake, around 1640 the assemblies of Virginia and Maryland legally distinguished 
slaves from indentured servants, protecting the latter with finite contracts and payment in 
clothes and provisions.
293
 After white servants revolted in Bacon’s Rebellion in 1676,
294
 
planters turned to black and Indian slaves, abandoning Indian slavery in the 1700s.
295
 On 
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 But in 1697 the Crown appointed the Earl of Bellomont the governor of New York, New Hampshire, 
and Massachusetts, provoking colonial resistance. 
293
 These laws were written to attract poor white Englishmen, and many bachelors from the Thames Valley 
immigrated to work as servants for a few years in shops or fields. They flocked to the tobacco plantations 
of the Carolinas and the Chesapeake, over half to Maryland alone. Disease, starvation, and labor killed 
most. Few lived to twenty, and fewer to forty. This quick turnover increased demand for English servants, 
and many of these newcomers, vulnerable to colonial diseases, also died. Rocketing demand exhausted the 
supply of English immigrant laborers, which by the century’s end dwindled three percent each year 
293
. 
Unrest also discouraged indentured labor in the Chesapeake. Frontier farmers in Virginia and the Carolinas 
might own their land and labor, but they clashed with resident Indians. Winthrop D. Jordan, “Enslavement 
of Negroes in America to 1700,” in Colonial America: Essays in Politics and Social Development, ed. 
Stanley Nider Katz (Little, Brown, 1976), 230–33. 
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 In 1676, Susquehannock tribesmen attacked settlements in Maryland and Virginia. Nathaniel Bacon 
rallied a militia of several hundred indentured servants and farmers, and at least eighty black slaves who he 
promised freedom. After Virginia’s Governor Berkeley’s refused to commission a formal militia to fight 
the Indians, Bacon’s mob marched on the capital at Jamestown, protesting the policy and the Governor’s 
nepotism. At gunpoint, Berkeley again refused, before the assembly capitulated. Triumphant, the mob 
torched the capital and slaughtered a group of Pamunkey Indians. Wary of poor whites, Virginia plantation 
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Smith, Civic Ideals, 61, 66. 
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 Europe demanded more tidewater tobacco, and by the 1680s, rice grown in the coastal swamps of South 
Carolina and modern Georgia. The tobacco trade enriched Virginia’s planters, public officials, and even its 
fledgling college. In 1661 Virginia formally established black chattel slavery, and Maryland did the same 
the following year. Charleston supplied the Carolinas with African slaves, and starting in the 1670s, with 
Native American slaves captured in war, or forced into servitude by the courts or their families. In this 
period, South Carolina’s Indian slave population grew to 50,000, eclipsing the number of black slaves. 
After 1682, Virginia’s House of Burgesses classed Indians not as indentured servants, but as slaves, akin to 
blacks. But Indians could escape and seek shelter with surrounding tribes. After costly wars against the 
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Meanwhile, African slave ships fed ports across the fertile, flat Southeastern coast, and the slave population 
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enslaved. By 1710, the percentage tripled. Bernard Bailyn, The Peopling of British North America: An 
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the eve of the Revolution, only five percent of Northern colonists were enslaved, but 
slavery was central to the Northern economy.
296
 Most colonial legislatures denied full 
citizenship to persons with African appearance or physiology, disempowering free and 
enslaved blacks across generations.
297
 
 In contrast, Britons did not rely solely on chattel slavery, and turned slowly 
against the system in the mid-eighteenth century.
298
 The abolitionists Thomas Clarkson 
and William Wilberforce brought antislavery petitions to Parliament, and Granville Sharp 
advised the 1772 Somerset decision limiting slavery in Britain.
299
 The Somerset ruling 
condemned colonial slavery as an affront to natural law, worrying Southern slaveholders 
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and emboldening some slaves.
300
 Further, Northern slave law was relatively ambiguous 
and contradictory, inviting British and Northern judges to rule in favor of liberty and 
habeas corpus, preventing the return of runaways from the South and perhaps allowing 
the abolition throughout the colonies. 
 Abolitionism found an audience in America. Many of Philadelphia’s Quaker 
merchants were invested in the slave trade, but a few joined Clarkson in establishing a 
local antislavery chapter. Granville Sharp printed his pamphlets in Boston and 
Philadelphia, and corresponded with Anthony Benezet, a firebrand Quaker abolitionist, 
and Benjamin Rush, a professor at the College of Philadelphia. Rush in turn petitioned 
the Crown to disband the slaveholding Royal African Company in 1773.
301
 Across the 
colonies liberal pamphleteers attacked monarchy by arguing men were naturally free and 
equal. And republican writers revived Roman, Florentine, and English arguments for 
liberty from domination, levelling them against both monarchy and chattel slavery.
302
 As 
war loomed in 1775, Virginia’s loyalist Governor Dunmore promised liberty to rebel-
owned slaves and indentured servants and indentured servants in exchange for service in 
the Royal Army, and three years later Rhode Island offered freedom to slaves joining the 
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Continental Army.
303
 This worried Southern planters who had spent decades suppressing 
armed slave revolts and developing detailed codes to control free and enslaved blacks. 
 Frontier expansion also split colonists from the Crown and their legislatures. As 
in feudal England, social life in a Mid-Atlantic proprietary colony or Southern plantation 
colony was hierarchical, dominated by a few dynasties which preserved their seats 
through charter privileges, primogeniture, entail, and intermarriage.
304
 In the smaller New 
England colonies, arable land was scarce and grand estates few, but so were the chances 
to own land and gain accompanying political and suffrage rights.
305
 For free white male 
colonists in the mid-eighteenth century, land and freedom lay west across the 
Appalachians,
306
 so families streamed west.
307
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 Rhode Island could afford the bargain – slaves were roughly a tenth of its population at midcentury. 
Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, 51. 
304
 With at least fifty acres of farmland, a free Pennsylvanian male twenty-one or older could vote. But 
since the 1681 Charter, much of Pennsylvania’s land belonged to the Penns and a few others, who leased it 
to disenfranchised tenant farmers. In New York, dynasties like the Livingstons, Van Renssalaers, and 
Beekmans controlled tenant estates of hundreds of thousands of acres. In Maryland, Virginia, and the 
Carolinas, slaves and indentured servants worked tobacco fields for wealthy planters. 
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 Families in New England and along the Atlantic seaboard split farms as they were bequeathed, with a 
double portion to the first son. Over generations, this left smaller divisions and less land. With less land, 
farmers could not afford to leave land fallow to recuperate after harvesting, the soil failed, and so did 
farmers. After 1750, many Massachusetts farmers would leave at least one son landless. In the town of 
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 Land did not grant freedom to all. Indentured servants farmed without immediate reward, and black and 
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some colonies, could vote, but rarely did. And some immigration was involuntary. England sent fifty 
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 From Connecticut, Yankees pushed to the Wyoming Valley in northeastern Pennsylvania, skirmishing 
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 Settlers crossing the Appalachians found the land claimed by Indians and the 
French.
308
 To Protestant colonists, roving Indians failed to enclose and tame the earth as 
God intended, losing their right to it.
309
 Frontiersmen sought to organize militias to 
displace Native Americans, but old, inflexible colonial laws reserved to governors or 
assemblies the power to appoint and salary militia officers. And in colonies like 
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and South Carolina, these laws concentrated legislative 
districts and the franchise in wealthy eastern counties.
310
 Without county status, western 
territories struggled to organize militias and forts, and without legislative representation, 
they could not fund new defense and infrastructure projects. So frontiersmen rioted. They 
publicly protested the colonial charters’ voting and apportionment schemes – 
disenfranchised Pennsylvanians mobbed polling places at least five times between 1739 
and 1755, and marched on the colonial Assembly twice.
311
 In 1763, the Crown granted 
the newly-captured Ohio River Valley to French Catholics and outlawed trans-
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 The Iroquois, or Haudenosaunee, peoples spread from the Hudson west to the Catskills and 
Adirondacks. A confederation of five tribes – the Cayuga, Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, and Seneca – the 
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east to the steep western Alleghenies. The Alleghenies ran south into the Blue Ridge and the Cherokees, on 
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 Expansion promised freedom and harmonized with many settlers’ Christian and English Whig beliefs. 
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 Eastern elite families in the colonial assemblies refused to dilute their power by parceling the western 
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 These rallies predate the conventional story of popular constitutionalism, which normally begins with 
the Stamp Act protests of 1765. 
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Appalachian migration,
312
 frustrating Protestant settlers and overriding land claims by 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Virginia.
313
 
 Then came the last and worst crisis for British rule. Under salutary neglect, 
Parliament’s Navigation Act tariffs lay dormant until the French and Indian War 
burdened Britain with costly new frontier garrisons and warships.
314
 To raise funds, 
Prime Minister George Grenville levied the 1765 Stamp Act on purchases as big as a 
plantation or as small as a pair of dice, thus taxing colonists of all classes, and required 
payment in pounds sterling, which few colonists carried.
315
 Americans rich and poor 
rioted, pilloried tax and customs officials, boycotted British goods, and refused to pay the 
tax.
316
 
 The crisis hinged on a question of legislative sovereignty in constitutional matters. 
Many Americans believed a tax law was legitimate only if it was passed by the 
representatives of the people taxed.
317 
Colonists lacked specific delegates to the House of 
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Commons, invalidating the Stamp Act, but Grenville’s deputy Thomas Whately 
concocted the idea of virtual representation, claiming all Members of Parliament 
represented all of Britain and its colonies.
318
 This gave Parliament broad sovereignty over 
legislative and constitutional affairs. American pamphleteers did not buy it.
319
 Colonists 
did elect representatives to the colonial assemblies, which passed legitimate taxes, but 
Parliament overruled these laws. Two months after the Stamp Act, Patrick Henry 
proposed seven resolutions to Virginia’s House of Burgesses abrogating the Acts.
320
 
Several months later the Virginia legislature affirmed that laws of “internal Polity and 
Taxation” required colonists’ consent. Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New 
York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and South Carolina issued similar declarations. In 
October, nine colonies dispatched delegates to the Stamp Act Congress in New York, 
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charters and decades of custom, colonists delegated taxation authority to their colonial representatives, who 
knew “what taxes the people are able to bear.” Henry merely wanted to maintain colonists’ customary 
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which affirmed Virginia’s resolutions, extending colonists’ legislative power past 
taxation, to all matters of domestic legislation.
321
 
 Grenville resigned four months later, and Parliament repealed the Acts.
322
 But in 
1773 Parliament heavily taxed colonial tea merchants while exempting the failing East 
India Company. Colonists again rioted. This time, Parliament did not retreat. The 1774 
Coercive Acts enforced the Tea Act by blockading Boston’s port, shuttering the 
Massachusetts government, stationing British troops in unoccupied buildings, and 
extraditing the Acts’ violators to Britain for trial. As Parliament intended, the Acts forced 
a crisis.
323
 Dulany, Dickinson, and Henry claimed their right to resist the Acts by citing 
English common law, the colonial charters, and their own British ancestry.
324
 And by 
1774, many of the members of the First Continental Congress appealed not only to 
English rights, but also to a natural or republican right to revolt.
325
 War loomed. 
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B. Escalation and Rebellion 
 
 Entering the Revolution, Americans debated abolition, the regulation of the 
frontier, and the nature of taxation and legislative sovereignty. Each was a constitutional 
question.
326
 Americans tackled these issues through three methods: popular resistance, 
judicial review, and constitutional framing, in each of the states simultaneously. 
Ultimately, these diverse, clashing methods exacerbated the era’s constitutional disputes. 
 The first method, popular constitutional reform, or “popular constitutionalism,” 
had roots in seventeenth century colonial politics,
327
 particularly in rebellions against the 
repeal of the colonial charters by James II in 1686.
328
 After 1720, Prime Minister Robert 
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universally, expanding the right to revolt, and enlarging the bounds of constitutional citizenship. Further, 
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 Since English conquest in 1664, New Yorkers had resisted English rule, and in 1673, an English colonist 
named Samuel Hopkins engineered the Dutch Navy’s briefly successful seizure of New York. Two years 
later, Nathaniel Bacon rallied poor Virginia farmers and slaves, promising the former legal recognition to 
call a militia, and the latter freedom. Bacon’s posse contested Governor William Berkeley’s harsh frontier 
and slavery regulations, aiming to broaden Virginian citizenship and reconstitute the polity. 
328
 James II revoked the charters of the New England colonies, merging them under the governorship of 
Edmund Andros, and proceeded against the powerful, unruly proprietary governments of William Penn in 
Pennsylvania and Lord Baltimore in Maryland. At James’ behest, Andros seized administration over all 
land in his new Dominion of New England, dissolved the colonial assemblies, and conformed Puritan 
marriage practices to Anglican law. Perhaps most offensive to Massachusetts Puritans, on May 1, 1687, 
Andros’ government planted a maypole in Charlestown, inciting the townspeople to dance. New 
Englanders rebelled. Connecticut colonists challenged James’ writ revoking their charter, before submitting 
in 1687. In early 1689, word reached the colonies that Parliament had ousted James II for William and 
Mary. On April 18, Bostonians seized a royal heavy frigate, then Andros’ officials, and then Andros 
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militia turn in their guns, John Coode led fellow Protestants to rebel for fear of persecution by Catholics 
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Walpole dispatched new, conciliatory governors, returning some colonies to salutary 
neglect.
329
 Still, farmers, frontiersmen, and urban mechanics rioted against their colonial 
charters and local governments.
330
 Suffrage exclusion was a perennial point of 
contention, particularly for disenfranchised white males.
331
 In New York, Hudson River 
Valley tenant farmers rioted when their wealthy landlords changed lease terms in 1765.
332
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Southern colonies too faced free and slave agrarian revolts.
333
 And Northern abolitionists 
printed, leafleted, and rallied to change the laws of their colonies.
334
 
 The 1764 Sugar Act and 1765 Stamp Act spurred riots against the Crown and 
Parliament.
335
 Colonists abrogated the Acts with mobs and grand juries freeing those 
arrested under the Acts. Failing this, a mob might publicly humiliate an official who 
enforced the Acts, or might block collection of taxes, as Bostonians famously did by 
destroying a tea shipment taxed under the Tea Act.
336
 As riots gave way to war, patriots 
overthrew their local governments.
337
 
 These colonial mobs engaged in constitutional politics in a few senses. They 
revised legal practices and thus revised the English customary constitution, which existed 
through practice and action as much as through written law. Additionally, in checking 
governors, legislatures, kings, and Parliament, these mobs helped balance government, an 
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essential part of Whig constitutionalism. Finally, colonial mobs momentarily assumed 
executive prerogative to enforce or abrogate charters and statutes. In an era of plural 
governors, proprietors, and trustees, and later, of rotating executive councils, it was 
normal for the executive power to belong to a plural, ad hoc group.
338
 
 Judicial reform offered a second method to address controversies over slavery, 
frontier regulation, and taxation and representation.
339
 Slaves and abolitionists, desperate 
for success where they could find it, looked to the judiciary. Northern and Southern 
judges diverged. Several slaves freedom won suits in eastern Massachusetts, where the 
1691 Charter promised all colonists “all liberties and Immunities of free and natural 
subjects.”
340
 In contrast, Southern legislatures curtailed the grounds for blacks to make 
freedom suits.
341
 And within months of Somerset, a Virginia court freed twelve Indian 
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slaves, arguing their matrilineal Indian ancestry made them legally white, narrowing the 
grounds on which blacks could sue for freedom.
342
 Since each colony elaborated its legal 
relationship to Great Britain differently,
343
 Somerset’s colonial judges interpreted the 
brief, ambiguous dictum in diverse and conflicting ways.
344
 Northern judges cited 
Somerset to protect runaways’ habeas corpus rights and to argue Northern abolition and 
privileges and immunities provisions freed resident runaways, preventing their return 
south. Conversely, Mansfield’s ruling admitted that Somerset, when he resided in 
Virginia, was a slave under the colony’s positive law. Clashing readings of Somerset 
threatened sectional tension over fugitive slaves. 
 Colonial courts also grappled with the rights and land claims of frontiersmen, 
tenant farmers, and Indians. Legal apprenticeship was expensive, so judges often came 
from and ruled for a circle of wealthy families, breeding resentment among colonists.
345
 
With few sheriffs and justices of the peace to enforce rulings, patrician judges’ used their 
stature, social authority, and knowledge of local traditions to eke out compliance.
346
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 As the Navigation Act taxes prompted smuggling and consequent searches by law 
officers, colonists took their search warrant disputes to court. When the Massachusetts 
Superior Court issued general search warrants to customs officer Charles Paxton, sixty-
three Boston merchants challenged the Court’s overly-broad writs in Paxton’s Case 
(1761).
347
 Representing the merchants, the young firebrand attorneys James Otis and 
Oxenbridge Thatcher argued that these writs violated the merchants’ common law 
privacy rights, and that consequently a 1662 Parliamentary statute authorizing these 
general warrants was unconstitutional.
348
 As customs officials ransacked merchants’ 
homes and stores, rebellious colonists seized Otis and Thatcher’s arguments for privacy 
rights and against Parliament’s authority to enforce the Navigation Acts. Samuel Adams, 
watching Otis’ rousing speech at Boston’s State House, recalled “Then and there the 
child independence was there born.”
349
 
 Rather than resolving disputes, colonial courts became sites of new controversies. 
In ruling against Otis and Thatcher and for the Crown, Massachusetts’ Chief Justice drew 
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charges of nepotism.
350
 George III bolstered these accusations by withdrawing colonial 
judges’ life tenure,
351
 appointing judges at will. And when colonial juries refused to 
condemn violators of the Navigation Acts, the Crown forced these trials into the English 
Vice-Admiralty Courts where the court’s single Crown-appointed judge could punish 
defendants, leaving no clear right of appeal.
352
 
 Frustrated with the judiciary, colonists rallied to thwart searches by sheriffs and 
customs officials. On August 14, 1765, Bostonian ransacked and torched the houses of 
Chief Justice Thomas Hutchinson and the Stamp Collector Andrew Oliver, forcing 
Oliver’s resignation.
353
 Rhode Islanders circumvented the courts’ seizure by burning the 
Liberty in 1769, shelled the customs ship St. John, and in 1772, burned the Royal Navy’s 
schooner Gaspee.
354
 As Massachusetts spiraled into war, patriots assembled in 
Cambridge to write a new state constitution, requiring “a special designation of the 
persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure” and assembling a new judiciary.
355
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Colonists in every major city protested the Stamp Act, often tarring and feathering or 
drowning customs agents, and patriots in every colony redrafted or abandoned their 
colonial charters.
356
 
 Constitutional framing was the third and final means colonists used to address 
these controversies. In March 1774, Parliament passed the Coercive Acts, dissolving 
Massachusetts’ unruly legislature and closing Boston’s port. The colony’s legislature 
reassembled as an independent Provincial Congress, and rural townspeople called for 
independence and reinstatement of the 1629 Massachusetts Charter. With the news of 
Massachusetts’ rebellion, the other colonies’ legislatures and revolutionary committees 
dispatched delegates to Philadelphia to meet as the First Continental Congress on 
September 6, 1774. Through 1775, colonists ousted their royal governors,
357
 shuttered 
their legislatures and courts,
358
 and abrogated their royal charters and customary 
constitutions. By 1776, only the insurrectionary Johnathan Trumbull of Connecticut 
                                                 
356
 Note, however, that North Carolinians treated a resigning customs agent to toasts and cheers. Beaumont, 
The Civic Constitution, 56–57. 
357
 On May 26, 1774, Virginia’s Governor Dunmore dissolved the House of Burgesses, closing the county 
courts the following month. Patriot legislators reassembled as the Provincial Convention in August, calling 
volunteers into a regular army. The following April, Dunmore, alarmed at the insurrections at Lexington 
and Concord, snuck fifteen and a half barrels of gunpowder from Williamsburg’s magazine by cover of 
night. Days later, Patrick Henry rallied the Hanover County militia for a march on the capital, and 
Dunmore, fearing a plot on his life, escaped to the British warship Fowey anchored nearby in the James 
River, and began drafting his proclamation for slave revolt against their insurrectionist owners. Governor 
Josiah Martin of North Carolina sought to defend his capital at Newbern with six cannon, but after 
townspeople stole them in April 1775, he fled to nearby Fort Johnson. New Hampshire’s Governor John 
Wentworth escaped a mob, sheltering in a royal fort in Portsmouth harbor, and Governor William Tryon of 
New York conducted business form a royal warship in October, 1775. Allan Nevins, The American States: 
During and after the Revolution 1775-1789 (New York, 1927), 75–83; Countryman, The American 
Revolution, 119–21; Adams, The First American Constitutions, 26–27; Nash, The Unknown American 
Revolution, 159–60, 194–99. 
358
 In July 1774, citizens of Pittsfield, Massachusetts, hearing that Parliament was preparing to revoke their 
colonial charter, mobbed the Berkshire County Courthouse, blocking royal judges from meeting. Worcester 
citizens forced the public resignations of their county judges the following month, and in Salem, citizens 
gathered to appoint delegates to a provincial patriot convention. Several weeks later, nearly five thousand 
rural militiamen descended again on rural Worcester to dissolve the county government. As the legislature 
joined the provincial committees in resisting Parliament’s Massachusetts Government Act, Military 
Governor Thomas Gage fled, realizing rebellion was not far off. And in New York and Pennsylvania, small 
farmers descended on their colonial capitals, demanding the resignation of their governors. Countryman, 
The American Revolution, 113–19; Nash, The Unknown American Revolution, 178–82. 
103 
 
retained his post as governor.  Temporary provincial congresses, conventions, and 
committees of safety and correspondence assumed control of many colonies, but lacked 
the skill and the legal authority to govern and to fend off British troops. 
 Virginia, New Hampshire, and South Carolina, all lacking governors, looked to 
the beleaguered Continental Congress for advice.
359
 On May 16, 1775, Massachusetts’ 
Provincial Congress requested from the Second Continental Congress instructions on 
replacing the colony’s royal governor and assembly.
360
 As Massachusetts militiamen 
reinforced the heights at Bunker Hill on June 9
th
, Congress answered Massachusetts’ plea 
with instructions to modify and reinstate the abrogated Massachusetts Charter of 1691.
361
 
In November, Congress allowed New Hampshire and South Carolina to draft 
constitutions, and in December, granted Virginia the same liberty.
362
 With Congress’ 
blessing, New Jersey’s constitutional convention assembled on May 26,
 
1776, drafting a 
constitution over the next month. From Philadelphia, the Continental Congress watched 
as New Jersey, Maryland, and North Carolina called independent legislatures and courts. 
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By April 1776, Georgia assembled an independent legislature and executive, and North 
Carolina formally declared separation from Great Britain.
363
 
 These first state conventions met under duress, declaring independence and 
forming wartime governments,
364
 framing constitutions long on revolutionary bluster and 
short on detail.
365
 New Hampshire and South Carolina’s expressly temporary 
constitutions rebranded their colonial legislature as the state legislature, but failed to 
clarify its lawmaking authority to Parliament or to the people of the state. These 
documents declared independence, but on the instructions of the Continental Congress, 
concluded by appealing to Great Britain for reconciliation.
366
 Despite their brevity, these 
first state constitutions were novel for expressly listing and limiting the powers of 
government.
367
 
 In early 1776 little was clear. After almost two centuries of largely uninterrupted 
salutary neglect, the colonies had rejected British rule in the courts, the streets, and in 
constitutional convention. The constitutions of New Hampshire, South Carolina, 
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Virginia, and New Jersey expressly repudiated British rule. But these were revolutionary 
documents – novel, explicitly temporary, and written to repudiate authority, not to 
permanently establish it. The sovereignty of these new governments would be tested on 
the fields at Trenton, Saratoga, and Yorktown and defined at the coming state and 
national constitutional conventions. So too would be standing controversies over slavery, 
the frontier, and legislative sovereignty and taxation powers. 
C. Congressional Deference to the State Constitutional Conventions 
 
 The beleaguered Continental Congress initially failed to address these 
controversies. While the Southern and New England colonies facing invasion had 
declared independence, the Congress split over the question of independence. John 
Adams, frustrated with the Boston crisis, sought a congressional declaration of 
independence as early as 1774. But blocked by other congressmen,
368
 Adams soon 
realized that “the delegates here, and other persons from various parts are unanimously 
very sanguine that if Boston and the Massachusetts can possibly steer a middle 
course…the exertions of the colonies will procure a total change of measures and full 
redress for us.”
369
 Congress was initially less prepared for independence, Adams saw, 
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than were his Massachusetts neighbors under British occupation.
370
 John Dickinson of 
Pennsylvania and James Duane of New York emerged as leaders of Congress’ 
conciliatory majority faction.
371
 Like many of the faction’s moderate delegates, they 
represented the middle colonies, which were still relatively insulated from the war.
372
 The 
Second Congress, hamstrung by unanimity requirements and overwhelmed with 
immediate wartime problems, repeatedly shying from declaring independence.
373
 
 Increasingly preoccupied Bostonians’ hardship under British blockade,
374
 Adams 
hatched a plan to circumvent Congress’ Dickinson-Duane faction and push America to 
independence. Late one evening in January 1776, Adams met with George Wythe, an 
elder Virginia congressman and jurist, to discuss the coming state constitutional 
conventions. Nearly forty years later, Adams recalled the meeting in exact detail. Wythe, 
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th
 to propose separation from Great 
Britain, but found little support. On June 26
th
, Jefferson and John Dickinson, both outspoken critics of 
Parliament, began compiling colonists’ grievances into the Declaration on Taking Up Arms.
371
 Dickinson 
redacted some of Jefferson’s insurrectionary language and the measure passed on July 6
th
. Two days later, 
Dickinson sent the conciliatory Olive Branch Petition to Lord Dartmouth, the King’s Secretary for the 
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Great Britain that summer, each shying from independence. Ibid., 17–25. 
372
 Thomas Jefferson, “Notes of Proceedings in the Continental Congress, 7 June to 1 August 1776,” in The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson: 1760-1776, ed. Julian P. Boyd, vol. I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1776), 309; Adams, The First American Constitutions, 57. 
373
 As rogue patriot militiamen clashed with royal troops at Lexington and Concord, Ticonderoga, and 
Bunker Hill in May and June of 1775, the Congress scrambled to organize American troops into the 
Continental Army. In the following months, Congress’ five dozen delegates met in ad hoc committees, six 
days a week, from early morning until dinner, borrowing and printing money, regulating the mail, and 
bargaining with Indians and loyalists. Congress, like the New England state assemblies, also worked as a 
court of last resort, arbitrating disputes over wartime property seizures, and as an executive, overseeing the 
treasury and Army and even mundane administrative issues like the salary of the congressional doorkeeper. 
Resolutions passed only with unanimous consent from the diverse state delegations, requiring days of 
backroom canvassing. Maier, American Scripture, 8–17. 
374
 He had come to Congress in May 1775 worried with the “poor People of Boston, imprisoned within the 
Walls of their City by a British Army.” Confiding to his journal, he wrote the delegates to Congress “knew 
not to what Plunder or Massacres or Cruelties [Bostonians] might be exposed.” He decided that Congress 
ought to resolve the crisis by recommending “to the People of all the States to institute Governments for 
themselves… then to inform Great Britain We were willing to enter into Negotiations with them for the 
redress of all Grievances, and a restoration of Harmony between the two Countries.” John Adams, “Diary,” 
in The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States: With A Life of the Author, Notes and 
Illustrations, ed. Charles Francis Adams, vol. II (Boston: Little, Brown, 1775), 406–7. 
107 
 
he wrote, agreed “upon the necessity of independence…observing that the greatest 
obstacle in the way of a declaration of it was the difficulty of agreeing upon a 
government for our future regulation.” The states, and their congressional delegates, each 
had different plans for government, deadlocking the Continental Congress. But the state 
committees and legislatures were smaller and more harmonious. Here, Adams saw a 
chance at progress. The colonies might individually draft constitutions declaring 
independence, circumventing the conciliatory, deadlocked Congress. “I replied,” Adams 
remembered, “that each colony should form a government for itself, as a free and 
independent State.” An impressed Wythe asked “what plan would you institute or advise 
for any of the States?” Unsure, Adams deferred the question, later penning a plan in a 
letter to Wythe. From this he redrafted his plans for the state constitutions into a 
pamphlet, the Thoughts on Government, which he forwarded to Wythe. Wythe offered it 
to another Virginian, Richard Henry Lee, who had it printed in Philadelphia in April and 
circulated to fellow members on the fourth day of Virginia’s Convention. Within days of 
this, Adams sent a similar plan to his fellow congressman Jonathan Dickinson Sergeant 
for Sergeant’s use in New Jersey’s Constitutional Convention.
375
 
 But in early May 1776, only New Hampshire, South Carolina, Virginia, and New 
Jersey had called conventions. On May 4
th
, Rhode Island cut ties with the Crown, but 
avoided drafting a constitution to replace its colonial charter.
376
 Adams felt he needed to 
coax the other states to independence.
377
 He pressed for a congressional resolution 
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requesting the remaining colonies call constitutional conventions, but on March 13
th
 
Congress’ conciliatory majority defeated the measure.
378
 In the following weeks, Adams 
set to bargaining with other members. Seconded by Lee, on May 10
th
 Adams introduced 
to the Committee of the Whole a new resolution, only a single sentence long, calling on 
the colonies’ revolutionary committees and assemblies to declare independence by 
drafting new governments.
379
 The resolution passed. Assembling a private subcommittee 
with Edward Rutledge and Richard Henry Lee, Adams added a strategically vague and 
brief preamble to the resolution declaring that “the exercise of every kind of authority 
under the crown should be totally suppressed.” After two days of heated debate, the 
resolutions narrowly passed on the morning of May 15
th
, with six to seven colonies 
voting in support, four against, including Duane’s New York delegation, and one to two 
abstaining.
380
 Adams felt America had declared independence. 
 Lee had cleverly isolated the issue of state constitutional design to his June 1775 
subcommittee, as had Adams in May 1776. By drafting their resolutions in private 
subcommittees, they initially avoided debating the Dickinson-Duane faction in the 
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Committee of the Whole, which Adams had called the “greatest obstacle in the way of a 
declaration.”
381
 A defeated Duane attacked Adams, calling his resolution “a Machine for 
the fabrication of independence,” to which Adams happily agreed.
382
 The rising fervor for 
independence no doubt helped Adams’ May 10
th
 and 15
th
, 1776 resolutions’ gain a 
majority of Congress, as did the resolutions’ brevity, which kept them short, vague, and 
agreeable. 
 Adams kept the resolutions short to push them through Congress, but this brevity 
had the unexpected consequence of empowering the states. The May resolutions deferred 
to the states on the design of government, and the regulation of slavery, the frontier, and 
every other constitutional matter. This was an exceptional devolution of authority – thus 
far, every colony to draft a new constitution had first asked Congress’ permission. Adams 
had allowed all remaining colonial conventions to draft their new governments, and solve 
America’s gravest crisis on their own, without congressional oversight.
383
 New Jersey 
first answered the call with a convention on May 26
th
, drafting a constitution and 
declaration of independence. Pennsylvania’s Provincial Conference, meeting from June 
18
th
 to 25
th
, also declared separation from Great Britain, calling a constitutional 
convention.  
 Trailing the states, the Continental Congress gradually turned toward 
independence. George III had snubbed Congress’ Olive Branch Petition in September 
1775, Lord Dunmore had freed Virginia’s loyalist slaves the following month, and 
Paine’s Common Sense, published in January 1776, had pushed delegates toward 
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separation.
384
 On June 7
th
, 1776, Richard Henry Lee, backed by Adams and Wythe, asked 
Congress to follow Virginia in formally declaring independence.
385
 Four days later, 
Congress delegated the Declaration’s drafting to Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, 
Benjamin Franklin, Roger Sherman, and Robert R. Livingston, dubbed “the Committee 
of Five.”
386
 
 Prior state constitutional framing aided the drafting of the Declaration. In exactly 
imitating previous state declarations of independence, the Committee made a national 
Declaration that was more palatable to moderate congressmen. Adams, Jefferson, and 
Franklin, the document’s primary authors, relied on their prior experience drafting local 
constitutions and declarations of independence.
387
 Charged with composing the first draft 
of the Declaration,
388
 Jefferson drew heavily on his proposed Virginia Constitution,
389
 as 
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he later admitted.
390
 The Committee of Five and the state convention delegates mailed 
each other, read the same pamphlets, and faced the same hardships under British rule.
391
 
Consequently, the national Declaration of Independence closely resembled those printed 
in the first four state constitutions. Thirty-two of the Declaration’s thirty-eight provisions 
appeared previously in some form in a state constitution.
392
 Four provisions were 
common to at least five of the six documents, including objections to the Crown’s 
dissolution of the colonial legislatures, deploying standing armies, blocking colonial 
trade, and making war against colonists.
393
 After Congress’ Declaration, seven state 
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constitutional conventions followed, imitating the national Declaration.
394
 State and 
national framers collaborated and together met the challenge of declaring independence. 
 The Declaration’s meaning changes when read through the state constitutions. 
Consider the Declaration’s infamous silence on slavery. Jefferson’s first draft of the 
Declaration condemned George III, who had “prostituted his Negative for Suppressing 
every legislative Attempt to prohibit or to restrain an execrable Commerce” in slaves.
395
 
When the Committee of the Whole debated Jefferson’s draft on July 2
nd
 and 3
rd
, 
Georgians and South Carolinians and Northerners representing slave merchants rejected 
the clause,
396
 and the Committee of Five cut the provision. Generations of scholars have 
mourned this deletion.
397
 
 But Jefferson’s redacted clause, drawn from the Virginia Constitution of 1776,
 398
 
defended the state legislatures’ constitutional right to control the slave trade. These 
nonimportation laws let white plantation hold owners a monopoly on slave labor and 
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limit and control the growth of rebellious slave populations.
399
 The newly-independent 
Virginia legislature passed a 1778 nonimportation act and a 1793 act prohibiting 
immigration by free blacks.
400
 Similarly, Delaware’s 1776 Constitutional Convention 
simultaneously declared the state’s independence from the Crown and right to abolish the 
royal slave trade, but maintained slavery in Delaware.
401
 Jefferson’s redacted clause, like 
its author, was ambivalent about liberty. It loftily proclaimed freedom for black slaves, 
but tacitly protected states’ rights to keep slaves.
402
 Accordingly, the Declaration cannot 
be understood only through the Committee of Five’s notes or scrapped provisions, but 
must be read as a response to state and local constitutional experimentation. 
II. Local Responses, 1776-1787 
 
 Prompted by Adams’ May resolutions, the state framers drafted new constitutions 
regulating legislative sovereignty, the frontier, and slavery. Separation from Great Britain 
prevented tyranny by Parliament, but not by the colonial and state legislatures, which too 
might overextend their constitutional authority. Framers responded by forbidding state 
legislators from making or amending constitutions. By the constitutional conventions of 
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the 1770s and 1780s, concerns over taxation and Parliamentary supremacy transformed 
into broader questions of designing checks on the legislature. Pennsylvanians proposed a 
unicameral legislature constrained by frequent popular elections, while in Virginia and 
Massachusetts framers checked the lower house with an upper house, a gubernatorial 
veto, and independent courts. By the 1790s, framers universally accepted the latter 
model, resolving national debate over legislative design. On frontier matters, revolution 
abrogated the 1763 Proclamation forbidding western migration, and in scrapping their 
elitist colonial legislatures, state framers reapportioned districts to better represent 
westerners. However, framers in all states maintained old, contentious property 
qualifications on the franchise. Finally, Northern courts and legislatures accepted gradual 
emancipation, while Southerners legally reinforced slavery. This section of the chapter 
explores first how state framers limited legislatures’ constitutional authority, second, how 
they reapportioned and checked the legislature, and third, how they regulated slavery. 
A. Separating Legislative and Constitutional Authority 
 
 Across the states, constitutional framers forbade legislators from engaging in 
constitutional reform. Accordingly, between 1776 and 1784, all but two states adopted 
their constitution through a special session or constitutional convention, on the 
assumption that constitutional sovereignty lay not in the legislature, but in the united 
people, represented by their delegates in convention.
403
 There was some truth to this 
populist claim. After the Continental Congress declared independence and assumed 
management of the War, local revolutionary committees shifted their focus from wartime 
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governance to calling popular elections for convention delegates. These conventions 
proceeded slowly and deliberately, submitting draft constitutions to public revision and 
approval. In seizing the power to make and amend constitutions and submitting these to 
popular review, these conventions assuaged colonists’ anxieties over legislative tyranny 
or detachment. 
 After the Declaration, at least seven states rejected legislative sovereignty in 
constitutional matters, instead calling special, popular elections to pick delegates for their 
constitutional conventions. As provincial conferences abolished colonial suffrage 
requirements, many Americans went to the polls for the first time. Pennsylvanians moved 
first. On May 7, 1776, Philadelphians heard reports a British warship was bearing royal 
marines to the city. Within hours of Adams’ May 15
th
 resolution, Philadelphia patriots 
began organizing a preliminary meeting to call a constitutional convention to declare 
independence, much to the dismay of loyalists like John Dickinson and James Wilson.
404
 
Five days later, a crowd of four thousand ordinary Philadelphians, pressed together in the 
rain, heard a reading of the resolution and erupted in cheers, tossing their hats. 
Pennsylvania’s aristocratic legislature would rule no more. The next day, Philadelphia’s 
Committee of Observation announced a Provincial Conference would assemble to call a 
convention. Nearly every day a new rally or pamphlet or article declared Philadelphians’ 
authority to draft a new constitution. The following morning, May 22
nd
, William 
Bradford, a Philadelphia militiaman and printer of the Pennsylvania Journal, republished 
the May 15
th
 resolution and this dialogue: 
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Q. Who ought to form a new Constitution? 
A. The people. 
Q. Should the officers of the old constitution be entrusted with the power of the 
making of a new one when it becomes necessary? 
A. No. Bodies of men have the same selfish attachments as individuals, and they 
will be claiming powers and prerogatives inconsistent with the liberties of the 
people. 
 
The dialogue appeared in at least one other Philadelphia paper, and an anonymous four-
page pamphlet, The Alarm argued the state legislature could not draft a constitution. The 
state would have to call a special election for delegates.
405
 
 Pennsylvanians were the first to strip the legislature of constitutional sovereignty. 
The colony’s loyalist legislators initially refused to draft a new, separatist constitution. 
But even after the Assembly grudgingly allowed a vote for independence on June 8
th
, 
Philadelphians refused a constitutional convention called by the legislature. 
Rediscovering populist English Whig pamphlet literature, Revolutionary Pennsylvanians 
felt that after their state declared independence, authority reverted to the people of 
Pennsylvania, who passed it to their representatives in the constitutional conventions.
406
 
Thus the Pennsylvania Journal called for delegates of the middling sort, who would 
“regard not the person of the rich, nor despise the state of the poor,” and at “moment the 
constitution is framed, [would] descend into the common paths of life” and abdicate their 
authority. Pennsylvania’s populists met again at Carpenter’s Hall in Philadelphia for the 
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Provincial Conference on June 18
th
, resolving the following day “That it is necessary that 
a provincial convention be called by this conference, for the express purpose of forming a 
new government in this province, on the authority of the people only.”
407
 Since the 
convention represented the people’s united will,
408
 it could only engage in the general act 
of constitution-making, and not in particular legislation.
409
 
 This populism was not merely rhetorical. Conference delegates decided that free 
males over twenty-one and with a year of residency could vote for delegates to the 
coming Constitutional Convention, and reapportionment of Convention delegates would 
give a voice to long-neglected western frontier counties. The proportion of freemen 
eligible to vote increased from fifty to ninety percent, and the elections vaulted 
Appalachian farmers and urban tradesmen into the Convention. On August 2
nd
, the 
Convention printed and distributed a draft constitution. For four weeks, Pennsylvanians 
debated the constitutions in town meetings, newspapers, and pamphlets, sending edits to 
the Convention, which incorporated the revisions into the final draft approved on 
September 27
th
. On dissolving, the Convention transferred authority over constitutional 
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revision not to the legislature but to a newly-designed Council of Censors, chosen from 
the people’s representatives.
410
 
 Pennsylvania’s populist process proliferated. With elite legislators excluded from 
the state conventions by loyalty oaths or prohibitions on dual office holding, many state 
framers were small farmers, backcountry lawyers, printers, merchants, and 
shopkeepers.
411
 Imitating Pennsylvania, other states distinguished constitution-making 
from lawmaking by calling special elections for convention delegates.
412
 On July 27, 
1776 Delaware’s legislature refused to engage in constitution-making, instead scheduling 
special elections to select delegates to the state constitutional convention.
413
 Provincial 
congresses in New York, New Jersey, Maryland, and North Carolina also expressly 
instructed convention delegates to represent the common will by avoiding legislating, a 
necessarily narrow and self-interested activity. To secure popular sovereignty, many state 
constitutions allowed the people to check legislators with frequent elections, open 
legislative sessions, and publication and public review of proposed bills. And Maryland 
and North Carolina delegates printed and distributed their proposed constitution for a 
                                                 
410
 Kruman, Between Authority and Liberty, 24–28; Maier, American Scripture, 66; Adams, The First 
American Constitutions, 74–77. 
411
 Nevins, The American States, 134. But note that Pennsylvania’s Provincial Conference required voters 
selecting delegates, and the delegates themselves, take loyalty oaths to the new state. This excluded 
royalists and the colony’s Quaker elite, which refused oaths on principle. Still excluded from the franchise 
were many women, slaves, non-Protestants, and the very poor. In most states, the public could not vote to 
ratify a proposed constitution. Of the thirty-four conventions between 1776 and 1799, only Massachusetts’ 
1778 and 1780 Conventions and New Hampshire’s 1784 Convention submitted their work for a vote of 
public approval, though Pennsylvania’s 1776 Convention distributed a draft constitution to public debate.  
412
 Note however, the separatist legislatures of Connecticut and Rhode Island used statutes to recognize 
their existing colonial charters as the state constitutions. See Adams, The First American Constitutions, 64–
66. At least since the revolt against the 1686 Dominion of New England, New England colonists had 
understood their charters and legislatures to shield them from monarchical tyranny. Nevins, against Wood, 
Kruman, and Adams, argues the conventions frequently engaged in legislation. See Nevins, The American 
States, 136–37. 
413
 Thomas McKean, as president of Pennsylvania’s Provincial Conference, had proposed the state’s special 
elections, was elected to serve in the Delaware Constitutional Convention in September, where he 
reminded fellow delegates to serve the common interest and avoid parochial lawmaking. 
119 
 
two-week period of pubic consideration.
414
 State constitutional convention delegates 
appeased frontiersmen by extending them the vote and lawmaking authority for the first 
time, and by ousting or weakening elitist eastern legislators.
415
 
 Massachusetts citizens were exceptionally clear in limiting legislative 
sovereignty. On September 17, 1776, the Massachusetts legislature issued a circular letter 
to the state’s town meetings, requesting authority to draft a constitution. Twenty-three of 
the ninety-seven towns objected to some element of the plan.
416
 Instead, the legislature 
held special elections for delegates a new legislative session, which drafted a constitution. 
The state called all men over twenty-one to vote on the proposed constitution, the first 
such election in America. In March 1778, Massachusetts voters resoundingly rejected the 
legislature’s constitutional plan 9,972 to 2,083. Finally, the legislature capitulated in June 
1779, calling a constitutional convention “with the sole purpose of framing a 
constitution.” The Convention drafted a new proposal that voters accepted two years 
later. In 1784, New Hampshire replaced its emergency constitution, imitating 
Massachusetts’ plan for popular elections.
417
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 Framers also forbade the legislature from amending the constitution. The first 
framers expected constitutional change to occur through extralegal popular revolution, 
rather than through legislative revision. Eleven state conventions invoked their right to 
rebel and draft a new constitution, and four formally recognized this popular authority in 
their bills of rights.
418
 Accordingly, initially only three states specified a formal, legal 
process for amendment by convention.
419
 Framers felt legislators represented narrow, 
parochial interests, and thus could not amend or reinterpret a constitution, which 
embodied the common good. Georgia, Delaware, and New Jersey framers expressly 
stripped the power of the state legislature to amend or contradict the ratified 
constitution.
420
 Pennsylvania also prohibited legislative amendment, which it passed to 
Georgia and Vermont.
421
 Maryland allowed the legislature to amend the 1776 
Constitution only if the amendment represented a united popular will, indicated by a two-
thirds majority in both houses over two years.
422
 And when South Carolina’s legislature 
attempted to frame a new constitution, Governor John Rutledge resigned in protest and 
his replacement refused to take office.
423
 Massachusetts’ 1780 Constitution prohibited all 
political branches from revising the constitution through “orders, laws, statutes, and 
ordinances, directions and instructions,” providing instead for an eventual popular 
referendum for constitutional replacement, a provision New Hampshire borrowed in 
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1784.
424
 Elsewhere, framers proposed a gubernatorial veto or an independent revision 
council as a counterweight to the legislature.
425
 For example, Pennsylvania’s Council of 
Censors met septennially to affirm that no legislative statutes had violated the people’s 
will as represented at the 1776 Convention.
426
 
 The state conventions clarified questions of legislative sovereignty and suffrage 
that had dogged the colonies under British rule. Colonists united in Farmers rejected 
legislative sovereignty and distinguished it from constitutional authority. All of the 
provincial congresses and constitutional conventions expressly refused to serve as a 
standing government, and after drafting a constitution, each of the initial state 
conventions dissolved.
427
 Underlying this self-imposed brevity was the assumption that 
only a rare, momentary emergency could unite the people to a common interest, making 
it possible to legally represent the whole people, the aim of constitution-making.
428
 In 
contrast, ordinary legislation, serving narrower private interests, was done by standing 
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bodies. Additionally, as states called conventions, many ordinary American freemen 
turned to the polls and to deliberative meetings for the first time. In selecting delegates 
and in writing constitutions, the people could claim authority over all law, refuting 
Parliamentary claims that popular authority extended only to tax law. 
B. Legislative Design 
 
 Still, the states did not ban their standing legislatures outright. It now fell to state 
constitutional drafters to check and equitably reapportion the legislature. In mid-1776, 
state framers split between two legislative designs. Pennsylvania framed a unicameral 
legislature checked by frequent popular elections, while Virginia and Massachusetts 
reverted to the English Whig plan to check the lower house with an aristocratic upper 
house and a gubernatorial veto. By the late 1780s the state framers settled on the latter 
model, which promised stronger, gubernatorial and judicial constraints. This model 
assuaged framers’ worries of legislative detachment, resolving the national question over 
legislative sovereignty and design. 
 Pennsylvania pioneered the unicameral model. For centuries, Pennsylvania’s 
colonial legislature, the Assembly, had maintained statutory and charter provisions 
disempowering the urban poor and western settlers.
429
 In 1775 under charter rule, only 
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This Charter downsized the Council and granted the Governor’s power of appointment 
to the Assembly, which effectively became the colony’s government. The Charter also limited the vote to 
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147 of Philadelphia County’s 6,941 taxable males were wealthy enough to vote.
430
 As 
Philadelphia’s poor population boomed in the 1750s and 1760s,
431
 these citizens mobbed, 
interrupting Philadelphia elections, casting multiple illegal ballots, and harassing wealthy 
voters with clubs and stones. Rowdy Pennsylvanians mobbed polling places in 
Philadelphia in 1705 and 1742, Chester County in 1739, Lancaster County in 1749, York 
County in 1750, and Bucks County in 1752. The following year the Assembly dispatched 
constables with lists of taxpayers to elections to expel ineligible voters, stifling the 
protests.
432
 Moreover, while western frontier counties rapidly grew in the mid-eighteenth 
century,
 433
 the colonial legislature largely refused to revise the 1701 Charter to grant 
westerners new seats.
434
 The malapportionment issue came to a head during the French 
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and Indian War, when westerners unsuccessfully petitioned the legislature to form 
militias and build forts,
435
 eventually rioting and marching on the legislature in 1763 
before being dispersed by royal troops.
436
 The Assembly responded with only token 
reapportionment.
437
 
 The Stamp Act and Coercive Acts spurred westerners and progressive 
Philadelphians to form the Committee of Correspondence of Philadelphia, challenging 
the loyalist Assembly.
438
 At the behest of the Committee, revolutionary delegates from 
nearly all Pennsylvania counties converged on Philadelphia for a brief, initial 
insurrectionary Provincial Convention in late January of 1775.
439
 On May 22, 1776, a 
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Philadelphia meeting affirmed the Continental Congress’ May 10
th
 and 15
th
 resolutions 
requesting new state constitutions. Then on June 18
th
, dozens of western delegates 
attended the statewide Provincial Conference of Committees to dictate the process for 
electing delegates to a convention to draft a new constitution.
440
 Consequently, the 
Constitutional Convention fielded a relatively egalitarian distribution of delegates,
441
 
many of whom were also ideologically committed to direct democracy and the 
unicameral legislative design.
442
 
                                                                                                                                                 
distributing goods. But “the real objective was to familiarize the people with the necessity of subverting the 
old charter and establishing a new constitution.” Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, 71. 
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5, Westmoreland, 2. The delegates were men of humble background, nearly all captains, majors, or 
colonels in the Continental Army, joined by a few country lawyers, and several scholars, including 
Benjamin Franklin and Benjamin Rush. The Conference’s first motion was to unanimously uphold the 
Continental Congress’ May 15
th
 resolution, and declare the colony’s royal government illegitimate. Two 
days later, the Conference allowed all taxpaying free males over twenty-one and with a year of residency to 
elect delegates to the Constitutional Convention. With property and apportionment restrictions lifted, the 
proportion of freemen eligible to vote increased from fifty to ninety percent, guaranteeing a more populist 
constitutional convention. Further, the Conference excluded from the election those who would not 
forswear allegiance to the crown, targeting wealthy eastern loyalists, as well as Quaker elites, who refused 
oaths. A unanimous resolution also required a similar oath for convention delegates. The pledge required 
delegates to “profess faith in God the Father, & in Jesus Christ his eternal son, the true God, & in the Holy 
Spirit,” excluding faithful Unitarian Christians as well as non-Christians. Kruman, Between Authority and 
Liberty, 26; Maier, American Scripture, 66. 
441
 A June 21 resolution by the Conference required at the Convention “equal representation for each 
County.” Thus each county, plus the City of Philadelphia, dispatched four delegates to the state’s 
Constitutional Convention. Western delegates outnumbered those from the City of Philadelphia and the 
three eastern counties thirty-two to sixteen, and many of the Philadelphia delegates were radicals opposed 
to the Assembly. Theodore Thayer writes: “When one considers the composition of the Constitutional 
Convention, it becomes apparent that almost any procedure adopted in choosing a drafting committee 
would have given it a radical majority…the opposition could do little more than register its protest.” And 
Rosalind Branning affirms that the imbalance of delegates at the Convention “marks the transfer of power 
from the people whose ancestors were the original settlers under William Penn to the newer elements in the 
recently settled regions, together with their political allies.” Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth 
of Democracy, 184, 191; Branning, Pennsylvania Constitutional Development, 9–16. 
442
 As Gary Nash asserts, Pennsylvania’s new “constitution drafters rejected three of the most honored 
elements of English republican thought” – bicameralism, executive independence, and property-based 
suffrage. Pennsylvania’s framers instead imitated the ancient Saxons and Romans. The Saxons governed 
England through the local “tithing,” the egalitarian, deliberative village meeting in which all men of age 
held stake. Tithings annually elected a common, unicameral legislature, and retained the right to revoke 
their delegates. An anonymous 1776 pamphlet printed in Philadelphia, The Genuine Principles of the 
Ancient Saxon, or English Constitution introduced many Pennsylvanians to unicameralism, popular checks 
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 Two coalitions emerged in the Constitutional Convention. John Dickinson’s 
populist faction joined the Convention, abandoning the Assembly, which collapsed in the 
summer of 1776, unable to reach quorum.
443
 Against them, conservative Convention 
delegates sought to preserve the Assembly’s aristocratic tradition and maintain mixed, 
multi-branch government.
444
  Thanks to Philadelphia’s revolutionary tenor, the radical 
party prevailed, designing a directly-elected, powerful unicameral legislature, with 
equitable apportionment for westerners.
445
 The people, the true seat of sovereignty, would 
regularly check the legislature with yearly elections and term limits.
446
 Legislators would 
debate publicly, submit their minutes and laws for public review and amendment, pledge 
                                                                                                                                                 
on the legislature, and manhood suffrage. Paine’s Common Sense, printed in January 1776, also inclined 
delegates toward unicameralism and regular election. Additionally, echoing the Roman model, 
Pennsylvanian framers proposed a Council of Censors to monitor the legislature and executive. Some 
delegates adopted a radical strain of republicanism, emphasizing the Lockean right to popular revolt. These 
reformers merged republican “Whig sentiments similar to those expressed in the Declaration of 
Independence and…guarantees of personal liberty and of Anglo-Saxon judicial procedures.” Selsam, The 
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, 71, 118; Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 
226–32; Branning, Pennsylvania Constitutional Development, 14; Nash, The Unknown American 
Revolution, 273–74. 
443
 The popular, or radical, party was led by wealthy Presbyterian Philadelphia radicals, including George 
Bryan, James Cameron, James Cannon, and Franklin, the Convention’s president. Despite their wealth, as 
Thayer puts it, their minds were unfettered by “traditional concepts concerning the proper form of civil 
government,” including mixed government. Instead they had a “tendency to approve the democratic 
aspirations of the common man.” Consequently, they allied with the west’s “motley throng of backwoods 
farmers and country politicians,” and a handful of populist German delegates from the middle counties. A 
few wayward Philadelphia Quakers like Timothy Matlack joined the radicals. Matlack was a westerner in 
spirit, prone to horse racing, cock fighting, and the occasional stint in jail, which cost him membership in 
the Quaker Society of Friends. Paul Leicester Ford, “The Adoption of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 
1776,” Political Science Quarterly 10, no. 3 (September 1, 1895): 432–34, doi:10.2307/2139954; Thayer, 
Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy, 182–86. 
444
 Most conservative leaders like George Ross, George Clymer, and James Smith came from wealthy 
Philadelphia families. A Quaker leader in the Assembly, Ross was presiding officer in the Convention. 
Clymer admired Montesquieu’s separation of powers and the moderate Whig theory of mixed government. 
And per Thayer, Smith “feared an unrestrained democracy…The end product of [the Convention], he 
concluded, was forcing upon Pennsylvania a thoroughgoing democratic ‘Agrarian constitution.” Thayer, 
Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy, 187–90. 
445
 Ben Franklin, George Bryan, and James Cameron proposed the unicameral legislature as the 
Constitution’s centerpiece, and the locus of institutional power in the state. The description of the 
legislature took the first third of the 1776 printing of the document for public consideration. See the 
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Section 1, 5-17. 
446
 Legislators sat for one-year terms, serving no more than four terms in seven years, and no more than 
four years consecutively. See the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Section 8. 
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loyalty to the people of Pennsylvania.
447
 They could not amend the Constitution, which 
the Preamble established as the written popular will. “Demophilius,” the pseudonymous 
author of a popular pamphlet on Saxon democracy, praised this measure for separating 
the legislature’s statutory authority from constitutional authority, which lay in “the hands 
of THE PEOPLE.”
448
 “Here we see a regular process,” Thomas Paine added, “a 
Government issuing out of a Constitution, formed by the people in their original 
character, and that Constitution serving not only as an authority, but as a law of control to 
the Government.”
449
 Sovereignty lay in the people’s will and Constitution, rather than the 
legislature, which would be closely checked.
450
 
 The people closely controlled the legislature, which controlled the other, weaker 
branches. The legislature selected an executive council of nine, with a president and vice 
president, to meet at the same time and place as the legislature.
451
 The Executive Council 
appointed a judiciary, which served at the legislature’s pleasure for seven-year non-
renewable terms.
452
 Legislators could impeach judges and executive councilmen, who 
lacked veto power.
453
  
                                                 
447
 See the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Section 10, 13-15. 
448
 Quoted in Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, 435. 
449
 Thomas Paine, Common Sense, The Rights of Man and Other Essential Writings of Thomas Paine (New 
York: Signet Classics, 2003), 297. 
450
 Selsam suggests the Pennsylvania legislature, “through the enlarged franchise, was the people’s – and 
the people were supreme.” Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, 187. 
451
 In the first draft, legislators selected all members of the council. Delegates’ most radical provisions 
stripped the executive of its traditional enforcement powers. The President commanded Pennsylvania’s 
armed forces, but only with the regular approval of the assembled Council, which through revision was 
enlarged to twelve members elected from the state’s eleven counties and Philadelphia. Each member served 
a three-year term, rotating so that only four members would be elected at the same time, preventing 
factions. Scattered across the counties, the Executive Council could meet only rarely to authorize military 
actions, preventing the overbearing executive that emerged under the early colonial charters. Other states, 
recalling Whig anti-monarchism and their own authoritarian and inept colonial governors, also limited their 
executives, but Pennsylvania’s was the weakest, largely an honorary office. See the Pennsylvania 
Constitution of 1776, Section 20. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, 72–79. 
452
 Without the power of judicial review, the branch could only arbitrate contracts and disputes. Judges, like 
legislators, were salaried, so that independently-wealthy aristocrats would not be the only ones attracted to 
office. See the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Section 17 on salaries for legislators and Section 26 for 
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 Further, the delegates framed a Council of Censors to interpret and guard the 
Constitution, the written will of the people, from the ambitions of the legislature.
454
 If 
elected officials failed in “their duties as guardians of the people,” the Council could 
impeach them, and repeal the laws inconsistent with the Constitution and the people’s 
will. And, for “the rights and happiness of the people,” the Council could call a new 
convention to abolish the legislature or executive entirely, and form a new popular 
government.
455
 
 Finally, the Constitution allowed broad political participation and equitable 
legislative apportionment, benefiting poor urban and frontier voters. Suffrage extended to 
every free male taxpayer, twenty-one or older, with at least a year of residence.
456
 
According to Gary Nash, this “created the most liberal franchise known in the Western 
world to that date.”
457
 The document also served Pennsylvania’s poor with a host of 
redistributive social welfare provisions.
458
 And appeasing frontiersmen, the Constitution 
                                                                                                                                                 
judges. After public review, delegates removed a provision from the proposed Section 25 allowing the 
legislature to create courts at will. 
453
 See the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Section 22.  
454
 Derived from Roman example, this Council of twenty-four was directly elected by each county, plus 
Philadelphia, every seven years. 
455
 See the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Section 47. Note the people of Pennsylvania could not call a 
convention, which Shaeffer suggests framers intended to check populism John N. Shaeffer, “Public 
Consideration of the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and 
Biography 98, no. 4 (October 1, 1974): 437. 
456
 See the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Section 17. 
457
 No longer disenfranchised by property qualifications, the urban poor exercised electoral power 
proportionate to their population. Foreigners could own property, after a year, could assume the rights of a 
freeman, and after two years, could vote. Nash, The Unknown American Revolution, 268–77; Wood, The 
Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 169. 
458
 The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 established and subsidized public schools in each county, limited 
tuition, and established a university, the modern Dickinson College. Delegates exempted debtors from 
imprisonment if they attempted to repay loans, and required reasonable bail for those who could not. 
Criminal prisoners were also exempted from excessive bail. Note, though, that non-capital crimes were 
punishable by work in labor houses. There was no property qualification to run for office. Finally, lands, 
commons, and game were provided for the public to hunt, affirming Pennsylvania’s claim to be a 
commonwealth. A provision of the Bill of Rights, later retracted, sought land redistribution to the poor. No 
other state passed a similar provision, and perhaps none have since. The clause held: “an enormous 
proportion of property vested in a few individuals is dangerous to the rights, and destructive of the common 
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promised to arm and train freemen, and allowed them to elect their own officers to 
organize militias.
459
 
 Pennsylvania was the first state to require public revision of a proposed 
constitution,
460
 and after public meetings, petitions, pamphlets, and newspaper 
commentary, Pennsylvania’s framers redrafted two-thirds of the original provisions.
461
 
Delegates also added a concession, Section 15, that the legislature could not pass a 
proposed law until the next session, letting the public review the proposal. The 
Convention deferred to the public to apportion legislative districts. Laymen reviewing the 
constitution proposed districts proportional to the taxable population, reapportioned every 
seven years in accord with census returns, assuring parity in representation between 
urban elites and growing Appalachian counties.
462
 The public also seized from the 
legislature the power of electing executive councilmen.
463
 After review, delegates 
                                                                                                                                                 
happiness, of mankind; and therefore every free state hath a right by its laws to discourage the possession 
of such property.” See the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Section 28-9, 43. Selsam, The Pennsylvania 
Constitution of 1776, 192, 202–4; Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy, 192–96. 
459
 See the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Section 5. 
460
 On September 5, 1776, the Convention submitted the Constitution for public review, printing 400 copies 
of the document for distribution. By September 18, the proposed Constitution appeared in three 
newspapers. Relatedly, “Demophilius” had proposed this measure only two months earlier. Oddly, a 
September 25 newspaper commentary also under the name “Demophilius” argued Pennsylvania’s new 
electorate of rural, uneducated farmers would select inept representatives. Against the unicameral Saxon 
model, the commentary argued for a council of educated legislators to check the lower house. Shaeffer, 
“Public Consideration of the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution,” 416, 432. 
461
 Delegates initially required voters take a loyalty oath, excluding Quaker elites, but dropped the 
provision after public review. The final draft of Section 6: “Every freemen of the full age of twenty-one 
Years, having resided in this state for the space of one whole Year next before the day of election for 
representatives, and paid public taxes during that time, shall enjoy the right of an elector: Provided always, 
that sons of freeholders of the age of twenty-one years shall be intitled to vote although they have not paid 
taxes.” This clause allowed Pennsylvania officials to exclude potential voters who were not freemen.  Note 
the original added a provision, proposed by the convention, which granted “the rights of an elector on 
taking an oath or affirmation of fidelity to the Common-Wealth, if required.” However, an original 
provision requiring legislators pledge loyalty (§10) survived public review. For the original proposal, see 
“The proposed plan or frame of government for the commonwealth or state of Pennsylvania : printed for 
consideration,” Rare Book and Manuscript Library – Rare Book Collection, Van Pelt Library, University of 
Pennsylvania. 
462
 The proposed Constitution required only voting by district (see the original Section 17). The rest was 
framed in response to public review. See Section 17 of the final draft. 
463
 Compare the original Section 18 to the final draft’s Section 19. 
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prefaced the Constitution with a preamble and bill of rights.
464
 On September 28
th
, the 
Convention ratified the 1776 Constitution. 
 Five states imitated Pennsylvania’s institutional, apportionment, and rights 
provisions.
465
 Timothy Matlack, Thomas Young, and James Cannon, all radicals in the 
Pennsylvanian Convention, evidently sent their plan to the conventions of Vermont and 
Georgia.
466
 In an open letter, Young cited Congress’ May 15
th
 resolution, he called on 
them to exercise their “supreme constituent power” – evidently the first use of this phrase 
– and draft a new constitution, modeled on Pennsylvania’s.
467
 On July 8, 1777, the 
Vermont Convention ratified a constitution almost identical to Pennsylvania’s, including 
a unicameral legislature, limited executive, yearly public review of legislation, and 
                                                 
464
 The preamble opened by claiming George III violated Pennsylvanians’ natural rights to safety and self-
government, forcing the colonists to rebel and found a new government on popular consent. The 
Convention first drafted a bill of rights on July 25, but did not include it in the publicly-circulated proposal. 
After public review, the final draft included a Declaration of Rights which protected life, liberty, property, 
happiness, and safety, religious free exercise and non-establishment, popular control of the police and 
government and a legal right to rebellion, and a right to vote. Other provisions prohibited taking property or 
forcing militia service without consent, trial without charge or council, warrantless search and seizure, and 
criminal and civil trial without jury. The conclusion recognized a right to free speech, to bear arms, to 
virtuous representatives, to move between counties and states, and to assembly. See the 1776 Declaration 
of Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth or State of Pennsylvania, Articles I--XVI. Fifteen years 
later, the federal framers adopted parts of nine of the Pennsylvania’s Declaration’s sixteen articles into the 
federal Bill of Rights. 
465
 The influence of Pennsylvania’s 1776 Constitution was not limited to the United States. Thomas Paine, 
an Englishman in Philadelphia, commended the Constitution in The Rights of Man. Franklin traveled 
France distributing copies of the Constitution, including to French intellectuals like Anne-Robert-Jacques 
Turgot, the Duke de la Rochefoucauld, and Condorcet. As the French Revolution loomed, the Girondist 
leader Jacques Pierre Brissot circulated a French printing of the Constitution with accompanying essays, 
which was later translated into Italian. And a German edition, “Die Regierungsverfassung der Republik 
Pennsylvanien,” was published in 1776. Not far behind Franklin was John Adams, an opponent of 
Pennsylvania’s majoritarian democracy, who tried to turn Europeans, and later, Americans, against the 
1776 Constitution. J. Paul Selsam and Joseph G. Rayback, “French Comment on the Pennsylvania 
Constitution of 1776,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 76, no. 3 (July 1, 1952): 311–
25; Williams, “State Constitutions of the Founding Decade,” 563. 
466
 John Adams, “Autobiography,” in The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States: 
With A Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, ed. Charles Francis Adams, vol. II (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1775), 508. 
467
 Thomas Young, “To the Inhabitants of Vermont, a Free and Independent Stae, Bounding on the River 
Connecticut and Lake Champlain, April 11, 1777,” in Publications of the Colonial Society of 
Massachusetts: Transations, 1906-1907, vol. IX (Boston: The Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 1777), 
44–46; Adams, The First American Constitutions, 63. 
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regular public review of the Constitution.
468
 The Georgia Convention, meeting by night 
in a tavern, followed Pennsylvania establishing a unicameral legislature and secret 
balloting, and elected nearly all civil officers annually.
469
 Maryland established a mixed 
government, including an upper house, but elected both houses annually.
470
 Under an 
early draft constitution, modeled on those of Pennsylvania and Vermont, legislation faced 
public, not gubernatorial, review. Following the Georgian model, citizens regularly 
elected all public officials.
471
 North Carolina’s Convention also seems to have borrowed 
elements of Pennsylvania’s bill of rights. Finally, Pennsylvanians like the Philadelphia 
radical Thomas McKean influenced the Delaware Convention, which adopted elements 
of the Pennsylvania and Maryland bills of rights.
472
 
 Philadelphia’s rising spirit of democratic unicameralism unnerved John Adams. 
Thomas Paine printed Common Sense in January 1776, which Adams condemned “as 
flowing from simple ignorance, and a mere desire to please the democratic party, in 
Philadelphia, at whose head were Mr. Matlack, Mr. Cannon, and Dr. Young,” the framers 
of Pennsylvania’s Constitution. He added: “I dreaded the effect so popular [a] pamphlet 
                                                 
468
 Beginning with a sweeping bill of rights, the Vermont Constitution granted universal manhood suffrage, 
abolished slavery, and even redistributed land to small farmers.  See the Vermont Constitution of 1777, e.g. 
Declaration of Rights, Article I, and Frame of Government, Section II, XIII-IV, XVI-XIX. Nash, The 
Unknown American Revolution, 280–84. 
469
 See the Georgia Constitution of 1777, Article II. In April 1776, Georgia’s Provincial Council drafted 
“Rules and Regulations of the Colony of Georgia.” These rules maintained laws made under the colonial 
Assembly, and thus do not qualify as a state constitution. Moreover, they were explicitly a “temporary 
expedient be fallen upon to curb the lawless and protect the peaceable,” and not as durable as a 
constitution. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 148 n40, 150, 226 n41. 
470
 See the Maryland Constitution of 1776, Article I-II. 
471
 Further, taxation was proportional to wealth, debt was limited, and the franchise was broad, a concession 
to armed disenfranchised citizens in five counties. Ultimately the Convention rejected these provisions, 
maintaining colonial restrictions on suffrage. 
472
 Adams, The First American Constitutions, 73, 78–80. 
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might have among the people, and determined to do all in my power to counteract the 
effect of it.”
473
 
 The following April Adams penned his Thoughts on Government, arguing 
Americans should maintain their tradition of Whig balanced government.
474
 He proposed 
bicameralism, limiting popular participation to annual elections, and constraining the 
people’s lower house with an upper house and a gubernatorial veto.
475
 Over the summer 
of 1776, Adams aggressively promoted his pamphlet among state framers.
476
 He started 
with Virginia,
477
 where local aristocrats sought an upper house to check a popular 
majority.
478
 The distribution of power in Virginia, and in other states, hung in the 
                                                 
473
 Addams however added that Paine’s “arguments in favor of independence I liked very well.” Adams, 
“Autobiography,” 507. He had pushed his May 10 and 15, 1776 resolutions through a subcommittee, rather 
than the Committee of the Whole, worrying that the latter might recommend unicameral governments for 
the states. Adams, The First American Constitutions, 54. 
474
 He stated “it will be safest to proceed in all established modes, to which the people have been 
familiarized by habit.” John Adams, “Thoughts on Government,” in The Works of John Adams, Second 
President of the United States: With a Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, ed. Charles Francis 
Adams, vol. IV (Boston: Little, Brown, 1776), 195; Nevins, The American States, 124; Wood, The 
Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 131, 134, 208, 579; Adams, The First American 
Constitutions, 118–22. 
475
 Note that Adams’ plan placed the state executive within the legislature, following the custom of 
Parliament, and that he equivocated on the extent of veto power, perhaps recalling Massachusetts’ 
authoritarian royal governor Gage. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 141. 
476
 Adams so thoroughly prompted the treatise that the historian Gordon Wood dubbed it “the most 
influential pamphlet in the early constitution-making period.” Ibid., 203. 
477
 As Virginia prepared to call a convention, Adams instructed Richard Henry Lee that Virginians ought to 
introduce an independent executive and judiciary to check their legislature: “It is by ballancing each of 
these Powers against the other two, that the Effort in humane Nature towards Tyranny, can alone be 
checked and restrained and any degree of Freedom preserved in the Constitution.” Lee spread the letter, 
and with his colleague George Wythe – also a friend of Adams – printed and disseminated Adams’ final 
draft of the Thoughts. Adams first sent the Thoughts to his Virginian confidante Patrick Henry, who 
reprinted it in Williamsburg’s Virginia Gazette on May 10
th
 for other members of the state Constitutional 
Convention. John Adams, “Letter to Richard Henry Lee, November 15, 1775,” in The Works of John 
Adams, Second President of the United States: With a Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, ed. 
Charles Francis Adams, vol. IV (Boston: Little, Brown, 1775). 
478
 Carter Braxton, scion of Virginia’s Carter dynasty, penned for his fellow Convention delegates “An 
Address to the Convention of the Colony and Ancient Dominion of Virginia.” Braxton’s aristocratic 
leaning surprised even Adams. Warning against “a reckless spirit of innovation” by “advocates of popular 
governments” and the consequent “tumult and riot incident to simple democracy,” Braxton’s proposal 
limited lower house elections to every third year, life tenure in the upper house, and urged delegates to 
retain their English laws and customs, including a strong executive and upper house. Braxton’s pamphlet 
derided Adams’ Thoughts as too trusting of democracy and public virtue. In a June 3
rd
 letter to Patrick 
Henry, Adams rebutted Braxton’s proposal for triennial legislative elections, scoffing that Braxton’s “little 
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balance.
479
 Drawing on the writings of Adams, Lee, Jefferson, and the English Whigs, 
Virginia delegates adopted a conservative tripartite scheme, establishing an upper house 
to represent the state’s gentry and check the lower house.
480
 The bicameral legislature 
would in turn select a Governor and Privy Council, imitating Parliament.
481
 Judges, 
though appointed by the legislature, held life tenure, conditional on good behavior, 
making Virginia the first state to introduce and independent judiciary. A prohibition on 
plural office holding helped ensure separation of powers. Framers maintained the colonial 
requirement that voters hold fifty acres of land, on the English Whig assumption that 
landed property gave its owner an enduring, perhaps inherited, material interest in the 
common welfare of the state, and the material independence to vote without coercion.
482
 
Malapportionment kept power in eastern counties, leaving unresolved questions of 
                                                                                                                                                 
pamphlet…will make no fortune in the world. It is too absurd to be considered twice.” Richard Henry Lee 
offered his own “Government Scheme” in the Gazette, reiterating Adams’ plan and calling for an upper 
house and a supreme court to check the people’s house. While serving in Congress, Jefferson also 
developed a tripartite plan of government, which he sent the Virginia Convention. Braxton, “An Address to 
the Convention of the Colony and Ancient Dominion of Virginia; on the Subject of Government in 
General, and Recommending a Particular Form to Their Consideration,” 670–72; John Adams, The Works 
of John Adams, Second President of the United States: With A Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, 
ed. Charles Francis Adams, vol. IX (Boston: Little, Brown, 1854), 837; Nevins, The American States, 122–
25, 145–46; Gutzman, Virginia’s American Revolution, 24–27; Unger, Lion of Liberty, 113–16. 
479
 As Robert Williams writes, “What was at stake was how new state governments would be structured and 
which groups in society would have the dominant policy-making role under the new governments.” 
Williams, “State Constitutions of the Founding Decade,” 544. 
480
 See the Virginia Constitution of 1776, Bill of Rights, Section 3. Since the upper house was elected, 
Virginian democrats hoped it too could be a people’s house. Kruman, Between Authority and Liberty, 141–
44. 
481
 The legislature was the state’s dominant branch, electing delegates to the Continental Congress, state 
judges, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General. The executive lacked a veto on the legislature. 
Ibid., 41, 91, 11–21. 
482
 Section 6 of Virginia’s 1776 Constitution: “all men, having sufficient evidence of permanent common 
interest with, and attachment to, the community, have the right of suffrage.” With the forced dispossession 
of frontier Indians, land became cheap and plentiful, allowing a broad franchise. This property requirement 
also closed a path to suffrage for women, who under coverture had few chances to own property, and 
perhaps to free blacks and Indians. See Adams, The First American Constitutions, 204–5. 
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frontiersmen’s rights.
483
 As Alan Nevins concludes, Virginia’s “Constitution tended to 
perpetuate the old oligarchy of rich Tidewater planters.”
484
 
 Building on the era’s moderate Whig sentiment,
485
 Adams’ separation of powers 
model spread to at least four other conventions, each of which imitated parts of his 
plan.
486
 Many other state framers checked the lower house by ensconcing their aristocrats 
in an upper house. South Carolina’s William Henry Drayton, for example, proposed state 
senators be not elected, but appointed for life from the state’s wealthiest families.
487
 The 
fever for mixed government peaked in Massachusetts in September 1779. John Adams 
proposed a tripartite scheme with a bicameral legislature, including a Senate to represent 
the state’s propertied classes, a powerful, veto-equipped governor elected by the people, 
an independent, tenured judiciary, and a bill of rights.
488
 In a state recently freed from the 
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 While the electorate was broad, it was not equitably represented. The Convention delegates maintained 
colonial malapportionment, such that small eastern counties, like larger, growing western ones, elected two 
seats to the House of Delegates, much to the frustration of democrats like Jefferson. In contrast, 
Pennsylvania’s 1776 Constitution redrew districts every seven years to incorporate growing frontier 
counties, and reapportioned districts by taxable population, rather than by voting population. On different 
models of apportionment, see Williams, “State Constitutions of the Founding Decade,” 569–74. 
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 Nevins, The American States, 146–48; Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 156; 
Kruman, Between Authority and Liberty, 41, 91, 117; Adams, The First American Constitutions, 234, 237–
40, 265–66. 
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 English Whigs pamphleteers advocated bicameral legislature and written bill of rights to check the 
Crown. American framers read these tracts  in every state save South Carolina, stripped the executive’s 
legislative authority. Many governors were elected annually, by the legislature, and all were supervised by 
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 The North Carolina legislature requested Adam’s writings, which he sent to John Penn, a fellow 
congressman. Penn served in the North Carolina Convention that December, which switched from a 
unicameral model to one of checks and balances. That November, Maryland’s Convention passed a 
constitutional provision declaring that “the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government ought 
to be forever separate and distinct from each other.” Consulting Adams’ pamphlet, New York followed suit 
in April 1777. As this dissertation later explains, Adams also implemented his model in Massachusetts. See 
the North Carolina Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, Section IV, the Maryland Constitution of 
1776, Declaration of Rights, Section VI, and the New York of 1777, Sections II-III. Adams, 
“Autobiography,” 508; Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 150–61; Williams, 
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 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 206–22. 
488
 The drafting of a bill of rights and structure of government was left to a subcommittee of James 
Bowdoin, Samuel Adams, and John Adams, who lead the group. 
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overbearing Governor Gage, Adams’ plan for a gubernatorial veto was contentious. No 
convention had so empowered a governor. But Adams defended governor as a 
dispassionate check on a tyrannical legislature, and the Convention passed his plan, with 
the stipulation that a two-thirds legislative majority override the veto.
489
 Four years later, 
New Hampshire called a convention, replacing its temporary 1776 Constitution with one 
modeled on Massachusetts’. 
 Eventually Pennsylvania pamphleteers turned memories of Parliamentary tyranny 
against their powerful state legislature. A polemicist called “Associator” in 1777 derided 
the Pennsylvania Constitution as a plan “full of whimsies – a government with only one 
legislative branch, which has never yet failed to end in tyranny.” Conservatives called for 
a new constitution with a strong executive and bicameral legislature, one that they felt 
better represented the natural, tripartite division of society. As the theory of mixed, Whig 
government eclipsed that of direct, Saxon democracy, Pennsylvania’s ideology drifted 
toward that of the other, more moderate states, and in 1790 Pennsylvanians scrapped their 
old constitution for a tripartite scheme.
490
 
 Harnessing arguments for judicial independence and that constitutions trumped 
ordinary legislation, state judges began interpreting constitutions to overrule legislative 
                                                 
489
 See the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Frame of Government, Chapter I, Section I, Article II. 
Nevins, The American States, 178–81; Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 218, 
558–59, 576–77; Kruman, Between Authority and Liberty, 125–26; Adams, The First American 
Constitutions, 88–90. 
490
 British troops threatened Philadelphia’s storehouses and armories, but Pennsylvania’s weak Executive 
Council, scattered around the state, was unable to meet to move the provisions. The Republican Party, long 
opponents of the 1776 Constitution, printed a host of pamphlets decrying the new government. Drawing on 
Whig arguments, they asserted that the dominance of a single branch of government was tyranny. For the 
quote by “Associator” – likely James Wilson or Benjamin Rush – see Wood, The Creation of the American 
Republic, 1776-1787, 233–37; Eric Nelson, The Royalist Revolution: Monarchy and the American 
Founding (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 164, 313n72. See also Selsam, The Pennsylvania 
Constitution of 1776, 205–46; Robert Levere Brunhouse, The Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, 1776-
1790 (Harrisburg : Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1942), 27–38; Nash, The Unknown American 
Revolution, 277–80. 
136 
 
statutes, checking the legislatures. For example, in Commonwealth v. Caton (1782), three 
prisoners appealed to the state courts to void their sentencing under a state statute which 
they claimed violated the Virginia Constitution. State legislators tried to steer the case 
into a special joint legislative-judicial committee, and then a legislative council of 
revision. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals convened, assumed the authority to “declare 
an Act of the Legislature void because it was repugnant to the Act for the Constitution of 
Government,” and ultimately upheld the 1776 statute.
491
 Edmund Randolph lauded the 
courts for shielding the Virginia Constitution from narrowly-interested legislators.
492
 
Similarly, in Rutgers v. Waddington (1784), judges on the Mayor’s Court of New York 
City held the New York Trespass Act of 1783, prohibiting military appropriations of 
property, violated the 1777 state Constitution, which incorporated a common law 
principle allowing military appropriation of abandoned property. In response, the New 
York Packet attacked the act of constitutional review by judges “who are independent of 
the people.” In Trevett v. Weeden (1786), attorney James Varnum convinced Rhode 
Island Supreme Court judges to overturn a statute that stripped the constitutional rights of 
trial by jury and appeal from merchants who refused to accept paper money as legal 
                                                 
491
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tender.
493
 After the decision, the legislature interrogated and reprimanded the judges, 
replacing all but one with paper money advocates the following term.
494
 North Carolina’s 
James Iredell, representing the plaintiff in Bayard v. Singleton (1787) argued that the 
American Revolution repudiated the British theory of parliamentary sovereignty,
495
 
persuading the Court of Conference of North Carolina to uphold the state Constitution’s 
promise of trial by jury, and vacate a legislative statute stripping this right. But Richard 
Dobbs Spaight, a champion of legislative supremacy, replied these judges could not 
represent the people’s will.
496
 By the late 1780s, judiciaries in only five states had 
asserted a right to judicial review with mixed success. 
 The state framers also accepted the Whig argument, propounded by Adams and 
others,
497
 that property allowed the material and intellectual independence needed to vote 
freely. Consequently, all states imposed property requirements on the franchise. Some 
framers required voters have some minimum wealth. This was the case at Maryland’s 
1776 Convention, where wealthy planters, wary of growing agitation by local farmers, 
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defeated a proposed inclusive franchise measure, instead restricting the franchise to the 
wealthiest half of property owners and reducing the frequency of elections.
498
 Agitation 
at New York’s 1777 Convention cut freehold qualifications in half – in New York City, 
nearly all freemen could vote – but in Duchess and Westchester counties, the seats of the 
state’s landholding Hudson river dynasties, the restrictions were tighter, and in some rural 
New York counties, only a third of freemen could vote. By Jefferson’s count, less than 
half of Virginians could vote under the 1776 Constitution. In the Carolinas and Georgia, 
the proportion varied from half to three-quarters 
499
. Other states’ requirements were less 
stringent.
500
 Overall, property qualifications disenfranchised a quarter to half of free 
American males.
501
 
 By the mid-1780s, Americans had rejected Pennsylvania’s populist legislative 
design for mixed government, legislative reapportionment, and property qualifications on 
the vote. Adams’ May 1776 resolutions allowed the state conventions to design 
governments, and gradually a consensus emerged around institutional checks on the 
legislature, resolving longstanding concerns over legislative detachment. The 
decentralized states had resolved the United States’ first and perhaps greatest 
constitutional controversy. 
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C. Slavery and the First State Constitutions 
 
 Adams’ May 1776 resolutions deferred all major constitutional questions, 
including regulation of slavery, to the states. Colonial framers largely dodged the slavery 
question. Several state declarations of independence called for liberation from slavish 
subjection under the Crown,
502
 and accordingly framers in eight states constitutionally 
protected life, liberty, property, and happiness,
 503
 and in seven recognized the natural 
equality of men.
504
 But Vermont was alone in explicitly abolishing slavery.
505
 All other 
state conventions deferred the slavery question to the political branches. 
 Southern and Northern state courts and legislatures continued on their divergent 
paths. The Northern states all moved toward abolition. Between 1777 and 1804, every 
state north of the Mason-Dixon Line began abolishing slavery,
506
 often citing the state 
constitution’s due process clause. New Englanders did so quickly. Vermont’s courts 
upheld at least two freedom suits made under the 1777 Constitution’s due process 
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clause.
507
 In 1779, at least nineteen New Hampshire slaves petitioned for their freedom 
before the state legislature, which in 1786 declared the state due process clause to clearly 
abolish slavery,
508
 and by 1800, the state recorded only eight slaves.
509
 Importantly, by 
explicitly extending due process liberty to all persons, including slaves, Massachusetts, 
Vermont, and New Hampshire became legal refuges for fugitive slaves, and would 
remain so until the Civil War.
510
 Connecticut and Rhode Island retained their colonial 
charters, which lacked equality and due process clauses, and abolition here came 
slowly.
511
 
 Between 1765 and 1783 Massachusetts courts heard at least eighteen freedom 
suits by slaves,
512
 culminating in Commonwealth v. Jennison (1783), the first judicial 
abolition of slavery in America. The case was the last of three freedom suits surrounding 
                                                 
507
 Nash, The Unknown American Revolution, 282 n22. 
508
 Zilversmit, The First Emancipation, 116–17; Menschel, “Abolition without Deliverance,” 164 n3. 
509
 Lois E. Horton, “From Class to Race in Early America: Northern Post-Emancipation Racial 
Reconstruction,” Journal of the Early Republic 19, no. 4 (December 1, 1999): 638, doi:10.2307/3125136. 
510
 Hence the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act was exceptionally controversial in Massachusetts and Vermont, as a 
later chapter explains. 
511
 Connecticut, with its tobacco plantations, had a slave population of five thousand in 1775. The state 
legislature manumitted enslaved black patriot servicemen and in 1784 passed the Gradual Abolition Act, 
freeing children of slaves after twenty-five years of indentured servitude. The recorded slave population 
dwindled to 310 in 1810, though formal abolition did not come to Connecticut until 1848. Rhode Island 
recorded 4,373 slaves in 1775, concentrated around the Narragansett plantations. The state manumitted also 
blacks serving in the Continental Army in 1778, and the following year, prohibited the sale of a slave 
without his consent. The legislature finally passed a 1784 act freeing all children of slaves, but not 
currently-enslaved people. A quarter century later, just over a hundred slaves remained in the state. 
Zilversmit, The First Emancipation, 105–8; Horton, “From Class to Race in Early America,” 639. 
512
 In 1781, Anthony Vassall of Cambridge successfully petitioned the legislature for reparations from his 
loyalist master’s seized property. Several years later, an elderly Medford slave named Belinda followed his 
example, drafting a legislative petition. Like many colonial legislatures, Massachusetts’ assembly, called 
the Great and General Court, adjudicated private judicial disputes, much as Parliament had in England. 
Since state courts had no special prerogative for constitutional review, slaves looked to the legislature for 
freedom. Stories of Belinda’s childhood seizure from Africa, her successful case, and her repeated 
petitions, circulated as far south as New Jersey, perhaps because they were sensational and exceptional. 
Massachusetts had five thousand slaves and only eighteen freedom suits in this period. Moore, Notes on the 
History of Slavery in Massachusetts, 51; Wiecek, “Somerset,” 117; Morton J. Horwitz, “A Historiography 
of the People Themselves and Popular Constitutionalism,” Chicago-Kent Law Review 81 (2006): 816; 
Nash, The Unknown American Revolution, 124–25; Roy E. Finkenbine, “Belinda’s Petition: Reparations 
for Slavery in Revolutionary Massachusetts,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 64, no. 1 
(January 1, 2007): 99–104. 
141 
 
a young Massachusetts slave, Quock Walker. In the spring of 1781, Walker fled his 
master, Nathaniel Jennison, but Jennison soon recaptured Walker and beat him with a 
cane. Walker sued in the Inferior Court of Common Pleas, winning fifty pounds in 
damages, but had to appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court to compel Jennison to pay. It is 
not clear if Jennison did pay, for in January 1782, he appealed to the Massachusetts 
legislature, where the issue stalled. Jennison then successfully sued John and Seth 
Caldwell, who had harbored Walker.
513
 The Supreme Judicial Court overturned the 
Caldwells’ conviction, hinting that 1780 Constitution’s Article I, protecting men’s “lives 
and liberties,” required abolition.
514
 Then, in September, Massachusetts indicted Jennison 
for beating Walker. Chief Justice William Cushing charged the jury to affirm that “the 
idea of slavery is inconsistent with our own conduct and Constitution.” The jury accepted 
Cushing’s claim, abolishing slavery in Massachusetts. By 1790, the national census found 
no slaves in Massachusetts.
515
 Following Jennison, legislators abolished slavery by citing 
the state constitution’s due process provision.
516
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 Mid-Atlantic states, split between abolitionists and slaveholders, settled on 
gradual legislative emancipation. In 1780, Pennsylvania’s was the first legislature to 
abolish slavery,
517
 albeit through very gradual abolition.
518
 New Jersey imitated parts of 
the Pennsylvania law in 1785.
519
 After rejecting an antislavery clause, New York’s 
constitutional framers expressly deferred abolition to their legislature,
520
 which passed 
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manumission and gradual abolition statutes in 1781, 1788, and 1799, though as in 
Pennsylvania, full abolition would not come until the 1840s.
521
 
 Southern states maintained slavery through the 1780s and 1790s. Maryland and 
Delaware constitutionally impeded abolition,
522
 and the Carolinas’ constitutions reserved 
due process protections to freemen, preempting slaves’ freedom suits or legislative 
freedom petitions on due process grounds.
523
 In 1782, South Carolina’s legislature 
promised “one grown negro,” confiscated from loyalist estates, to every militiaman who 
would serve ten months against the British, and “three large and one small negro” to 
every officer recruited.
524
 
                                                                                                                                                 
with the public safety, and the private property of individuals, for abolishing domestic slavery with the 
same, so that in future ages, every human being who breathes the air of the state shall enjoy the privileges 
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 Virginians too embraced slavery. Virginia newspapers circulated Mansfield’s 
antislavery Somerset decision, black slaves earned their freedom as loyalist and patriot 
soldiers, and though slaves lacked due process rights,
525
 the state’s courts took several 
Indian and black freedom suits.
526
 However the legislature passed statutes in 1778, 1789, 
1795, and 1806 narrowing slaves’ rights to sue for their freedom.
527
 And in Hudgins v. 
Wrights (1806), Virginia jurist George Wythe extended due process protections to 
Indians, but not to blacks.
528
 Further, Mansfield’s decision upheld Virginia’s positive 
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claiming that as Indians, they were legally “persons perfectly white,” and hence free. See Hudgins v. 
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constitutional one. Similarly, contemporary Native Americans hold national citizenship not through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but through the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act. Tucker also granted the Indians 
freedom on physiological grounds, asserting that petitioners with Indian characteristics like straight, black 
hair should be assumed to have matrilineal Indian descent, and thus be free. Tucker’s precedent excluded 
black slaves and Indians from a constitutional right to liberty and citizenship, and helped legally bind 
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proslavery laws, and the state courts cited a growing body of statutes prohibiting freedom 
suits by African-Americans. In 1786 the legislature eased manumission rules and allowed 
slave-holders to free young and mentally-able slaves, but twenty years later, amended the 
act, requiring free slaves leave the state, lest they mix with the local white population.
529
  
 Constitutional decentralization on the slavery issue yielded two distinct, stable 
regional approaches to slavery.
530
 Like their colonial predecessors, state judges 
interpreted Mansfield’s short, vague, and flexible Somerset decision in irreconcilable 
ways. Northern judges cited Mansfield’s claims that slavery violated natural law and that 
positive law, including Northern manumission and antislavery statutes and constitutional 
rights provisions, granted fugitive slaves a habeas corpus right against seizure.
531
 
Conversely, Southern judges cited Mansfield’s affirmation of Virginia’s positive 
proslavery law, and eventually, reinterpreted Somerset to argue abolition only held where 
explicitly required by positive law, suggesting slavery might be legal in incoming 
territories.
532
 While the North and South diverged over slave law, interstate disputes over 
slavery mobility were few.
533
 
                                                                                                                                                 
slavery to African physiology. Wiecek, “Somerset,” 123–24; Adams, The First American Constitutions, 
183; Ablavsky, “Making Indians ‘White,’” 1487–94. 
529
 The Assembly passed a 1778 nonimportation law, allowing some imported slaves grounds for freedom 
suits and appeasing abolitionists, but the law also gave slaveholders a monopoly over the colony’s black 
slave population. Virginia’s domestic slave population was growing without importation, so much so that 
the law tempered the booming population, allowing whites to maintain control of the state with less fear of 
revolt. A 1793 statute prohibited immigration by free African-Americans. McColley, Slavery and 
Jeffersonian Virginia, 163–67; Nicholls, “‘The Squint of Freedom,’” 55; Adams, The First American 
Constitutions, 183–84; Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders, 31–32; Ablavsky, “Making Indians ‘White,’” 
1501–5. 
530
 This split also applied to black citizenship to some degree. Since slaves depended on others for their 
wellbeing, state framers did not trust slaves to act as independent voters or citizens. Consequently, slaves 
did not have franchise or citizenship rights. Conversely, propertied freemen, including blacks, could vote in 
every state at the founding. But Southern states like Virginia reduced their free black population, their 
black electorate dwindled. Kruman, Between Authority and Liberty, 106–7. 
531
 As late as 1848, Free Soilers adopted the Jennison argument to claim Southern state constitutions had 
outlawed slavery. Wiecek, “Somerset,” 125. 
532
 For example, in 1797 Maryland’s Luther Martin dismissed Mansfield’s enthusiasm for liberty. See 
Mahoney v. Ashton, 4 H. & Mc H. 295, 1799 WL 397 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1799). However, at the 1787 
146 
 
III. National Responses: The Confederation Era and Convention, 1787-1799 
 
 This final section explains how prior state constitutional revision quieted two 
pivotal debates at the federal Convention. Since the states had settled on a bicameral 
tripartite system, federal delegates, many of them former state framers, adopted this plan 
immediately and with little debate. Further, federal framers deferred to the states’ 
divergent slave policies rather than impose a uniform federal slave law. 
 Framers in at least seven states declared their governments sovereign and 
independent not only from Parliament, but also from the Continental Congress.
534
 
Delaware’s 1776 Convention, the first assembled after the Declaration of Independence, 
stated “the people of this State have the sole exclusive and inherent Right of governing 
and regulating the internal Police of the same.” Similarly, Massachusetts’ framers 
declared authority over all police powers, to the exclusion of Congress, save for the few 
powers “expressly delegated” to the Continental Congress.
535
  
 These sovereignty claims defanged the Continental Congress. The Articles of 
Confederation, ratified in 1781, charged Congress with the common defense, 
536
 but 
recognized the states’ sovereignty over nearly every other subject, including all affairs 
                                                                                                                                                 
Constitutional Convention, Martin argued for a national ban on the slave trade, deeming slavery 
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536
 Congress was responsible for the “common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and 
general welfare,” and formally recognized Congress’ existing foreign policy, trade, and war powers, 
including treaty-making with Indians. The Articles also established a system of weights, currency, and a 
post office. 
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under the broad, nebulous label of regulating the “internal police.”
537
 Congress could not 
compel states’ financial contributions or regulate their commerce.
538
 Congressional 
apportionment was similarly contentious.
539
 Further, questions over frontier regulation 
reemerged,
540
 as states made conflicting western land claims,
541
 and unrecognized 
frontier republics unsuccessfully petitioned for congressional recognition.
542
 Finally, 
amendments to the Articles required unanimous approval so that no sovereign state 
would be bound to a constitutional provision it had not approved,
543
 preventing revision 
of the flawed system. The document was therefore no more than a “firm league of 
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friendship” between the states.
544
 The Articles’ constitutional legitimacy was also 
suspect, as the Continental Congress, a standing legislature, lacked constitution-making 
authority, and moreover, had never been expressly authorized to draft the Articles.
545
 In 
limiting legislators’ constitutional prerogative, state framers had also undermined the 
Congress.  
 In response, delegates eventually assembled in Philadelphia for the national 
Constitutional Convention on May 14, 1787.
546
  All thirteen original states, save for 
Rhode Island, were represented, and up to half of the fifty-five delegates were former 
state framers.
547
 By relying on prior state constitutional design, the federal framers 
preempted debate on institutional design and slavery, two of the era’s most contentious 
topics. 
 Delegates immediately and with little debate adopted the states’ tripartite 
institutional design. Waiting for a quorum in mid-May, James Madison, author of 
Virginia’s tripartite 1776 Constitution, began quietly conferring with Gouverneur Morris 
                                                 
544
 The Articles thus explicitly affirmed constitutional sovereignty lay with the states. In a provision nearly 
identical to Massachusetts’ sovereignty clause, the Articles acknowledged “Each state retains its 
sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this 
Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.” See the Articles of 
Confederation, Article II. Note the original draft of the Articles that John Dickinson reported to the 
Continental Congress on July 12, 1776, read “Each Colony shall retain and enjoy as much of its present 
Laws, Rights and Customs, as it may think fit, and reserves to itself the sole and exclusive Regulation and 
Government of its internal police, in all matters that shall not interfere with the Articles of this 
Confederation,” potentially allowing national intervention in state police powers. See Worthington 
Chauncey Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, vol. V (U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1906), 547. Congress dropped this language. For Dickinson’s early drafts and notes on the Articles, 
see the R. R. Logan collection of John Dickinson papers: Series 1. b. Political, 1774-1808, Box 3, Folders 
20-1 and Box 4, Folder 22, at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. 
545
 Most Americans deferred constitution-making to temporary conventions. 
546
 After a smattering of frontier rebellions and years of campaigning by nationalists like Alexander 
Hamilton, five state delegations convened for four days in Annapolis in 1786, listing the failings of the 
Articles and calling for another, larger meeting. Beeman, The Penguin Guide to the United States 
Constitution, 145–50. 
547
 Williams, citing at least five other scholars, estimates a third to a half of the federal delegates had 
already framed state constitutions. See Robert F. Williams, “Experience Must Be Our Only Guide: The 
State Constitutional Experience of the Framers of the Federal Constitution,” Hastings Constitutional Law 
Quarterly 15 (1988 1987): 403; Williams, “State Constitutions of the Founding Decade,” 542–43. 
149 
 
and James Wilson of Pennsylvania, opponents of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
548
 When 
a quorum assembled, delegates to the Philadelphia Convention met again on May 25
th
 
and 28
th
, turning first, as the state conventions had, to the question of institutional design. 
On May 29
th
, Madison and Edmund Randolph proposed a tripartite national government, 
modeled on the Virginia Constitution they had drafted together eleven years earlier. 
Wilson and Morris backed Madison’s plan, as did the Pennsylvanian John Dickinson, 
another opponent of the Pennsylvania model. Reflecting on the federal Convention, 
Dickinson argued that “government must never be lodged in a single body,” but rather in 
“a number of great departments… three or four of these are competent in number.”
549
 On 
May 30
th
, only the fourth day of meeting, the Committee of the Whole resolved in favor 
of the widely-accepted tripartite design.
550
 Prior state framing helped delegates quickly 
settle this essential question. 
 Framers also rejected unicameralism. After several weeks of debate over 
proportional representation,
551
 on June 15
th
, delegates from small and enclosed states 
rallied around the New Jersey plan penned by William Paterson, which promised equal 
representation per state in a unicameral legislature. But recalling the deadlocked 
unicameral Pennsylvania legislature and Continental Congress, delegates settled instead 
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on the Connecticut Compromise of July 16
th
, incorporating the New Jersey plan’s 
chamber as the upper house in a bicameral scheme.
552
 This closed debate on 
unicameralism. As Robert Williams states, “One of the earliest—and most resolute—
decisions of the Convention was in favor of bicameralism…There was no real 
controversy over this point.”
553
 
 Morris and Wilson engineered a strong national executive. By June 4
th
, delegates 
agreed the president would be unitary, and like Massachusetts’ executive, could veto 
legislation.
554
 As Willi Paul Adams concludes, “The presidential system at the federal 
level can be ascribed much more to the beliefs of the authors of the first state 
constitutions” than to any other source.
555
 
 Judicial review, still being debated at the state level, did not take hold in the 
federal Convention. Several federal delegates had promoted judicial review in the state 
courts. William Davie did so in North Carolina’s Bayard v. Singleton in 1787, as had 
delegates John Francis Mercer, John Blair, and George Wythe in Virginia’s 
Commonwealth v. Caton in 1782. Edmund Randolph served in the latter case as 
Virginia’s Attorney General, sending his arguments for judicial review to James 
Madison.
556
 But only five states had attempted judicial review, and it was new and 
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contentious in all of them. New Yorkers and North Carolinians, including Richard Dobbs 
Spaight, now a North Carolina delegate to the Convention, had chastised their judges for 
overruling the popularly-elected legislature, and Rhode Island legislators fired four 
justices who had attempted judicial review. Judicial review was attractive to some 
delegates, but still an untested and divisive idea. 
 Since Northern and Southern framers had happily diverged over slavery, few 
delegates would likely consent to a uniform national slave law. As Madison wrote, “the 
great division of interests in the U. States… did not lie between large & small States: it 
lay between the Northern & Southern.”
557
 On May 30
th
, the Convention debated the 
Virginia Plan for legislative apportionment by “free inhabitants.” Fearing an early debate 
over apportionment of free and slave votes would split the nascent Convention, Madison 
cut the language, hoping to postpone the slavery debate.
558
 The framers subsequently 
avoided explicitly mentioning slaves or implying that the federal Constitution allowed 
slavery,
559
 largely deferring to existing state regulation. 
 Convention debates over slavery yielded only three major clauses. State framers, 
imitating the British model, had used an upper house to represent their state’s aristocracy 
and property, including property in slaves. On June 11
th
, Rutledge and Pierce Butler 
proposed national legislative representation also remained proportionate to property in 
slaves. Charles Pinckney split with his South Carolina delegation, instead proposing 
slaves receive partial representation as population, counting as three-fifths of a vote. 
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 Slavery troubled some delegates on moral grounds. On August 25
th
, Madison declared he “thought it 
wrong to admit in the Constitution the idea that there could be property in men…slaves are not like 
merchandise, consumed &c.” Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 1911, II:417. 
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James Wilson backed this more moderate proposal, which the Convention applied to 
House representation on July 12
th
, adopting the same three-fifths proportion for 
determining each state’s tax burden on August 21
st
.
560
 
 The day after the Convention adopted the three-fifths compromise, the 
Continental Congress passed the Northwest Ordinance, prohibiting slavery in states 
formed from the Northwest Territory. On August 29
th
 and 30
th
, delegates settled on the 
process for admission of a new state into the union, requiring only that the proposed 
constitution be republican in nature. The Convention did not specify whether other 
territories would draft free or proslavery constitutions, leaving this controversy to future 
congresses, courts, and presidents. 
 Further controversy lay with the domestic mobility of slaves. Northern judges 
could cite Somerset to claim that their state’s positive law abolition provisions, privileges 
and immunities clauses, and personal liberty laws freed a runaway, preventing his 
return,
561
 while Southern judges could cite Somerset’s deference to the positive 
proslavery laws of Virginia. The same day they scrapped Rutledge’s tariff plan, delegates 
passed the Fugitive Slave Clause, requiring runaways be returned to their home state, 
protecting Southern slaveholders’ monopoly on slaves. Still, delegates did not charge 
specific federal or state agents with enforcement, maintaining the status quo of 
nonintervention.
 562 
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The slave trade proved less contentious. Neither Northerners nor Southerners 
relied on the trade to maintain local slavery,
563
 such that eleven states heavily taxed or 
outright abolished the trade,
564
 yielding bisectional agreement on nonimportation. But 
rogue South Carolinians and Georgians in the Continental Congress had used the 
Congress’ unanimity requirement to block a national nonimportation provision in 
1776.
565
 The 1787 Philadelphia Convention gave Northern and Southern delegates the 
chance to finally establish a uniform federal nonimportation policy. On August 22
nd
, 
George Mason warned the federal Convention that the nation’s growing slave population 
threatened revolt, and accordingly, it was “essential in every point of view that the 
government should have to power to prevent the increase of slavery.”
566
 But John 
Rutledge represented South Carolina’s robust slave importation business, and proposed 
any international commercial treaty pass a two-thirds vote in both houses. This would 
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thwart tariffs on slaves, boosting the South Carolinian slave trade, but also blocked tariffs 
on manufactured goods, gutting the protectionist policies New England industrialists 
wanted. On August 25
th
, New Englanders capitulated, allowing slave importation until 
1808 under the terms of the Importation Clause,
567
 and the Convention rejected the rest of 
Rutledge’s tariff plan four days later.
568
 
 As before, the states called conventions to ratify the proposed Constitution. 
Imitating the state constitutional conventions, the ratification conventions were temporary 
representations of popular authority, distinct from the states’ standing legislatures.
569
 
New Hampshire’s convention cast the ninth vote to approve the Constitution on June 21, 
1788, allowing nationwide ratification of the new Constitution. Following the 
Convention, Georgia, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Delaware, and Vermont replaced 
their constitutions to match the federal model. Though the Constitution’s Guarantee 
Clause only requires of states “a republican form of government,” since 1787, states have 
almost invariably chosen bicameral tripartite governments. 
 State framers resolved questions on institutional design and slavery, preempting 
these debates at the Philadelphia Convention. Most scholars rely on Convention records 
to recount how delegates bargained,
570
 for example, focusing on the bicameral 
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Connecticut Compromise.
571
 But this misses how prior state framing made bicameralism 
a near certainty, foreclosing the option of unicameralism long before federal delegates 
even met. Similarly, most scholars assert federal delegates like James Wilson centralized 
power and introduced a strong executive as a reaction to the Articles’ failure. But this 
centralization, particularly in Wilson’s case, was also a rejection of weak, decentralized 
executive design at the state level. In studying federal Convention records but ignoring 
state conventions, scholars may miss how previous state framers’ choices silently 
preempted certain Convention debates.
572
 To ignore state constitutionalism, is to 
misunderstand decisions at the federal Convention. 
 The era’s final constitutional debate concerned formalizing rights. By 1787, eight 
states already had bills of rights,
573
 leading George Mason, framer of Virginia’s bill, to 
propose combining them into a federal bill late in the Convention.
574
 Weary delegates 
unanimously refused, and during ratification federalists argued the state bills made a 
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national one redundant,
575
 deferring the issue to Congress. Between 1788 and 1799, 
Congress heard 345 proposals for federal amendments, 311 of these in the first two-year 
session. Most of these initial proposals were rights provisions drawn exactly from the 
state constitutions and bills.
576
 These proposed federal amendments protected free speech 
and press, free exercise, keeping arms, trial rights, prohibited quartering of troops and 
certain searches, and reserved non-delegated powers to the states, and were eventually 
combined and ratified as the federal Bill of Rights. 
 In conclusion, during the Revolution and founding, every state reauthorized or 
replaced its colonial charter, resulting in two dozen new state constitutions. These helped 
resolve longstanding debates over legislative sovereignty and design, slavery, and frontier 
regulation, preempting these debates during the framing and ratification of the 
Constitution and Bill of Rights. Even in this tumultuous period, state constitutional 
revision quieted national controversies. Yet some, like slavery and consolidation of the 
frontier, would later reemerge in the antebellum era, as the next chapter explains. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE ANTEBELLUM ERA, 1800-1849 
 
“The Constitution had not destroyed the individuality of the states, and all bodies, of 
whatsoever sort, have a secret instinct leading them toward independence. That instinct is 
especially pronounced in such a country as America, where every village is a sort of 
republic accustomed to rule itself.” 
Alexis de Tocqueville, 1835
577
 
 
 Antebellum Americans debated expanding suffrage and reforming elections, 
abolishing slavery, and establishing a national bank. Congressmen proposed hundreds of 
federal amendments on these topics, some proposed by presidents, and federal courts 
intervened to expand and contract federal authority. Despite these attempts to revise the 
federal Constitution, only a single federal amendment passed. In contrast, the states 
proposed dozens of new state constitutions and hundreds of state constitutional 
amendments. Thus the question for this chapter – why, in the tumultuous antebellum era, 
was the national Constitution so stable while the state constitutions were so unstable? 
This chapter argues state constitutional reform resolved national controversies over 
elections, slavery, and banking, preempting national constitutional reform. Antebellum 
state constitutional revision stabilized the federal Constitution. 
I. Trends in State and Federal Constitutionalism, 1800-49 
 
 In the antebellum era, state constitutional reform far outpaced federal amendment. 
Between 1800 and 1849, the states proposed fifty-three new constitutions, ratifying 
twenty-seven.
578
 While Revolutionary state framers had avoided amendment,
579
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 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 386. 
578
 On average, a state constitution ratified between 1800 and 1849 lasted only 52.6 years. While proposals 
were spread evenly across the states and territories, ratifications were not. New Englanders rejected all but 
three constitutional proposals, instead gradually elaborating their existing constitutions through judicial and 
legislative review and amendment. The vast and sparsely colonized Great Plains and Western territories 
generally did not call conventions or ratify new constitutions. So most constitutional ratification occurred 
where whites were settling in large numbers and organized new states, along the Mississippi and Ohio 
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antebellum Americans proposed hundreds of state constitutional amendments,
580
 ratifying 
least 201,
581
 mainly to older New England and Southern constitutions.
 582
 These numbers 
are all the more impressive given there were relatively few states in this era.
583
 In 
contrast, of the 476 federal amendments proposed before Congress, only the Twelfth 
Amendment passed. Why did antebellum Americans frequently amend and replace their 
state constitutions while leaving the federal Constitution almost untouched? 
                                                                                                                                                 
Rivers. Of the twenty-seven constitutions ratified, fifteen were initial constitutions that organized new 
states, and all but two of these fifteen were drafted by Southern or Old Northwest and Mid-Atlantic states. 
For the full list and map of constitutions proposed and ratified between 1800 and 1850, see Figure 17 in the 
appendix. 
579
 Between 1776 and 1800, states mainly revised their constitutions through conventions, rather than 
amendments. This was partly an issue of expediency, as the Revolutionary-era constitutions were framed 
quickly, under duress, and haphazardly, sometimes resulting in contentious, experimental designs that 
required wholesale replacement by convention. Revision by convention, rather than legislative amendment, 
was also an ideological choice. Conventions in New York, New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, and 
South Carolina refused to specify a process for constitutional amendment on the grounds that the power of 
constitutional revision belonged solely to the whole people and their representatives assembled in 
convention, rather than partisan, narrowly-interested legislators. For example, the 1776 conventions of 
Delaware and New Jersey forbade the legislature from amending rights provisions. 
580
 As the zeal for revolution faded, Americans began delegating constitutional reform to standing, 
permanent legislatures. Six of the seven states admitted to the Union between 1800 and 1828 required 
voters approve legislative amendments or convention proposals. In response to Jacksonian populism and 
state legislators’ complicity in the economic panic of 1837, framers allowed voters pass statutes and 
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between 1828 and 1860. See Dealey, Growth of American State Constitutions, 45–49; Sturm, “The 
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federal Constitution. Also recall that not all state amendments are equally important. For example, New 
Hampshire’s 1792 Constitutional Convention passed a single six-thousand-word amendment with seventy-
one articles, all but replacing the state’s 1784 Constitution. Conversely, North Carolina effectively replaced 
its constitution in 1835 by passing thirty-seven separate amendments. See Wallis, “The NBER - Maryland 
State Constitutions Project”; Dippel, “The Rise of Modern Constitutionalism, 1776 - 1849.” 
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 Further, six Southern states had a tradition of frequent constitutional revision dating to colonial civil law 
systems under French, Spanish, or Mexican government. Ten states were settled by France, Spain, or 
Mexico and had developed civil law systems at the time of the Revolution. These are states Alabama, 
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, and Texas. For 
more on this, see Berkowitz and Clay, “American Civil Law Origins.” Citizens of the Northwest Territory 
earned statehood by ratifying constitutions, which, newly-drafted, needed few repairs by amendment. 
583
 By 1849, there were only thirty-four states. 
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 There are a few familiar explanations of the federal Constitution’s stability. First, 
Article V’s supermajority requirements may have blocked proposed federal amendments. 
But in in the Jeffersonian era there were fewer states – only sixteen in 1800 – and thus 
fewer potential vetoes. Further, backlash to the Federalists’ Alien and Sedition Acts and 
widespread support for states’ rights swept Jeffersonians into both houses of Congress 
and the White House. With Monroe’s 1816 election, the Democratic-Republicans 
controlled thirty of forty-two Senate seats, 146 of 185 House seats, clearing the necessary 
two-thirds to propose an amendment, and held many state legislatures, paving the way for 
ratification.
584
 Yet puzzlingly, the unchallenged Democratic-Republicans did not 
entrench their power through federal amendment or a second constitutional convention.  
 As David E. Kyvig asserts, growing veneration for the founders and their 
Constitution may have discouraged congressmen, state legislators, and ordinary 
Americans from reforming the federal document.
585
  A 1796 schoolbook introduced 
children to their Constitution in words “made level to the lowest capacities.” The book, 
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 Between 1800 and 1806, Democratic-Republicans and their allies captured both houses in eight of ten 
legislatures for which this dissertation has data, and took the other two not long after. Democratic 
Republicans captured from Federalists both houses of the legislature in New York (1800-2), Pennsylvania 
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Michael J. Dubin, Party Affiliations in the State Legislatures: A Year by Year Summary, 1796-2006 
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controversy was not the only cause of partisan turnover in the state legislatures. States with greater social 
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and accordingly in Jeffersonian America, more voters, as well as states like Pennsylvania, which harbored 
multiple ethnic groups capable of participating in politics. Hence not every state hosted two parties in at the 
turn of the nineteenth century. See Paul Goodman, “The First American Party System,” in The American 
Party System: Stages of Political Development, ed. William N. Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 65–72. 
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 Kyvig explains: “Contributing to the limited use of amendment during the first half of the nineteenth 
century was a widespread, though hardly universal, feeling that once the Bill of Rights had been added, the 
Constitution provided an adequate structure of government.” See Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts, 110. 
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small enough to carry in a breast pocket, dissuaded readers from revising the work of the 
founders, which it called 
“The greatest [constitution] by far that any people ever had; and it can scarcely be 
expected that any ever should be greater. It was formed in an age when the 
principles of liberty were well understood; [the federal framers] had all the 
examples of former ages and governments before them, their beauties and defects; 
they sat down in a state of profound peace, and had full leisure to form the most 
perfect constitution that the nature of things would admit of.”
586
 
  
 But the antebellum Constitution was not so widely venerated. The secrecy of the 
1787 Convention and the extralegal ratification process tarnished the Constitution for 
Anti-Federalists,
587
 and for some later Jeffersonians and Federalists.
588
 In 1828, the South 
Carolina legislature attempted to nullify Congress’ constitutionally-guaranteed tariff-
making power, and in 1845, the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison burned a copy of the 
Constitution at a Framingham rally of the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society. By the 
late antebellum era, state and federal legislators cited compact and nullification theory in 
calling for amendment or replacement of the ailing Constitution. 
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 Repudiating the Revolutionary generation’s rowdy spirit, the book instructed “no riots, mobs, nor 
tumultuous proceedings are necessary, to gain what we can much easier obtain by legal, peaceable, and 
constitutional means.” The text also predicted the Constitution would endure through “a vast majority of 
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 After the disputed presidential election of 1800, Jeffersonians considered scrapping the Constitution 
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secession, proposing instead to redesign the Constitution through eight amendments. Russell L. Caplan, 
Constitutional Brinksmanship : Amending the Constitution by National Convention: Amending the 
Constitution by National Convention (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 42–46; Kyvig, Explicit 
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 Alternately, John Marshall and subsequent justices may have reinterpreted the 
Constitution, easing it into new contexts and preempting amendment. But after the 1803 
Marbury decision, the Supreme Court would not again use judicial review to overturn a 
congressional statute until Dred Scott in 1857. Rather, the Marshall Court overturned 
state legislation, helping explain why many antebellum constitutional controversies were 
focused at the state level. 
 There are a few possible explanations for the states’ frequent revision. First, some 
state legislatures could easily propose and pass amendments or new constitutions.
589
 But 
in other states, early framers set higher barriers to legislative amendment and 
replacement, perhaps thwarting revision.
590
 Further, given how often elites and reformers 
circumvented formal rules for constitutional revision,
591
 these rules cannot alone explain 
the states’ frequent constitutional upheavals. Nor can procedural rules explain why 
antebellum reformers sought change in the first place. As Donald Lutz concludes “the 
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 For example, Article IV of Maryland’s 1776 Declaration of Rights recognized a popular right to “to 
reform the old or establish a new government,” and Article X encouraged frequent legislative amendment: 
“That, for redress of grievances, and for amending, strengthening and preserving the laws, the Legislature 
ought to be frequently convened.” Most amendments could pass with a simple majority, but under Article 
LIX, they had to be approved by two sequential legislative sessions. Thus Maryland was able to pass ten 
amendments in 1837. 
590
 Revolutionary-era state constitutional convention delegates, worried state legislators were self-
interested, often expressly impeded legislators from proposing a convention or amendment, discouraging 
frequent state constitutional revision. New York’s 1777 Constitution, for example, did not allow 
amendment. In 1822, New York voters approved a new constitution that failed to provide a mechanism for 
calling future conventions. Even newer state constitutions, like Indiana’s 1816 document, did not address 
amendment procedure. The Indiana document required that every twelve years citizens vote on whether to 
hold a constitutional convention. See the Indiana Constitution of 1816, Article VIII. See also Dealey, 
Growth of American State Constitutions, 41; William P. McLauchlan, The Indiana State Constitution: A 
Reference Guide (Greenwood Press, 1996), 4. 
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 Reformers often skirted or ignored the legal procedure for revision. Per James Dealey’s estimation, only 
eight of the eighteen states replacing their constitutions between 1828 and 1860 actually followed the 
constitutionally-sanctioned procedure for calling a convention. And by the Jacksonian era, local elites had 
captured many state legislatures, constitutionally entrenching their power with quasi-legal constitutional 
reforms, and blocking subsequent populist attempts at legal constitutional revision. For example, referenda 
ostensibly allowed voters to circumvent the legislature in drafting laws, but Jacksonian legislators could 
often override these ballot measures. And in Rhode Island and Virginia, malapportionment handed the state 
legislature to conservative planters, who rigged the selection of constitutional convention delegates to over-
represent their own districts. 
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first state constitutions were not used legalistically the way Americans use constitutions 
today… political conflicts were not susceptible to resolutions on the basis of the precise 
wording of a constitution.”
 592
 
 One might speculate that antebellum Americans had little veneration for their 
state constitutions, and thus fewer qualms with state constitutional revision. But in an era 
when the distant, fledgling national government commanded little authority, and its 
Constitution earned little respect, many Americans revered their state constitutions. 
Thomas Paine recalled that the Pennsylvania Constitution was 
“the political Bible of the state. Scarcely a family was without it. Every member 
of the Government had a copy; and nothing was more common, when any debate 
arose on the principle of a bill, or on the extent of any species of authority, than 
for the members to take the printed Constitution out of their pocket, and read the 
chapter with which such matter in debate was connected.
593
 
 
The state constitutions regulated the mundane elements of most Americans’ lives, 
including their schooling, their religious and moral habits, their commerce and 
employment, and their marriage and family life, and so these documents held citizens’ 
attention and investment. 
 This chapter instead asserts that state constitutional replacement outpaced federal 
reform because of the decentralization of constitutional conflicts. The antebellum 
Congress split over the regulation of suffrage, slavery, and banking and finance. These 
issues internally divided the Democratic-Republicans, and later the Democrats and the 
Whigs. Rather than confront these divisive controversies, congressmen deferred them to 
                                                 
592
 Dealey, Growth of American State Constitutions, 45–50; George Parkinson, “Antebellum State 
Constitution-Making: Retention, Circumvention, Revision” (University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1972), 1–
13; Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 102–5; Henretta, “The Rise of ‘Democratic-Republicanism:’ 
Political Rights in New York and the Several States, 1800-1915,” 61–63; Donald S. Lutz, “Political 
Participation in Eighteenth-Century America,” in Toward a Usable Past: Liberty Under State 
Constitutions, ed. Paul Finkelman and Stephen E. Gottlieb (University of Georgia Press, 2009), 21. 
593
 Thomas Paine, “The Rights of Man,” in Common Sense, The Rights of Man and Other Essential 
Writings of Thomas Paine (New York: Signet Classics, 1791), 297. 
163 
 
the states. State legislators and constitutional convention delegates revised their 
constitutions to extend suffrage to nearly all adult white males, to preserve slavery south 
of the Ohio River and abolish it to the north, and to create a system of locally-regulated 
banks and infrastructure corporations. This helps explain the era’s high rate of state 
constitutional revision.
594
 Congress accepted these reforms. Between 1800 and 1849, 
congressmen did not pass any national amendments regulating suffrage, slavery, or 
banking and finance, and following the states’ revisions, congressmen largely avoided 
even proposing national amendments to regulate these issues. National controversies 
prompted state constitutional revision, preempting national constitutional change. 
 This chapter proceeds in three steps. First, the chapter explains how presidents, 
Congress, and the Supreme Court deferred to the states on national controversies over 
suffrage and elections, territorial slavery, and chartering banks. Second, the chapter 
argues that prior to 1828 the states preempted and resolved national controversies over 
slavery and elections and suffrage. Finally, the chapter argues that after 1828, the states 
resolved the banking question while struggling territorial slavery debates. 
II. Constitutional Controversies at 1800 
 
 Several constitutional controversies gripped the early republic. Between 1800 and 
1849, congressmen proposed 476 amendments, clustered around several topics,
595
 
                                                 
594
 Territorial expansion and the incorporation of new states accounts for some of these new constitutions. 
But this cannot explain why some new states amended their newly-drafted constitutions, or why old states 
replaced or amended previous constitutions. 
595
 To generate a list of the most common proposed amendment topics for 1800-49, this dissertation first 
identifies policy-related words to appear at least ten times across all descriptions of proposed amendments 
for 1800-49 in the NARA dataset, excluding duplicate words and words like “of” and “the” not related to 
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year. See Ames, The Proposed Amendments, 324–53; Vile, Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments, 
Appendix D. 
164 
 
primarily on the regulation of Congress (142), the presidency (83), the judiciary (25), 
finance and taxes (57), and slavery (19).
596
 Note that the latter two categories concern 
concurrent powers subject to regulation by state constitutional reform, and as did some 
topics in the former categories, such as the selection of presidential electors (48), of the 
president (65), and of congressional representatives by district (34). That is, many of the 
issues that threatened to destabilize the federal Constitution were also subject to state 
constitutional regulation.
597
 
 These counts cannot reveal an amendment’s congressional support or doctrinal 
impact and can systematically miss issues excluded from the congressional agenda. 
Therefore this section explores three antebellum constitutional controversies in greater 
detail. The first concerns the balance of state and national economic authority. The brief 
Tenth Amendment did not expressly delineate the states’ legal, economic, and police 
powers,
598
 leaving Justice James Wilson in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) to reject 
Georgia’s claim to legal immunity to a private citizen’s suit.
599
 Jeffersonian senators were 
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 In 1791, Congress passed the Tenth Amendment reserving to the states powers not delegated to the 
federal government, but this did not explicitly define or protect states’ police powers. The Guarantee 
Clause, requiring states draft republican governments, and the Supremacy Clause, proclaiming the 
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and Article VI. 
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 In South Carolina, Alexander Chisholm, the executor of clothier Robert Farquhar’s estate, sued Georgia 
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Dismissing Georgia’s sovereignty claims, Justice James Wilson admitted that the states’ citizens may have 
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upset that the Federalist Wilson favored Alexander Chisholm, a private merchant, over 
Georgia’s state sovereignty rights, and so two days after the ruling proposed an 
amendment overriding the decision.
600
 Months later the Eleventh Amendment passed 
after a day’s debate in each chamber, granting states sovereign immunity from private 
suits. And three years after the Amendment, the Virginia and Kentucky legislatures 
affirmed that the states had compacted to form the Constitution and should remained 
arbiters in constitutional disputes.
601
 
 While the Amendment and Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions helped clarify the 
states’ legal authority, the federal Constitution was ambiguous on the extent of state and 
federal economic powers.
602
 Banking authority soon became a point of contention. To 
finance the young nation’s mounting debt, Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton 
proposed the First Congress authorize a federal mint, taxation system, and national bank. 
Fisher Ames, Theodore Sedgwick, and Johnathan Trumbull rallied congressmen to pass 
Hamilton’s mint and taxation plans.
603
 But the Constitution did not expressly empower 
                                                                                                                                                 
delegated sovereignty to their state constitutions, but added that these citizens also ratified the national 
Constitution, granting federal courts authority over interstate disputes. Wilson thus firmly concluded “As to 
the purposes of the Union, Georgia is NOT a Sovereign State.” See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 457 
(1793). 
600
 As Robert G. McCloskey writes, after Chisholm the “larger question of the nature of the Union was 
postponed for the more devious talents of Marshall to cope with.” Robert G. McCloskey, The American 
Supreme Court (University of Chicago Press, 2004), 22. 
601
 In 1798, Congress, now in Federalist hands, passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, imprisoning 
Jeffersonian printers and disenfranchising immigrants. Virginia and Kentucky legislators responded with 
resolutions, drafted by Madison and Jefferson, nullifying the Acts. Jefferson’s Kentucky Resolution 
declared the states formed the Constitution, were bound by the “certain definite powers” delegated to the 
Constitution, and that in cases of dispute, the national government could not be the “exclusive or final 
judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself.” With the dissolution of the compact, “each party has 
an equal right to judge for itself” in resolving the controversy. This challenged the national branches’ 
exclusive authority to interpret the Constitution.  
602
 But see Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, granting Congress the power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts and Excises.” 
603
 Congressmen initially frowned on political factions, instead clustering into advocates and opponents of 
strong national government, a division familiar from the Constitution’s ratification debates. When bills 
concerning national powers reached the First Congress’ Committee of the Whole, Federalists and Anti-
Federalists clashed, but without party structure or discipline, neither group could rally around a 
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Congress to establish a national bank, which might also muscle out fledging state 
banks.
604
 Thus the Virginians Madison, Jefferson, and Edmund Randolph, all opposed to 
broad federal powers and constitutional readings, allied with George Clinton and Aaron 
Burr of New York, uniting the nation’s Democratic-Republican societies and presses 
against Hamilton’s bank plan.
605
 Despite this, Congress chartered the bank of the United 
States in 1791. The bitter presidential election of 1796 internally divided many states, 
with established local elites often assuming the Federalist label – by the late 1790s, New 
England Federalists like Ames, Sedgwick, and Trumbull caucused with prominent 
families in Delaware and South Carolina, becoming a national party.
606
 Congressmen 
split into two intersectional parties, one supporting the Bank and the other opposing it, 
each trying to entrench its position, together proposing a dozen federal constitutional 
amendments on national banking powers.
607
  
 With the Constitution still silent on banking authority, states too claimed this 
power. States and localities had long engaged in self-financing. Neglected by Parliament 
and sometimes by their own legislatures,
608
 colonial counties, cities, and rural villages 
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608
 Parliament excluded the colonial legislatures from levying import taxes, and under colonial Whig 
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funded their own infrastructure and public works projects through lotteries.
609
 Between 
1766 and 1775, Rhode Island alone authorized forty-three lotteries.
610
 But with 
independence, state legislators formalized and expanded their authority to raise revenues 
through taxes and banks. By 1791, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore all 
hosted state banks, each of which competed with a corresponding local branch of the 
national Bank.
611
 Albany opened a state bank the following year, and in 1793 
Pennsylvania opened a second state bank in Philadelphia, hoping to raise state revenue to 
through stock sale rather than taxation. When Hamilton threatened to plant a national 
Bank branch in Virginia, Jefferson and the state legislature proposed competing banks in 
Alexandria and Richmond to better respond to yeoman farmers’ credit needs. Twenty-
three banks were chartered between 1792 and 1800, and with President Jefferson’s 
blessing,
612
 uncounted more opened in the following decade, such that by 1811, each 
state had established at least one bank. Accordingly, each senator represented a state bank 
that competed with the national one,
613
 keeping alive congressional opposition to the 
national Bank, such that by the 1810s, congressmen still proposed federal constitutional 
amendments to block the institution’s re-chartering.
614
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 Moreover, untried state clauses threatened to clash with federal constitutional limits on states’ legal and 
economic power. See for example the Contracts Clause in Article I, Section 10, Clause 1. 
168 
 
 Territorial slavery presented a second issue. The 1787 Northwest Ordinance 
abolished territorial slavery north of the Ohio River,
615
 while the 1789 North Carolina 
Cession Act forbade territorial abolition south of the River,
616
 promising a balanced 
Senate. Territorial slaves would count as three-fifths of a person for the purposes of 
national taxation and representation,
617
 inflating the number of congressmen and 
Electoral College votes south of the Ohio.
618
 Some convention delegates expected whites 
to quickly settle these fertile new states, further increasing the Southern delegation.
619
 But 
Northerners knew they could use the Senate to check a Southern House and veto a 
Southern president.
620
 And any congressional statute, including slavery regulation, would 
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Of the bill’s five drafters, three were Southerners – Richard Henry Lee and 
Edward Carrington of Virginia, and John Kean of South Carolina. Seeing that the Ordinance’s abolition of 
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Clauses should be read as parts of the same constitutional bargain. Lynd, “The Compromise of 1787,” 243–
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 On June 30
th
, Madison proposed making this balance explicit by representing slaves in one house but not 
the other. “By this arrangement,” Madison wrote, “the Southern Scale would have the advantage in one 
House, and the Northern in the other.” Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 1911, 
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require bisectional support, as would any amendment changing the terms of the 
compromise.
621
 
 This peace lasted nearly twenty years, with free states formed north of the Ohio 
and slave ones south, until Jefferson’s 1804 Louisiana Purchase pushed American 
jurisdiction west across the Mississippi, past the Ohio’s dividing line. Federal framers, 
dodging the slavery controversy, had not expressly specified whether congressional 
authority extended to regulating slavery in new territories.
622
 Further, the eastern states 
had abolished or affirmed slavery without congressional interference, suggesting new 
western states might do the same. Congressmen were now unsure of the boundary and the 
balance of free and slave states and congressional seats, opening the bisectional compact 
to renegotiation by constitutional amendment. Between 1803 and 1808 congressmen 
proposed eight amendments banning slave importation,
623
 and another eight stripping 
Southern states’ extra slave votes and tax duties,
624
 threatening the bisectional balance. 
All failed. And congressmen avoided proposing amendments on the divisive question of 
territorial slavery,
625
 leaving this pivotal national issue to territorial legislators. 
 Finally there was the issue of election and suffrage law. Colonial and early state 
legislatures established property and taxpaying qualifications that disenfranchised 
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bisectional agreements on slavery policy than with determining the substance of those arguments in 
advance.” See  Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders, 8; Graber, Dred Scott, 96. 
622
 Congress assumed this power in abolishing slavery in Old Northwestern territories and allowing slavery 
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women, slaves, transients, the urban poor, and tenant farmers. In late July 1787, federal 
Convention delegates briefly debated national franchise reform before delegating this 
question to the overburdened Committee of Detail, which rejected a uniform federal 
property requirement. The Convention again rejected reform in August,
 626
 settling 
instead on three clauses that reaffirmed the states’ traditional authority over elections. 
The Elections Clause allowed state legislatures to regulate the “Times, Places and 
Manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives,” subject to Congressional 
override.
627
 Second, people qualified to vote for candidates for the state’s lower house 
also qualified to vote for candidates for the national House of Representatives.
628
 And the 
Guarantee Clause required, without any elaboration, “a Republican Form of 
Government” for each state.
629
 The Constitution was otherwise silent on suffrage 
qualifications, including those for state office, and congressmen refrained from proposing 
any amendments on the topic. As Alexander Keyssar concludes, “By making the 
franchise in national elections dependent on state suffrage laws, the authors of the 
Constitution compromised their substantive disagreements to solve a potentially 
explosive political problem.”
630
 As white, male tenant farmers and urban laborers began 
rallying against their disenfranchisement, this problem fell to the state legislatures. 
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 In early August, Gouverneur Morris and James Madison argued a freehold requirement would grant the 
vote to small, independent farmers, while the tradesmen Nathaniel Gorham of Boston and Benjamin 
Franklin of Philadelphia replied that this rule unfairly disenfranchised city dwellers. On August 8
th
, 
Madison pleaded delegates drop the divisive question of suffrage rights, lest they alienate each other and 
the citizens of the states. He warned “the people have been accustomed to this right in various parts of 
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 The Elections Clause, deferring election regulation to the states, resulted in 
conflicting state laws for the selection of House members and for presidential electors. 
Different states elected House members by district,
631
 by general ticket,
632
 and by two-
stage election,
633
 much to the frustration of congressmen, who sought a consistent 
system. In 1800, John Nicholas proposed a national amendment for election by district, 
and similar district proposals came in 1802 and 1813, followed by twenty-two 
amendment proposals between 1816 and 1826. Three passed the Senate before failing in 
the House.
634
 Congress’ authority to unilaterally regulate these elections was itself 
suspect, and state ratification conventions in 1788 proposed eight amendments to prevent 
congressional interference, but these and a few subsequent proposals failed, leaving 
authority split.
635
 Relatedly, congressmen grew frustrated with states’ inconsistent 
schemes to pick presidential electors by district vote, by general ticket, or by legislature, 
particularly when deadlocked legislatures failed to pick electors. Allegations of House 
interference in the 1824 presidential election reignited demands for a selection by popular 
vote. Between 1800 and 1849, Congress fielded at least sixty-five amendments on 
presidential elections,
636
 and forty-five for selection of electors by district, at least four of 
which passed the Senate with broad support,
637
 and six for popular election of the 
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 Massachusetts, Virginia, New York, Maryland, South Carolina. 
632
 New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia. 
633
 In Connecticut a preliminary election then narrowed the field by a third, from which a second election 
selected a representative. 
634
 In total, between 1800 and 1849, Congress saw at least thirty-four proposals for electing representatives 
by district. See Table 11 Table 1in the appendix. 
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 Ames, The Proposed Amendments, 28–29, 56–58. 
636
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resulting in the Twelfth Amendment in 1804. 
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 Ames puts the total count at forty-two, with four passing the Senate. Ames, The Proposed Amendments, 
80–84, 113. 
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president,
638
 among other methods.
639
 Like the selection of House members, this issue 
threatened to destabilize the national Constitution, but was also being regulated the state 
legislatures. 
III. Constitutional Conflict and Resolution, 1800-1828 
 
A. Constitutional Decentralization 
 
 Presidents, Congress, and the Supreme Court delegated these three matters to the 
states. Presidents left suffrage law to the state constitutional conventions. John Adams 
focused his suffrage reform efforts on Massachusetts’ 1821 Constitutional Convention, to 
which he was a delegate.
640
 Thomas Jefferson supported expanding the franchise through 
state constitutional reform,
641
 and while Madison sought a national freehold 
qualification,
642
 he admitted in The Federalist “One uniform rule would probably have 
been as dissatisfactory to some of the States as it would have been difficult to the 
convention,” instead leaving the issue to be “fixed by the State Constitutions.”
643
 
Jeffersonian congressmen too shied from tinkering with state suffrage laws, and early 
congressional interventions into territorial suffrage, though expressly constitutional,
644
 
were few. These tended to expand the white male vote.
 
After Ohio’s 1802 Convention 
allowed an exemption of taxpaying requirements, Congress scrapped property 
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requirements for the neighboring Indiana Territory, and did the same in the southwestern 
territories. Similarly, the congressional acts authorizing the Ohio and Indiana 
constitutional conventions allowed white male taxpayers with a year of residence to vote 
for state convention delegates. Congress abandoned these taxpaying requirements for 
convention elections in Illinois in 1818, Michigan in 1835, and Wisconsin in1846.
645
 
 Territorial slavery was more divisive. Southern congressmen pushed to open new 
western territories to Southern trade and settlers, aiming to win seats in the House and 
Electoral College and unbalance the bisectional accord.
646
 The issue came to a head when 
Indiana settlers convened at their territorial capital of Vincennes in 1802,
647
 and, hoping 
to encourage Southern emigration, requested Congress modify Article VI of the 
Northwest Ordinance to allow slave importation for ten years.
648
 A House committee 
split between the Virginian John Randolph and a Northern bloc rebuffed the petition, but 
a subsequent Southern committee accepted it in 1804, only to be defeated by floor votes 
in 1804 and 1806.
649
 Ignoring Congress and the Northwest Ordinance, Indiana’s 
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Territorial Governor William Henry Harrison redrafted a slave code from his home state 
of Virginia and forced it through the territorial legislature.
650
 As slaveholders streamed 
into Indiana, Congress refused to repeal or enforce Article VI of the Ordinance, avoiding 
the issue. Thus, per John Craig Hammond, “the battle between slavery and freedom in 
Indiana shifted from Congress back to Indiana itself.”
651
 
 Congress also refused to intervene in southwestern territorial slavery. 
Congressmen, unable to coerce distant Appalachian settlers to emancipate their slaves, 
capitulated to North Carolina’s proslavery 1789 Cession Act,
652
 and in March 1798, 
Secretary of State Timothy Pickering recommended Congress maintain slavery in the 
Mississippi Territory, for fear abolition would push local slaveholders to defect to 
Britain. When Maine’s antislavery Federalist representative George Thatcher proposed 
abolition in the Territory, condemnation was widespread. South Carolina Federalists 
Robert Goodloe Harper and John Rutledge, Jr. rallied their party against Thatcher’s 
amendment,
653
 which failed against bipartisan support,
654
 garnering only twelve votes in 
the House. Both congressional parties upheld the existing patchwork of local slavery 
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regulations. As John Nicholas concluded, it “was not for them to make a particular spot 
of country more happy than all the rest.”
655
 
 Following Jefferson’s 1804 Louisiana Purchase, Congress reaffirmed its policy 
nonintervention.
656
 Questions of implementing the treaty and of territorial slavery fell to 
the Senate,
657
 where Federalist James Hillhouse of Connecticut proposed abolishing the 
domestic and international slave trade within the Louisiana Territory and emancipating 
male slaves at the latest at age twenty-two and females at nineteen. The moderate 
Federalist senators Timothy Pickering and John Quincy Adams rallied with Democratic-
Republican Southerners to defeat the latter provision, but the importation prohibition 
stood, provoking an angry, seditious petition from Louisiana slaveholders.
658
 In response, 
Southern congressmen led Congress to quietly let these antislavery provisions expire the 
following year.
659
 And as Federalists lost congressional seats in the 1810s,
660
 calls for 
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territorial abolition subsided. As Donald Fehrenbacher puts it, Congress used “the hands-
off strategy later called ‘nonintervention.’ The effect, especially in view of slavery’s 
pervious existence there, was a tacit federal sanction of the institution everywhere west of 
the Mississippi.”
661
 
 Similarly, presidents and Congress refused to enforce the contentious Fugitive 
Slave Clause across the states,
662
 instead deferring to local law enforcement. When 
Pennsylvania abolitionists clashed with proslavery Virginians over an escaped fugitive in 
May 1788,
 663
 Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Mifflin appealed to President Washington, 
who, on the advice of Attorney General Edmund Randolph, avoided the issue, as would 
subsequent presidents.
664
 Congressmen grappled over the issue for two years, debating 
one House bill and three Senate bills before settling on the 1793 Fugitive Laborer Act,
665
 
asking governors to accept each other’s extradition requests, as required by the federal 
Fugitive Slave Clause, satisfying Southerners, but did not force federal agents, governors, 
or state courts to comply, satisfying Northerners. Later attempts to amend the Act failed 
                                                                                                                                                 
Democratic-Republican House reorganized land west of the Mississippi under the Missouri Territory, 
soundly defeating a proposal by Pennsylvania Democratic-Republican Abner Lacock to prohibit territorial 
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to gain bisectional support.
666
 Deference to state governors and judges remained the 
status quo.
667
 
 While the early Supreme Court rarely debated slavery or franchise regulation, 
after seizing the power of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison, the Marshall Court 
began overturning state statutes and constitutional provisions that regulated commerce 
and contracts.
668
 In Fletcher v. Peck (1810),
669
 Marshall asserted the Constitution’s 
Contracts Clause forbade newly-elected Georgia legislators from invalidating a contract 
their predecessors had drafted with the Yazoo Land Company.
670
 Nine years later he 
directly answered the banking debate in McCulloch v. Maryland, interpreting the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to affirm federal power to charter a national bank.
671
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Marshall also interpreted the Clause in this case to constrain a state’s economic powers, 
repudiating the Maryland legislature’s attempt to levy a crippling fine a local branch of 
the Second Bank of the United States,
672
 and by extension, overturning similar fines 
passed by five other states.
673
 Over the next two years, Jeffersonian congressmen replied 
with four proposals for a national amendment to override McCulloch by prohibiting 
further congressional national Bank charters, but all failed.
674
 Marshall further cemented 
federal economic authority in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), holding that a federal statute 
overrode a conflicting state law regulating interstate steamship traffic.
675
 With Fletcher, 
McCulloch, and Gibbons, Marshall established three separate and independent routes to 
limit state legislatures’ economic regulatory powers. 
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 The early Marshall Court also extended federal judicial authority to the exclusion 
of the states. In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee (1816), Spencer Roane of the Virginia 
Supreme Court forced a confrontation with the Marshall Court, which in response seized 
jurisdiction over cases originating in the state courts.
676
 Five years later, in Cohens v. 
Virginia (1821), Marshall again reversed Roane. Roane refused the right of the Cohen 
brothers, who had illegally sold lottery tickets in Virginia, to appeal to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, claiming Virginia’s police powers granted the state sole jurisdiction over criminal 
cases.
677
 Marshall rejected Roane’s claim, arguing the Cohens’ appeal concerned federal 
law, thus extending federal jurisdiction to criminal cases originating in state courts and 
chipping at states’ traditional police powers. 
 But the early Court left other major constitutional disputes to the states. In Calder 
v. Bull (1798), the Court was forced to decide, among other questions, whether a 
Connecticut statute violated the state’s Constitution. In response, Justice Chase threw out 
the case, ruling that the Supreme Court could not decide any cases relating solely to state 
law.
678
 This let state courts decide most disputes over state statutes and constitutions.
679
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intervening in the states’ legal prerogatives. Justice Samuel Chase dodged this dilemma by holding the 
Court lacked authority over constitutional disputes within a state that did not relate to federal law. He wrote 
“this court has no jurisdiction to determine that any law of any state Legislature, contrary to the 
Constitution of such state, is void. Further, if this court had such jurisdiction, yet it does not appear to me, 
that the resolution (or law) in question, is contrary to the charter of Connecticut, or its constitution, which is 
said by counsel to be composed of its acts of assembly, and usages, and customs. I should think, that the 
courts of Connecticut are the proper tribunals to decide, whether laws, contrary to the constitution thereof, 
are void.” Chase’s decision diffused the potential conflict, excluding the Supreme Court from most matters 
of state constitutional politics. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798). 
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The Marshall Court accordingly deferred electoral and slavery regulation to the states, 
and, save for the Cohens decision, largely respected the states’ traditional police powers. 
 Marshall’s deference may have preempted conflict between the Federalist Court 
and Jeffersonian White House and Congress. While Jeffersonians tried to control the 
Court, first by impeaching the Federalist Justice Chase, and then by appointing 
Jeffersonian justices, Marshall still dominated Court deliberations, relegated to the 
minority in only eight of the thousand cases he heard.
680
 By respecting the states’ 
traditional authority over slavery, elections, and police powers, the Federalist Marshall 
Court avoided direct conflict with hostile Jeffersonian executives and congressmen, 
shielding the young Court. The rise of the Marshall Court reflects not only Marshall’s 
clever reasoning in cases like Marbury, and not only the waning of executive power 
towards the end of the Era of Good Feelings, but also the Court’s relationship with the 
states. Deference to the states prevented national inter-branch conflict, helping make the 
Supreme Court and independent, equal federal branch. It also pushed many controversial 
issues to the states, decreasing pressures for federal constitutional revision. 
B. Jeffersonian State Constitutional Revision 
 
 This deference and national partisan trends destabilized state constitutionalism. 
With the election of 1800, Jeffersonians swept both congressional houses, the White 
House, and many of the state legislatures. For example, in South Carolina in 1800, an 
alliance of Appalachian frontiersmen and Charleston mechanics and shopkeepers ejected 
Federalists in favor of a Democratic-Republican governor and legislature. In turn these 
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Democratic-Republicans increased the number of local elections, opened the farming 
upcountry to banking and the slave trade, and amended the state Constitution in 1808 to 
equitably reapportion the legislature, and again in 1810 to repeal taxpaying qualifications 
on the franchise.
681
 This was a common pattern,
682
 and many of these legislative switches 
incited constitutional replacement. Between 1800 and 1849, the states proposed at least 
205 constitutional amendments,
683
 and thirty-one constitutions to replace previous 
documents.
684
 Of the twenty-two constitutional proposals for which this dissertation has 
data on legislative party balance, fifteen occurred within three sessions of a switch in 
legislative control,
685
 and the proposals defying this trend were exceptional.
686
 In the 
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 Tidewater Federalist gentry had controlled state politics, limiting the number of legislative seats 
representing upcountry farmers. See South Carolina Constitution of 1790, Article I, Section 3, Article I, 
Section 4, Amendment 1 of 1808, Section 7, Amendment 2 of 1808, Section 9, Amendment 3 of 1808, and 
Amendment 4 of 1810.  
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antebellum era, attempts at state constitutional replacement almost always were 
associated with shifts in state coalition politics.
687
 And these new Jeffersonian state 
legislators and framers had broad prerogatives to regulate slavery, suffrage and elections, 
and banking and finance. 
 State convention delegates, legislators, and judges, confronted with regulating 
slavery, maintained the bisectional consensus. The older, eastern states continued their 
previous policies.
688
 In New England, only Vermont’s Constitution mentioned or 
abolished slavery, but the courts and legislatures of Vermont, Massachusetts, and New 
Hampshire promised liberty to all persons, including slaves.
689
 Rhode Island and 
Connecticut joined New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and to some degree, Maryland, 
on the path to gradual emancipation by statute.
690
 But courts in Virginia, the Carolinas, 
and Georgia still largely refused to extend constitutional rights to slaves and blacks, and 
in 1832, the Virginia legislature defeated a proposal for gradual emancipation.
691
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 All nineteen constitutional provisions on slavery passed between 1800 and 1820 
were drafted in new frontier states or territories,
692
 where the federal government 
exercised little power and state framers had broad discretion. Framers in Old Northwest 
states reaffirmed abolition north of the Ohio under the bisectional consensus. In 1800, 
Democratic-Republican candidates in Cincinnati and in Ross County warned Ohio voters 
that slavery would bring plantations and a Federalist aristocracy. Swept into office with 
Jefferson’s election that year, Democratic-Republicans dominated Ohio’s Constitutional 
Convention of 1802, where they held majorities on all eight committees and marginalized 
the proslavery Federalist Governor Arthur St. Clair. Delegates adopted the Northwest 
Ordinance’s Article VI into the state constitution, but allowed indentured servitude for 
black apprentices, and forbade blacks from voting, office-holding, military service, and 
legal testimony against whites.
693
 Indiana’s territorial legislature repealed proslavery 
territorial statutes and outlawed black indenture in 1810. The state’s 1816 Convention 
passed a constitution, modeled on Ohio’s Constitution and Article VI, with an 
unamendable ban on slavery, though the Constitution allowed continued indenture of 
existing servants, and forbade blacks from militia service.
694
 Slavery in Indiana waned. 
By 1830 the federal census listed only three slaves in the state,
695
 and later reforms 
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forbade free blacks from immigrating.
696
 Facing pressure from Northern antislavery 
congressmen, framers of the 1818 Illinois Constitution almost exactly imitated Ohio’s 
abolition clause,
697
 and six years later Governor Edward Coles led Illinois voters to 
soundly reject a constitutional convention to redact the clause.
698
 But to attract Southern 
settlers, Illinois framers tacitly endorsed slavery.
699
 Over a thousand blacks, mainly 
slaves and servants, lived in the state at the 1818 Constitution’s passage, and formal 
abolition did not come until the late 1840s.
700
 
 This constitutional revision pleased congressmen and legislators in other states. 
Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois conventions formally upheld the Ordinance’s abolition 
requirement and its promise to return fugitive slaves, curbing conflict with slaveholders 
in bordering Kentucky and Virginia. With slavery waning in the Old Northwest,
701
  
antislavery congressmen were appeased – the firebrand James Talmadge was a lonely 
congressional voice of opposition to Illinois’ 1818 Constitution. Slavery was, as 
Hammond writes, “by default, a local question. Consequently, slavery entered local 
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politics in western states and territories far more frequently and intensely than it did 
national politics prior to 1819.”
702
 
 States south of the Ohio allowed slavery, maintaining the consensus. In 1790, 
seventeen percent of Kentucky’s population was enslaved, enough that Congress, which 
governed the region under the 1790 Southwest Ordinance, left the institution intact. 
When a group of seven Protestant ministers proposed abolition at the state’s 1792 
Convention, the Convention’s proslavery majority prohibited the legislature from freeing 
a slave without compensation or the owner’s consent.
703
 Tennessee’s 1796 Convention 
also followed the 1776 North Carolina Constitution and 1790 Southwest Ordinance in 
allowing slavery within the borders of the state, but granted the vote to all freeholders or 
residents over twenty-one, including blacks.
704
 Similarly, Louisiana’s territorial 
legislature passed a slave code, and in 1807, forbade manumission and compensated 
emancipation.
705
 The state’s 1812 Convention borrowed many provisions from 
Kentucky’s 1799 Constitution, but curiously redacted all explicit references to slavery.
706
 
Five years later, Mississippians drafted their own constitution, borrowing heavily from 
the constitutions of Kentucky and Tennessee, but allowing the legislature to emancipate 
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slaves for “distinguished service” to the state, with compensation paid to the owner.
707
 In 
sum, between 1800 and 1828, the state conventions elaborated the bisectional bargain 
struck at the Convention. With the question of territorial abolition settled for the time, the 
issue presented little national controversy. 
 The states also took up suffrage and electoral reform. Revolutionary-era state 
framers, worried that tenant farmers and the urban poor were not materially invested in 
their community or wealthy enough to think and vote independently, conditioned voting 
and office-holding on private property ownership and taxpaying.
708
 All thirteen original 
states passed property or taxpaying requirements,
709
 disenfranchising women, blacks, 
Indians, and white male tenant farmers, transients, and urban workers.
710
 
 But with the rise of urban manufacturing, mechanics, workingmen, shopkeepers, 
and immigrants rallied for labor and suffrage reform. Baltimore mobs pushed the 
Maryland legislature to reject property requirements in 1801. In Milwaukee, German and 
Irish immigrants organized to claim the franchise. And in Richmond, disenfranchised 
protestors presented the 1829 state convention with a formal petition. Small farmers 
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across the country faced similar disenfranchisement. A muster of 1,000 Shenandoah 
County, Virginia militiamen found that 700 lacked the vote.
711
 New York had long 
excluded tenant farmers,
712
 particularly those in Westchester and Duchess Counties on 
the east Hudson,
713
 such that by 1821, only seventy-eight percent of adult male New 
Yorkers could vote for assemblymen, and only thirty-nine percent for the governor or 
senators.
714
 In 1839, the Hudson Valley’s tenant farmers revolted and formed roving 
militias, attacking sheriffs, threatening to burn cities and estates, and skirmishing with the 
state militia.
715
 
 Antebellum state framers were amenable to franchise reform. From Massachusetts 
to Illinois to Virginia and Alabama, convention delegates argued enfranchised militiamen 
were more loyal, obedient, and in the South, better able to stop slave revolts. Thanks to 
Congress’ liberal enabling acts to admit a territory to the Union, in some territories, male 
taxpayers with a year of residence could vote for delegates to a territory’s constitutional 
convention. This new generation of convention delegates and state legislators worked as 
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village lawyers, farmers, mechanics, and shopkeepers, and felt independent employment 
– not property wealth – allowed independent voting,
716
 arguing for franchise expansion. 
 Martin Van Buren was one such delegate.
717
 In 1821, he attended the New York 
Constitutional Convention, organizing delegates against a proposal for freehold 
qualification of 250 dollars in state elections. Defeating the amendment would double the 
state electorate, enfranchising 75,000 new freeholders, mainly “mechanics, professional 
men, and small landholders… constituting the bone, pith, and muscle of the population of 
the State.”
718
 The Convention enfranchised all white males who served in the military or 
paid taxes, though free black males had to hold a prohibitively high 250 dollars in taxable 
property.
719
 Along the Hudson and around Albany, hotbeds of tenant farmer agitation, 
Van Buren found a mass political base, turning sporadic rural unrest into a statewide 
machine dubbed the Albany Regency. Van Buren’s men nearly unseated the patrician 
Governor DeWitt Clinton in 1820, boosting Van Buren to the Unites States Senate in 
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1821. In response Clinton capitulated and sponsored a successful constitutional 
amendment removing tax and service requirements on the franchise in 1826.
720
 
 In the 1820s and 1830s, these workingmen seized state legislatures and 
conventions. Democrats and Whigs competed to expand their base by enfranchising new 
groups, repealing property qualifications.
721
 Delaware eliminated constitutional property 
qualifications in 1792,
722
 Maryland in 1802,
723
 Massachusetts in 1821, and New York in 
1826.
724
 For new western territories, enfranchisement also promised more settlers and 
quicker admission to the Union. Kentucky’s 1792 Convention extended the vote to all 
male residents older than twenty-seven, including blacks and Indians.
725
 Delegates to the 
1796 Tennessee Convention put only a token freehold requirement on the white male 
franchise.
726
 Five of the next eight states admitted enfranchised almost all white males.
727
 
White males twenty-one or older could vote under Indiana’s 1816 Constitution after a 
year of residence in the state, while Alabama’s 1819 Constitution lowered the 
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requirement to three months.
728
 Hence, while the number of states nearly doubled 
between 1790 and 1830, the number of states with property requirements actually 
decreased. Most suffrage reform was complete by the 1820s, allowing Andrew Jackson to 
campaign and win in 1828 on a workingmen’s platform. Between 1830 and 1855, the few 
states maintaining property qualifications repealed these laws.
729
 Since enfranchisement 
might also draw immigrants to a state and boost the state’s tax revenues and land values, 
many new western states further relaxed constitutional suffrage restrictions.
730
  
Year 1776 1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1855 
States in Union 13 13 16 17 23 24 26 31 31 
States with Property Requirements 13 10 10 9 9 8 7 4 3 
Percent of States with Prop. Req.s 100 77 63 53 39 33 27 13 10 
Table 6: States with Property Requirements on the Franchise. 
Data from Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States 
(New York: Basic Books, 2000), 336. 
 
 States relaxed other restrictions on the franchise and participation. By 1855, only 
six states maintained taxpaying qualifications for voters, down from a peak of twelve. 
Through the 1830s, Democratic legislators enfranchised resident aliens.
731
 State 
legislators and framers also scrapped municipal franchise restrictions, liberalized office-
                                                 
728
 See the Indiana Constitution of 1816, Article VI, Section 1 and the Alabama Constitution of 1819, 
Article III, Section 5. 
729
 On capturing the governorship, Democrats enfranchised North Carolina’s landless poor in 1850. An 
influx of Anglo-American immigrants to Louisiana pushed the legislature, long controlled by French 
planters under the conservative 1812 Constitution, to call a convention. The state’s 1845 Convention 
scrapped property and taxpaying requirements to extend the vote to all adults over twenty-one with two 
years of state residency, reapportioned the legislature, and increased the number of elected offices. See the 
Louisiana Constitution of 1845, Title II, Articles 8 and 10. Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution, 1–
5. 
730
 Delegates to Illinois’ 1847 Constitutional Convention proposed loosening the state’s franchise 
restrictions to increase immigration and repay the state’s loans 
731
 Delaware, South Carolina, Indiana, and Michigan reduced residency requirements on the franchise. 
After Pennsylvania Whigs passed an 1836 Registry Act to temper the Democratic vote, Democrats halved 
residency requirements at the state’s 1837 Constitutional Convention, hoping to attract new immigrant 
voters. Henretta, “The Rise of ‘Democratic-Republicanism:’ Political Rights in New York and the Several 
States, 1800-1915,” 59. 
191 
 
holding requirements and religious tests, and established judicial elections.
732
 Of the 
seven states admitted between 1800 and 1828, six allowed voters to approve amendments 
or conventions by referenda.
733
 And across the country, state legislators and framers 
reapportioned legislative districts to equitably represent these new voters.
734
 
 This electoral reform occurred almost entirely through state constitutional 
revision. Between 1790 and 1855, at least fifty-nine state-level legal provisions 
elaborated or repudiated property and taxpaying qualifications. Of these, forty-six were 
constitutional provisions and thirteen were statutory, and even these few statutory 
provisions had a quasi-constitutional function in bounding the polity.
735
 Framers also 
entrenched these franchise regulations in the state constitutions to prevent partisan 
legislators from disenfranchising their opponents’ base.
736
 Similarly, to preempt 
gerrymandering by legislators, state framers often entrenched apportionment rules in the 
constitutional text. Attempts to correct malapportionment usually meant calling a 
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Constitution of the State of New York, 278. 
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convention.
 737
 In sum, by the Jacksonian era state framers had revised their constitutions 
to expand the franchise.
738
 
 State constitutional guarantees of white male suffrage appeased riotous farmers, 
workingmen, and militiamen. Mass suffrage let parties herd these new voters to the polls 
and to party caucuses, parades, rallies, and barbecues. Party identification absorbed and 
tempered class identification, perhaps preempting national labor agitation.
739
 Thanks to 
state reforms, many small farmers now vented their discontent at the polls by voting 
Democrat. Rowdiness became rote and routinized. In frontier states, the guarantee of 
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legal recognition might have preempted settlers from mobilizing in the first place.
740
 In 
sum, most states broadened the white male franchise and saw relative peace.
741
 
 Admittedly, when reform came, it was not always peaceful. Under Rhode Island’s 
antiquated constitution,
742
 the state’s southern rural districts, comprising a third of the 
state’s population, elected a majority of the state’s legislators, mainly rural planters, who 
exempted themselves from taxes and refused to reapportion districts toward growing 
cities. These same planters repeatedly renewed freehold qualifications from 1762 that 
disenfranchised a majority of voters, including Providence’s recent Irish immigrant 
textile workers.
743
 In the 1820s, a carpenter named Seth Luther began stumping the state 
calling for constitutional reform. After legislators rebuffed five attempts to revise the 
Constitution,
744
 in 1840, voters installed a new cohort of Whig legislators who called a 
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sixth constitutional convention in February 1841. Still skeptical of legislative reform, the 
populist Rhode Island Suffrage Association, backed by the ousted Democrats, called a 
competing, extralegal “People’s Convention” staffed by urban workers and led by the 
radical Democrat Thomas Dorr, which reversed franchise exclusions and 
malapportionment.
745
 Voters approved the People’s Constitution over the legislature’s 
constitution, and the radical faction elected a separatist legislature and Dorr as their 
governor. In early May 1842, Dorr assembled a company of several thousand militiamen 
and laborers and marched on Providence, where he and his legislature were inaugurated. 
President Tyler rebuffed Governor Samuel King’s request for federal troops to thwart 
Dorr,
746
 and Congress too refused to intervene.
747
 In the early hours of May 18
th
, Dorr 
rallied four hundred supporters to storm the arsenal at Providence. Church bells across 
the city called loyalist militiamen to defend the arsenal, which Dorr, joined by Luther, 
prepared to shell. But Dorr’s cannons failed to fire, and his troops retreated to the rural 
town of Chepachet. The separatist legislature dissolved, and with a thousand-dollar 
bounty on his head, Dorr fled the state. The following year, a new convention extended 
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the vote to all males who paid a token tax, including blacks, restoring peace to Rhode 
Island.
748
 
 Rhode Island shows the danger of withholding the vote from mobilized, armed, 
angry white Jacksonian men. Other states saw the same tensions over class, the vote, and 
malapportionment,
749
 and could have faced Rhode Island’s fate.
750
 There were 
exceptions. Virginians peacefully submitted to franchise restrictions,
751
 Louisiana refused 
reform until an 1845 convention, and North Carolina legislators and convention delegates 
appeased Appalachian farmers with token reapportionment and franchise expansion.
752
 
Conversely, suffrage expansion did not always guarantee stability. Anglo-Americans in 
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California, New Mexico, and Texas granted broad suffrage to white males, but still faced 
domestic turmoil, forming separatist governments to split from Mexico.
753
 After 1801, 
Maryland refused property and taxpaying qualifications but maintained 
malapportionment, leading a reform party to consider armed revolt.
754
 And in 1838, a 
narrow and corrupt Democratic victory in the Pennsylvania gubernatorial election led the 
deposed Whig governor to rally militiamen to seize the state armory, despite the state’s 
liberal franchise laws.
755
 But again, these are the exceptions. Between 1800 and 1850 
most states reformed their constitutions to repeal taxpaying and property qualifications,
756
 
and most of these states had stable constitutional politics.
757
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Stable Constitutional Politics 
Strict Qualifications Lax or No Qualifications 
LA 1812: requires voters own 
property, pay taxes in the last six 
months, or have purchased federal 
land 
NC 1823(F), 1833(L), 1835 (F, A): 
1835 amendments require 50 acres 
to vote for Senate, taxpaying for 
Governor and House vote 
NY 1801(F), 1804(S): 1801 
Convention maintains 1777 
requirement for a 20 pound freehold 
or rental of a tenement for 40 
shillings per yearly ; 1804 statute 
changes the tenement requirement to 
$25 per year 
VA 1804(S), 1816(F), 1829, 1850: 
1804 statute maintains 1762 
requirement of 25 cleared acres or 50 
acres total; 1830 Convention adds 
exception enfranchising some leasing 
land; 1850 Convention repeals 
property requirements 
AL 1819: no qualifications 
AR 1836: no qualifications 
CT 1818, 1845(A): 1818 convention maintains lax 1796 statutory requirement voters own $134 in property 
or a freehold worth $7 per year, exempts taxpayers and militiamen from property qualifications; 1845 
amendment repeals property and tax qualifications 
DE 1831: 1831 Convention maintains 1792 amendment enfranchising anyone who paying taxes within the last 
six months, with exceptions 
FL 1838: no qualifications 
GA 1833(F), 1839(F): maintains 1798 Constitution’s provision enfranchising anyone paying taxes within the 
last year 
IA 1846(F), 1848: no qualifications 
IL 1818, 1848: no qualifications 
IN 1816: no qualifications 
KY 1850: no qualifications 
LA 1845: no qualifications 
MA 1821(F, A): 1821 amendment enfranchises anyone paying taxes within last two years unless exempt from 
taxes, repeals 1780 property qualification requiring 3 pounds in annual income or 60 pounds in estate for 
Senate vote 
ME 1819: no qualifications 
MI 1835, 1850(F): no qualifications 
MO 1820, 1845(F): no qualifications 
MS 1817, 1832: in 1817 requires taxpaying or militia service; drops this requirement at 1832 Convention 
NH 1847(S), 1850(F): 1792 provision disenfranchises those who opt out of tax payment; 1847 statute 
enfranchises them after a year of tax payment 
NJ 1807(S), 1844: 1807 statute enfranchises those worth 50 pounds and all taxpayers; 1844 convention 
repeals this 
NY 1821, 1826(A): in 1821 drops property requirement for whites, keeps $250 requirement for blacks, 
institutes taxpaying requirement, with exceptions for militiamen, firemen, and resident highway workers; 
subsequent conventions maintain this 
OH 1802: enfranchises taxpayers, exempting resident highway workers 
OR 1843(F), 1845(F): no qualifications 
SC 1810(A): 1810 amendment repeals 1790 tax qualification, maintains 50 acre freehold from 1790 
Constitution 
TN 1835: repeals freehold 1796 qualification 
VT 1814(F), 1822(F), 1828(F), 1836(F), 1843(F), 1850(F): no qualifications 
WI 1846(F), 1848: no qualifications 
Unstable Constitutional Politics 
Strict Qualifications Lax or No Qualifications 
RI 1824(F), 1834(F), 1841(F), 
1842: failed conventions maintain 
1762 statute requiring a freehold 
worth 40 pounds or 40 shillings per 
year, with exceptions for freeholders’ 
sons; 1842 Convention requires 
$134 in real estate or $7 in yearly 
rentals, with exceptions 
CA 1849: no qualifications 
MD 1801(S), 1850(F): 1802 amendment repeals 1776 freehold qualification of fifty acres or thirty pounds in 
value; no tax qualifications 
NM 1848(F), 1849(F), 1850(F): no qualifications 
NY 1837(F), 1846: maintains 1821 qualifications 
PA 1833(F), 1838: maintains 1970 provision enfranchising those paying taxes in the last two years with minor 
exemptions 
TX 1836(F), 1845: no qualifications 
Table 7: State-Level Outcomes of Attempts at Regulation of Property and Tax Qualifications on the 
Franchise, 1800-50. 
Franchise regulations listed above are passed by constitutional convention, unless noted as a legislative constitutional amendment (A) 
or statute (S). Also included are failed conventions (F) and legislative committees (L) that proposed but did not ratify a new 
constitution to displace standing franchise regulations. These standing regulations, made by a previous legislature or convention, are 
listed after the failed convention or committee. For details on the stability of constitutional politics in each state, see Table 20 in the 
appendix. 
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 This state constitutional revision helped preempt Congress from proposing a 
national amendment regulating suffrage. Between 1800 and 1849, members of Congress 
proposed at least 476 amendments to the federal Constitution. Not one directly addressed 
suffrage qualifications.
758
 This was not for lack of congressional authority, as Congress 
could have overturned local and state constitutional election law through a single federal 
amendment, as it later would through the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-
Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments.
759
 Rather, antebellum congressmen continued to 
respect the states’ traditional authority over franchise law, perhaps in part because the 
states so competently and thoroughly addressed the issue. Further, antebellum suffrage 
movements, concerned with local questions of labor, apportionment, and 
enfranchisement, did not bridge states or regions, preventing the rise of a single national 
campaign for an amendment.
760
 
 In restricting the franchise to white males, state framers also helped settle and 
define the extent of antebellum citizenship.
761
 With industrialization and land shortages 
pushing white men into urban wage labor, state framers abandoned prohibitive property 
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and tax qualifications, instead asserting that independent labor allowed the material 
independence needed to vote.
762
 This disenfranchised dependent laborers like women and 
slaves, and some free blacks, Indians, and aliens. But other free blacks, Indians, and 
resident aliens were wage laborers and potential voters. Framers in some states closed 
this loophole by asserting that blacks, Indians, and immigrants, like women and children, 
lacked the mental and moral capacities for citizenship and thus the vote.
763
 For example, 
delegates to Maine’s 1819 Convention excluded Indians from the state polity and vote, 
but included free blacks in both.
764
 New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, 
Maryland, and Virginia, which had granted the vote to any inhabitant, revised their 
constitutions to enfranchise only citizens, excluding aliens, as did every new state 
constitution drafted between 1800 and 1840, save Illinois.’
765
 Free blacks lost the vote in 
Connecticut, North Carolina and Tennessee in 1835, and Pennsylvania in 1839,
766
 and in 
New Jersey in 1844, which in 1807 repealed the nation’s only provision to allow female 
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suffrage.
767
 By 1860, only the New England states still allowed free blacks to vote 
without qualification.
768
 
 The states also resolved congressional disputes over selecting presidents, 
presidential electors, and selecting members of the federal House by district. Congress 
heard at least sixty-five, forty-eight, and thirty-four amendment proposals for these topics 
respectively,
769
 such that election regulation was the most common topic for amendments 
proposed in Congress for thirty of the fifty years after 1800.
770
 As noted, in the 1810s and 
1820s Congress heard dozens of amendment proposals for electing federal 
representatives by district, three of which passed the Senate. But the states gradually 
settled on a single-member district system, to Congress’ satisfaction. After New Jersey 
failed elect a general ticket slate of representatives, congressional Whigs pushed to 
nationalize the system of election by districts. Since all but six of the twenty-six states 
had already adopted single-member districts, the district proposal passed by 
congressional statute in 1842.
771
 Congress largely refrained from intervening in House 
elections again until the Reconstruction. As Herman Ames summarizes, “The desire for 
local representation gradually led to the general adoption by the States of the district 
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system of electing their Congressmen, and caused the introduction of amendments on this 
question to cease.”
772
 
 The disputed election of 1824 reignited debates over electing the president. 
Presidential electors in 1824 split between four candidates, granting a plurality of the 
Electoral College vote to Andrew Jackson, the popular vote winner. Since no candidate 
garnered a majority, the House intervened, with Speaker Henry Clay rallying 
congressmen to John Quincy Adams, allegedly in exchange for appointment as Secretary 
of State.
773
 Backlash was swift. Following Adams’ election, congressmen proposed at 
least twenty-two constitutional amendments to guarantee selection of the president by 
popular vote, as well as amendments to standardize the selection of electors by general 
ticket, by districts, or by legislature, to abolish the Electoral College, and to prevent the 
election from devolving on the House.
774
 The issue quickly overwhelmed Congress’ 
constitutional agenda. Between 1824 and Jackson’s election in 1828, Congress heard 
sixty-four amendment proposals, forty-five of which concerned executive selection.
775
 
 While none of these congressional proposals cleared Article V’s supermajority 
threshold, the states’ lower barriers to statutory and constitutional reform allowed 
experimentation. Most states selected electors by legislature, by district, or by general 
ticket, often changing their method when new parties took power. Massachusetts alone 
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switched its practice for selecting electors between every election from 1796 and 1820.
776
 
But partisan deadlock over switching methods occasionally kept states from picking 
electors. State legislators looked for a consistent practice, converging on the general 
ticket method. In 1789 Pennsylvania united its electors onto the same general ticket to 
maximize the state’s electoral impact. In 1812, only nine of eighteen states in the Union 
allowed direct election of presidential electors. But by the 1820s three of the other five 
most populous states imitated Pennsylvania, with small states following, such that by 
1824, twelve states used the general ticket system. States also opted to select these tickets 
by popular vote, so that by 1832, all but two of the twenty-four states selected electors by 
a general ticket and popular vote.
777
 
 This state-level reform alleviated congressional fear of an undemocratic 
presidential election. Congressmen proposed fewer amendments on the topic – only 
twenty-seven of the total sixty-five between 1832 and 1836 – none of which passed. By 
the middle of the century, congressmen almost entirely abandoned the issue.
778
 As 
Herman Ames notes, thanks to the states, “after 1832, the method of choosing electors 
had become nearly uniform throughout the country without the resort to an amendment to 
the Constitution.”
779
  State reform quieted the most contentious national constitutional 
issue of the 1820s, shaping the presidency and preempting Congress from shaping 
presidential elections.
780
 The states established a general ticket system that still endures, 
creating swing states and affecting presidential campaigns, and in allowing a popular vote 
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for in presidential elections, inaugurated Jacksonian democracy and the plebiscitary 
presidency. 
IV. Constitutional Conflict and Resolution, 1828-1849 
 
A. Constitutional Decentralization 
 
 In 1828 Van Buren engineered a mass interstate coalition, increasing presidential 
election turnout,
 781
 to elect Jackson to the White House.
782
 Crowds of all classes 
swarmed to Jackson’s inauguration in March 1829.
783
 The spirit had not yet died in 
December, when Jackson offered his first State of the Union Address, calling for a 
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constitutional amendment to guarantee the popular vote in presidential elections.
784
 In the 
1830s, the Whigs copied Van Buren’s model, organizing as an intersectional party and by 
1840 the average difference in state-level vote share dropped to eleven percent as both 
parties gained footholds in states across the country.
785
 
 While state constitutional revision and Jackson’s landslide election largely 
quieted debate over enfranchising adult white males, slavery and state sovereignty still 
divided the national parties. The admission of Missouri reignited the slavery crisis. The 
House in 1800 and 1812 encouraged slaveholders to immigrate to the Missouri 
Territory,
786
 until in April 1818 New Hampshire representative Arthur Livermore 
proposed a federal amendment banning slavery in any territory admitted to the Union.
787
 
The House rejected the proposal, but the following March James Tallmadge, Jr. rallied 
congressmen around a new proposal excluding additional slaves from Missouri and 
freeing at the age of twenty-five all slaves born after the state’s admission.
788
 A few days 
later, John W. Taylor, a fellow New Yorker, proposed banning slavery in the Arkansas 
Territory. The stakes were high for antislavery congressmen. Missouri’s admission as a 
slave state threatened to bolster slavery in neighboring Illinois and perhaps revive it in 
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Indiana.
789
 Proslavery congressmen feared Talmadge’s proposal would cordon slave 
states and congressional seats to the southeast. Further, Tallmadge justified the 
amendment by claiming that the Constitution’s Guarantee Clause, requiring each state 
have a “republican government,” forbade proslavery state constitutions, potentially 
invalidating slavery nationwide.
790
 Over Missouri, there was little bisectional agreement 
– Northerners voted nine to one for Tallmadge’s amendment to the Missouri bill, while 
Southerners coalesced against it. The issue cut across both congressional parties, 
threatening the constitutional status quo.
791
 
 But in December 1819, Northern congressmen admitted Alabama under a 
proslavery constitution,
792
 signaling proslavery state law did not violate the Guarantee 
Clause, tacitly accepting Southern and Missouri slavery. Congress then admitted the free 
state of Maine alongside the slave state of Missouri, and abolished slavery in states 
admitted north of the 36º 30’ latitude line, preserving it in those below, extending the 
bisectional line.
793
 Southerners approved the plan, expecting Northerners would struggle 
to settle the barren Great Plains, while Southern migration would quickly create 
southwestern slave states and congressmen. Northerners accepted the plan rather than 
alienate secessionist Southerners.
794
 Congress would regulate territorial slavery and 
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refuse statehood to any territory violating the Compromise.
795
 But were a state north of 
the line to allow slavery or one south to abolish it, Congress and the executive would 
have weak constitutional grounds to reverse the decision.
796
 The Missouri Compromise 
depended on the states’ cooperation. 
 Leaders in both parties silenced and delayed abolitionists. Starting in 1832, the 
Democratic Party required all presidential and vice-presidential candidates claim two-
thirds of convention delegates to receive the party’s nomination, requiring compromise 
with both Southern and Northern delegates. Three years later, Jackson ordered the federal 
post to impound abolitionist printing, and refused Texas’ 1836 statehood petition until it 
was paired with a free state’s. And in 1835, free-state Democratic congressmen joined 
their slave-state counterparts in instituting a gag rule to table antislavery petitions.
797
 
Free-state Democrats voted for the measure sixty-one to fourteen, and voted seventy-five 
to five for a separate resolution preventing interference with slavery in the District of 
Columbia.
798
 This effectively kept slavery a local concern.
799
 
 As party leaders attempted to quiet abolitionists in the 1830s, they reopened the 
bank debate. Between 1800 and 1830, America doubled in territory, adding eight new 
states on the frontier, and nearly tripled in population. For example, in 1800, four years 
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after its founding, Tennessee held 105,000 residents, increasing to 682,000 in 1830.
800
 
Mills and factories drew rural and foreign immigrants to booming eastern cities.
801
 State 
and national legislators proposed canals, turnpikes, roads, and railways to link these 
eastern cities to each other and to raw goods like Appalachian coal and Southern cotton. 
Across the frontier legislators scrambled to authorize roads and canals to draw more 
settlers west and send raw commodities to eastern mills and to interlink rural villages. 
 Turnpikes, canals, and railways stretched great distances, and thus were built 
slowly, with little prospect of immediate profit. Congress could sell federal land and pass 
tariffs to subsidize these private projects, but tariffs were contentious, and none more so 
than John Quincy Adams’ Tariff of 1828, which protected Northern industries, to 
Southerners’ frustration. When Jackson upheld the Tariff, Virginia, Mississippi, and 
North Carolina contested the tariff’s constitutionality, Georgia, Alabama, and South 
Carolina proposed a national constitutional convention to amend the Constitution to 
prohibit regionally-biased tariffs, and Jackson’s Vice President John C. Calhoun 
anonymously penned the South Carolina legislature’s “Exposition” arguing for tariff 
nullification.
802
 On December 10, 1832 Jackson answered with the “Proclamation to the 
People of South Carolina.”
803
 Jackson stated that the constitutional compact irrevocably 
bound the states, warning that “if force was applied to oppose the execution of the laws, 
that it must be repelled by force.” South Carolina radicals resentfully retreated, but the 
balance of state and national economic authority remained unresolved. 
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 Infrastructure companies instead turned to state and local banks loans for capital. 
Since 1816, these local banks had followed lending rules set by the Second Bank of the 
United States. Frontier farmers and workingmen relied on infrastructure development and 
thus on the policies of the distant, elite-run Second Bank headquartered in Philadelphia. 
Already unpopular with populist Democratic-Republicans, the Bank issued enough paper 
currency to exacerbate inflation, contributing to panic of 1819 and the foreclosure of 
many loans on small farms. Democratic-Republicans attacked the Bank’s 
constitutionality. Walter Lowrie of Pennsylvania proposed a national amendment to 
prohibit chartering of a bank outside the District of Columbia, effectively gutting the 
bank. The legislatures of Tennessee, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois backed the measure, and 
other Indianans and Pennsylvanians proposed similar constitutional amendments the 
following year.
804
 
 Jackson began dismantling the nation’s system of centralized finance. On taking 
office in 1829, he vetoed congressional funding bills, which he felt invaded state 
authority. And in 1832, when his opponents attempted to renew the Bank’s charter, 
Jackson, aided by Attorney General Roger B. Taney, successfully vetoed the Bank’s 
renewal on constitutional grounds. The following year the Georgia legislature called for 
an amendment to distribute a federal surplus raised under the Tariff of 1833, and two 
years later, Calhoun proposed a pair of amendments to pass the surplus to the states.
805
 
Congress answered with an 1836 bill distributing the funds directly to local banks, ending 
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congressional debate over the surplus and the Bank.
806
 Financial devolution quieted 
congressional debates on national banking powers. 
 Marshall was in a bind. Jackson effectively reversed McCulloch with his bank 
veto, and he pointedly refused to enforce Marshall’s Worcester v. Georgia (1832) 
decision,
807
 on states’ rights grounds.
808
 A keen student of inter-branch politics since his 
Marbury decision, Marshall likely realized he would not win a direct confrontation with 
Jackson and the House’s solid Democratic majority.
809
 
 So Marshall strategically deferred economic regulation to the states, where defeat 
was less certain. In Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co. (1829), Marshall affirmed the 
Delaware legislature’s police power to charter a dam company to dry a marsh that 
threatened public health, even though closing the marsh impeded interstate commerce.
810
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Then, in Barron v. Baltimore (1833), Marshall asserted the Bill of Rights did not bind 
Maryland from interfering in the private business of Baltimore resident John Barron.
811
 
 On Marshall’s death, Taney became Chief Justice, issuing a triad of decisions 
dramatically expanding the states’ banking and incorporation powers. In Charles River 
Bridge v. Warren Bridge (1837), Taney ruled that the state legislatures had broad powers 
to charter and constrain a corporation, while a corporation could not use its charter to 
constrain a state legislature without that legislature’s explicit blessing.
812
 And in Mayor 
of New York v. Miln (1837), the Taney Court upheld a New York’s use of state police 
powers to require passenger ships publish passenger lists and pay a tax funding 
immigrant processing facilities, even though this state statute may have impeded 
interstate commerce.
813
 Finally, in Briscoe v. Bank of Commonwealth of Kentucky (1837), 
Taney affirmed Jackson’s decentralized banking scheme,
814
 holding states could charter 
banks despite the federal Constitution’s stipulation the states not issue credit.
815
 In 
Willson, Miln, Charles River Bridge, and Briscoe, the Court, Congress, and the White 
House together upheld the state legislatures’ authority to charter corporations and banks. 
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B. Jacksonian State Constitutional Revision 
 
 State legislators used their new constitutional authority to charter infrastructure 
ventures. Spurred by the mercantilist desire to protect unprofitable public projects, by the 
promise of eventual returns on their investments, and by outright corruption, state 
legislators established and funded private corporations and banks to build roads, 
turnpikes, bridges, canals, and railways. The number of banks in the United States 
boomed from four hundred to six hundred between 1833 and 1836 and bank liability 
skyrocketed, particularly in the west, where bank note issues increased by 100 percent, 
and in the South, were they increased by 120 percent.
816
 
 Financial regulations were lax in the early 1830s. For example, Michigan’s 1835 
Convention almost entirely failed to regulate corporations.
817
 Lobbyists swarmed the 
Michigan legislature, and railroads and banks were chartered without personal liability 
clauses, leaving investors no recourse if these businesses failed. A clause requiring the 
state government make costly internal improvements nearly bankrupted the booming 
state.
818
 In neighboring Ohio, legislators allowed banks to be chartered with little hard 
currency reserves, subsidized private infrastructure ventures under the 1837 Loan Act, 
and granted these companies tax breaks. Increased spending and corporate tax cuts 
inflated the state’s annual deficit to nearly twenty million dollars, which legislators 
covered with heavy taxes on personal and real property, irritating voters.
819
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 Then, in March of 1837, a decline in cotton prices brought the failure of Herman 
Briggs and Company, a major New Orleans cotton firm. A panic in New Orleans ensued, 
leading to the collapse of other local firms, and then ones in New York. British lenders, 
worried that American banks had overextended themselves, called in their loans.
820
 This 
sparked a nationwide panic. In Ohio, runs drained the shallow reserves of local banks, 
which collapsed. Newly insolvent banks lacked capital to lend to existing infrastructure 
ventures, which too folded, leaving taxpayers to cover their losses.
821
 
 Voters, ruined by land and infrastructure speculation, called constitutional 
conventions to constrain corporations and state legislators in the late 1830s. For example, 
Florida’s 1839 Convention devoted a fourteen-section article to bank regulation, 
prohibiting election of candidates who had worked for a bank within the previous year, 
limiting legislators’ authority to issue debt and charter corporations, and requiring public 
oversight of corporations.
822
 At least nineteen documents regulated the printing and 
circulation of currency, and twelve more imposed reserve requirements on banks.
823
 
Delegates to California’s 1849 Convention passed a similar currency provision and 
prohibited state legislators from chartering special banks.
824
 Many state framers followed 
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California, particularly in the West.
825
 And the first Midwestern constitutions, all drafted 
after the panic, each included at least five banking and finance regulations, exceeding the 
national antebellum mean of two per document.
826
 
 Framers aggressively constrained legislators’ borrowing and lending powers. 
Delegates to New York’s 1846 Convention limited legislators’ power to issue debt,
827
 
and every other constitution ratified after 1845 included a similar clause.
828
 New York’s 
new, comprehensive document tripled its predecessor in word count, and with more 
regulations, constitutions grew longer. Michigan’s 1835 Constitution, drafted on the eve 
of the panic, had only one provision on corporate regulation, but was replaced by an 1850 
Constitution that dedicated two articles and at least thirty clauses to the topic.
829
 
Indianans scrapped their 1816 Constitution for an 1851 document with at least thirteen 
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sections regulating banks, corporations, and debt.
830
 In a few states, legislators even 
passed constitutional amendments to constrain themselves.
831
 
 Framers also used elections as a constraint. In New York, nearly all judicial, 
administrative, and local offices were now elected, and senators were elected from small 
single-member districts every two years, rather than four.
832
 Other states did the same,
833
 
and voters gained new power, using referenda, frequent elections, conventions, and 
amendments to constrain corporations, recall judges, and prohibit legislators from 
granting corporations special privileges, risky loans, and immunity to liability,
834
 
suggesting Jacksonian democracy was in part a pragmatic response to the financial crisis. 
 These state constitutional revisions quieted national controversy over banking. 
While banking began as a congressional issue, with congressmen proposing a dozen 
federal constitutional amendments around the 1816 Second Bank chartering and 1832 re-
chartering debates, thanks to Jackson’s devolution and the panic of 1837, state 
constitutional bank regulations increased in the 1830s and 1840s.
835
 Thirty-eight of the 
fifty-two state constitutions or organic laws proposed after 1830 regulated debt, banking, 
                                                 
830
 See the Indiana Constitution of 1851, Article I, Section 22, Article XI, Section 1-7, 11-13, Article X, 
Section 5-6. By contrast, the state’s previous constitution seemed to have only two sections on the topic. 
See the Indiana Constitution of 1816, Article I, Section 17, and Article X, Section 1. 
831
 An 1846 amendment to Arkansas’ 1836 Constitution forbade the incorporation of new banks, and in 
1847, Maine legislators passed an amendment limiting the state’s authority to take on debt. See the 
Arkansas Constitution of 1836, Amendment 1, Article I of 1846 and the Maine Constitution of 1819, 
Article IX, Section 1, Amendment 14 of 1847. Tinkle, The Maine State Constitution, 7; Kay Collett Goss, 
The Arkansas State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 1–3. 
832
 See the New York Constitution of 1846, Article III, Section 2. Gallie, The New York State Constitution, 
1–14; Gallie, Ordered Liberty, 9–116. 
833
 For example, in 1835, Tennessee instituted judicial elections to check the legislature, and after local 
road and turnpike projects failed, Kentucky delegates required the legislature submit to voters all non-
emergency loans over 500,000 dollars. Laska, The Tennessee State Constitution, 7–9; Ireland, The 
Kentucky State Constitution, 6–8. 
834
 Dinan, The American State Constitutional Tradition, 9, 67–76. 
835
 At least thirty-eight state constitutions regulated incorporation, thirty-one of which were drafted after 
1830. Another thirty included similar oversight mechanisms, twenty-six of which were drafted after 1830. 
At least four others included office-holding limitations. See Table 15 in the appendix. 
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or incorporation. Similarly, all but sixteen of the total 157 antebellum corporate 
regulations and debtors’ protections were drafted after 1830.
836
 State regulations crested 
roughly ten years after the panic,
837
 though every constitution ratified between the panic 
of 1837 and 1860 constrained banks and lending, save for Kentucky’s 1850 document.
838
 
In contrast, Congress proposed only three constitutional amendments on banking and 
corporations between 1837 and 1860.
839
 In 1840, dissatisfaction over the panic of 1837 
swept Whigs into the White House and both houses of Congress. Yet congressional 
Whigs neither chartered a third Bank nor proposed a national constitutional amendment 
to centralize banking powers.
840
 This was partly because the states’ voters and convention 
delegates had already developed a comprehensive local system of bank regulations. 
                                                 
836
 These 157 regulations exclude at least 45 antebellum debtors’ protections. This was the first type of debt 
regulation – sixteen of the provisions date to the eighteenth century – and also the most common, 
particularly after 1830. For example, in 1846, Wisconsin’s first constitutional convention proposed 
preventing the seizure of debtors’ homes and banning banks outright, but voters rejected the document. 
Two years later, voters instead approved a constitution forbidding imprisonment for debt but allowing 
lenders to seize debtors’ homes, limited by the “privilege of the debtor to enjoy the necessary comforts of 
life.” See the Wisconsin Constitution of 1848, Article I, Section 16-7. In 1852, Wisconsin voters approved 
a referendum instituting banks within the state, but subject to careful regulation. Stark, The Wisconsin State 
Constitution, 4–8. See Table 15 in the appendix. 
837
 This suggests that state constitutions can adjust to exogenous shocks relatively quickly, especially 
compared to the federal Constitution. 
838
 In total, off the 107 state and territorial constitutions and organic laws drafted between 1776 and 1860, 
sixty-eight regulated banking, debt and finance. This population includes all state and territorial 
constitutions and organic laws drafted between 1776 and 1860 as listed in the Rise of Modern 
Constitutionalism database. This database is a compendium of proposed constitutional documents, 
including American state constitutions. See the appendix for Table 15 listing these 107 documents and their 
banking and corporate regulations. Note that this population includes some observations, including 
constitutions of failed American states, that are not listed in the dissertation’s dataset, and note that the 
dissertation dataset includes some constitutional proposals that never resulted in documents and thus are 
excluded from the Rise of Modern Constitutionalism database. However, the two datasets are fairly similar. 
839
 As the panic spread in March 1837, a select congressional committee proposed prohibiting the states 
from incorporating a bank to issue paper notes. The amendment failed, as did a similar one proposed by 
Representative Rice Garland of Louisiana, and another proposed by an 1840 select committee. Ames, The 
Proposed Amendments, 257–58. 
840
 Ibid., 250. 
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Figure 7: State and Federal Constitutional Banking Regulations, 1776-1860. 
For these federal and regulations see respectively Table 12 and Table 15 in the appendix. 
 
 On matters of territorial slavery, the states preserved the Missouri Compromise. 
South of the Ohio River and Missouri’s 36º 30’ parallel, every newly-admitted state 
preserved slavery within its borders,
841
 while territories north of these lines abolished 
slavery, letting Congress pair each new slave state with a free one, keeping the House and 
Electoral College balanced. When the Arkansas Territory in 1833 petitioned for a 
territorial census as a prelude to statehood, Congress stalled for two years until admitting 
Michigan as a free state. Arkansas’ 1836 Constitution subsequently recognized slavery, 
forbade emancipation without the owner’s consent, and limited voting and office-holding 
in the legislature to white males, and charged the legislature with controlling the slave 
trade.
842
 Florida’s Constitution, framed two years later, also prohibited legislators from 
emancipating slaves, allowing them to control the influx of free and enslaved people of 
color into the state.
843
 These state constitutional prohibitions on emancipation promised a 
durably proslavery South and a balanced, stable national constitutional regime. Congress 
thus recognized Florida’s Constitution in 1844, when Iowa accepted congressional limits 
                                                 
841
 By the ratification of Mississippi’s 1831 Constitution, all but three Southern states constitutionally 
recognized slavery. The exceptions are Louisiana and the Carolinas.  
842
 See the Arkansas Constitution of 1836, Article II, Section 21, Article IV, Section 2, 4, 6, 25, Article IX, 
Section 1. Goss, The Arkansas State Constitution, 1–3. 
843
 See the Florida Constitution of 1846, Article XVI, Section 1-3. D’Alemberte, The Florida State 
Constitution, 1–5. 
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on its boundaries and could be admitted as a free state.
844
 Wisconsin entered the Union as 
a free state four years later.
845
 
 In the far West, only Texas constitutionally protected slavery.
846
 Delegates to 
New Mexico’s 1849 Convention, embroiled in a border dispute with Texas, rejected the 
Texan model’s proslavery clauses.
847
 President Zachary Taylor, eager to consolidate 
territory newly seized from Mexico, urged Congress to swiftly admit New Mexico as a 
free state. But after Taylor’s unexpected death, Millard Fillmore assumed the presidency 
and submitted without comment New Mexico’s statehood request, where it died in the 
Senate.
848
 The framers of California’s 1849 Constitution banned slavery with little 
debate, fearing recent white immigrants would lose jobs to cheap slave labor, and that 
slaves might intermix with local whites.
849
 Congress admitted California the following 
year. To the northwest, Oregon’s Organic Laws of 1843 and 1845 prohibited slavery. The 
state legislature affirmed this by statute, but also outlawed free or enslaved blacks from 
entering the territory, under punishment of whipping.
850
 This differed slave state 
                                                 
844
 Stark, The Iowa State Constitution, 1–5. 
845
 See the proposed Wisconsin Constitution of 1846 Article XVI, Section 2 and the ratified Wisconsin 
Constitution of 1848 Article I, Section 2. 
846
 Texans also forbade legislators emancipate slaves without compensation or block their importation. 
However, the 1845 Constitution also prohibited legislators from stripping slaves’ rights to jury trial and 
obligated slaveholders to feed and clothe their slaves. See the Texas Constitution of 1845, Article III, 
Section 1-3. Similarly, Texas’ 1836 Constitution had prohibited forced emancipation and regulated 
immigration of slaves. See the Texas Constitution of 1836, Article VI, General, Section 9.  
847
 The Constitution made no reference to slavery, though it limited the vote and office-holding to the white 
male population, which also determined legislative district apportionment. See the New Mexico 
Constitution of 1849, Article II, Sections 3, 4, 6, 8. 
848
 Smith, The New Mexico State Constitution, 2–4. 
849
 See the California Constitution of 1849, Article I, Section 18.Grodin, Massey, and Cunningham, The 
California State Constitution, 1–9. 
850
 See the Oregon Organic Law of 1843, Article I, Section 4 and Oregon Organic Law of 1845, Article I, 
Section 4. Schuman, “The Creation of the Oregon Constitution,” 611–17. 
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constitutions, fourteen of which required slaves, as valuable property, be treated 
hospitably,
851
 and eleven of which guaranteed slaves’ jury trial rights.
852
 
 Thanks to these state clauses, there was little controversy in the state or national 
legislatures over constitutional regulation of slavery in the 1830s and 1840s. States 
drafted relatively few clauses on slavery.
853
 Northern state framers avoided the slavery 
issue or addressed it with a single clause, while Southerners framed comprehensive state 
constitutional slavery provisions to prevent local emancipation and preserve a proslavery 
South. Save for a triad of unsuccessful abolition amendments proposed by John Quincy 
Adams in 1839,
854
 Congress entirely avoided proposing amendments on the topic. 
 In conclusion, both the state and federal legislatures faced constitutional 
controversies over suffrage and electoral regulation, territorial slavery, and banking 
powers. Congress proposed relatively few federal amendments expressly constraining 
states’ constitutional powers,
855
 instead proposing amendments on concurrent 
constitutional powers,
856
 which were also subject to state constitutional regulation. State 
constitutional revision quieted these issues, preempting federal constitutional reform.  
                                                 
851
 Slave state constitutions, often framed by slaveholders, protected slaveholders’ property in slaves by 
outlawing uncompensated emancipation and physical harm to slaves. See Table 16 in the appendix. 
852
 This jury trial right usually extended to only a petit jury. See Table 16 in the appendix. 
853
 Between 1776 and 1860, state framers drafted only ninety-six slavery regulations. In contrast, the states 
constrained legislators and corporations with at least 202 detailed constitutional banking and debt 
regulations. This count of slavery and banking regulations does not include amendments. See Table 16 in 
the appendix. This data is from the Rise of Modern Constitutionalism database. As explained in Footnote 
838 this database differs slightly but not significantly from the one created for this dissertation. 
854
 Adams’ amendments would have abolished hereditary slavery in 1842, forbade the admission of slave 
states after 1845, and prohibited slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia. Ames, The 
Proposed Amendments, 193. 
855
 Congressman Hall of North Carolina proposed an 1829 amendment for defining national and state 
authority, and South Carolina’s 1832 tariff nullification brought four proposals between 1832 and 1833 for 
resolving disputes between the federal and state governments. And as noted, proposed amendments in 
1837, 1838, and 1840 would have regulated state banks that issued notes. Amendments proposed in 1839 
would have refused admission to proslavery territories and abolished hereditary slavery within the states. 
An 1842 proposal would have regulated state legislatures’ nomination powers. 
856
 As stated, following the disputed election of 1800, congressmen proposed alternate means to select 
presidential electors. Jefferson’s contentious 1807 Embargo Act led congressmen to propose amendments 
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 This pattern played out across all three issues. Jeffersonian congressmen, 
executives, and courts deferred to the states’ traditional authority to regulate elections. 
State legislators and framers caved to white males’ demands for enfranchisement, 
repealing state constitutional property and taxpaying qualifications and beginning mass 
democracy in America. Congress deferred to these state regulations, largely avoided the 
topic of electoral reform. Similarly, as Congress proposed federal amendments on the 
selection of House members and of presidential electors, the states settled on single-
member House districts and general ticket popular selection of electors. By the 1830s, 
beleaguered congressmen accepted these systems, abandoning attempts to revise the 
federal Constitution. These antebellum state reforms still fundamentally structure the 
modern House, binding members to their district and encouraging particularistic 
policymaking, and modern presidential campaigns, which are now popular contests in 
which candidates compete over the general ticket votes of swing states. That is, state 
constitutional reform helped establish the current, stable constitutional design of the 
House and presidency. 
 States also helped resolve banking controversies. In the 1830s, Jackson and 
congressional Democrats encouraged state legislators and framers to constitutionally 
charter and fund banks and infrastructure corporations. Marshall too deferred to the states 
rather than confront Jackson’s coalition, demonstrating how devolution can preempt 
inter-branch conflict. But with the panic of 1837, bank runs drained the shallow reserves 
of these banks, and corporations collapsed, often passing their losses to small investors. 
                                                                                                                                                 
regulating embargoes, the national Bank, taxes, and funding for internal improvements. When 
congressional leadership handed John Quincy Adams the 1824 election, members responded with proposals 
for direct election of the president or his electors. The Jacksonian congresses proposed several means to 
distribute the national surplus before Jackson settled on his system of decentralized banks. 
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Popular outrage led to a wave of state constitutional provisions constraining legislators, 
bankers, and corporate employers. The result was a stable locally-run and locally-
regulated system of banks, such that congressmen stopped proposing amendments to the 
federal Constitution.  
 Finally, tensions simmered over territorial slavery. Jeffersonian congressmen 
abolished slavery north of the Ohio River and tacitly allowed it below, but could not 
enforce these laws in the distant territories. Territorial voters kept the bisectional accord 
through state constitutional revision, abolishing slavery in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, and 
allowing it in Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Mississippi. With the Compromise of 
1820, the states extended the accord line across the Mississippi in cooperation with the 
executive and Congress, which almost entirely avoided proposing federal constitutional 
reform on the issue. However, in the 1850s the line blurred as it extended west, and 
Northerners reevaluated their tolerance for territorial slavery and the Fugitive Slave 
Clause. This promised conflict. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1850-77 
 
“What we wanted, and what we now labored to obtain, was a constitution free from the 
narrow, selfish, and senseless limitation of the word white.” 
Frederick Douglass, on state constitutional framing, 1893
857
 
  
 
 In the mid-nineteenth century, Americans faced constitutional crises over 
territorial slavery, fugitive slaves’ rights, black citizenship, and state sovereignty. By 
1850, the populous free states had grown to a majority in the House and Electoral 
College. Proslavery congressmen passed the 1850 Compromise and 1854 Kansas-
Nebraska Act to let Western states adopt slavery, increasing slave state congressional 
seats. But this devolution backfired. Western constitutional framers consistently rejected 
plantation slavery, constricting slavery and slave states to the southeast, making 
Southerners a permanent national minority. Frustrated with the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act, 
Northern states invoked state sovereignty in refusing to return Southern runaway slaves. 
Southern firebrands rebelled, ending the antebellum constitutional order. 
 Union victory brought Reconstruction through state constitutional revision. 
Rather than dictating the terms of Reconstruction through a new national constitution or a 
host of new amendments, Congress passed only three federal amendments, two of them 
quite brief, relying instead on statutes that forced the states to revise their constitutions 
and elaborate in detail the postwar constitutional order. Southern blacks and Northern 
carpetbaggers drafted state constitutions to outlaw slavery, grant blacks citizenship, 
disenfranchise ex-Confederates, and recognize the national government’s sovereignty. 
These documents expounded and enforced the brief national Reconstruction 
Amendments, formulating a new if still intensely contested and fragile settlement of 
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 Frederick Douglass, “Life and Times of Frederick Douglass,” in Autobiographies (Library of America, 
1893), 666. 
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slavery, citizenship, and state sovereignty. Even as Congress and the president expanded 
their constitutional powers, they relied on the states to resolve many of the era’s 
constitutional questions.
858
 
I. Trends in State and Federal Constitutionalism, 1850-77 
 
  In most eras of American history, Americans have revised the state constitutions 
far more frequently than the federal Constitution. But during the Civil War and 
Reconstruction, both the state and federal constitutions saw unprecedented revision. The 
number of state constitutions proposed each year skyrocketed, and exceeded the 1791-
1877 yearly mean by at least a standard deviation for much of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction.
859
 In 1861 alone the states proposed fifteen new constitutions. In total, 
between 1850 and 1877, the states proposed 104 new constitutions and ratified fifty-two, 
more than any other era before or after.
860
 Even when weighted by the increasing number 
of states, attempted state constitutional replacement still increased significantly around 
the Civil War, suggesting this instability was not driven solely by westward expansion.
861
 
Similarly, the number of state constitutional amendments spiked during the Civil War 
and Reconstruction.
862
 
 Attempts to revise the federal Constitution also peaked. During and after the Civil 
War, congressmen proposed a slew of amendments, exceeding the 1791-1877 yearly 
                                                 
858
 In mentioning the “Constitution,” “Congress,” “White House,” and “Supreme Court,” this chapter refers 
to the Union institutions, and not their Confederate counterparts, unless otherwise noted. 
859
 Specifically in 1850, 1851, 1857, 1861, 1864-5, 1868, and 1875. 
860
 Of the era’s 104 proposed state constitutions, forty-seven were Southern. Another twenty-one were 
Midwestern or Western. See  in the appendix for a United States map indicating the number of 
constitutions proposed in each state. 
861
 Between 1791 and 1877, the number of states in the Union nearly tripled from fourteen to thirty-eight, 
inflating the rate of antebellum constitutional replacement. But attempted replacement exceeded the 1791-
1877 weighted yearly mean in almost exactly the same years as the unweighted yearly mean – in 1850-3, 
1857, 1859, 1861-76, and by at least a standard deviation in 1850-1, 1857, 1859, 1861, 1864-5, 1868, and 
1875. 
862
 See Figure 14 for the number of state constitutional amendments proposed each year for 1789-1877. 
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mean by at least a standard deviation during and after the Civil War.
863
 In total, between 
1850 and 1877, Congress saw 834 proposals for federal constitutional amendments. 
Three of these passed – the Thirteenth (1865), Fourteenth (1868), and Fifteenth (1870) – 
fundamentally revising the federal Constitution in favor of freedom and civic equality for 
African Americans, and eventually for other groups. 
 
Figure 8: Proposals for State Constitutions and for Federal Constitutional Amendments, 1791-1877.  
 
 Reinterpretations of the federal Constitution proliferated alongside calls for 
amendment. With Congress deadlocked over slavery, Justice Roger B. Taney in Dred 
Scott reversed decades of judicial non-intervention in slavery, firmly establishing 
territorial slavery and rejecting black citizenship.
864
 And when Congress in 1850 forced 
Northerners to recapture fugitive slaves, abolitionists like William Lloyd Garrison and 
Ralph Waldo Emerson reinterpreted the Constitution as an irredeemably proslavery 
document.
865
 Southerners radicals worried Free-Soil and Republican congressmen would 
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 Specifically, proposals exceeded the mean by at least a standard deviation in 1860-1, 1864, 1866, and 
1869. Proposal rates exceeded the 1791-1877 yearly mean in 1860-1, 1864-9, 1872-3, and 1876-7. 
864
 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). As later explained, the Prigg decision anticipated elements 
of Dre Scott. 
865
 Garrison in 1833 questioned the Constitution’s morality but accepted its legitimacy. But by 1845, he and 
his colleague Wendell Phillips rightly derided the Constitution as a covenant with slaveholders, which they 
felt was illegitimate. On Emerson, see George Kateb, “Self-Reliance, Politics, and Society,” in A Political 
Companion to Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Alan M. Levine and Daniel S. Malachuk (The University Press 
of Kentucky, 2011); James H. Read, “The Limits of Self-Reliance: Emerson, Slavery, and Abolition,” in A 
Political Companion to Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Alan M. Levine and Daniel S. Malachuk (The 
University Press of Kentucky, 2011). 
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ban territorial slavery, reconceived the Constitution as a revocable compact, some 
abandoning the Constitution outright in favor of the Declaration’s invocation to rebellion. 
 Demonstrating that the state and national constitutions faced intense and joint 
revision, spurs another question – why? Why did the era’s debates over slavery, states’ 
rights, and citizenship force revision at both levels of government? This national 
constitutional revision is even more unusual compared to the constitutionalism of the 
Jacksonian era, when the states resolved controversies over suffrage, slavery, and 
financial regulation, preempting federal constitutional reform. What made the Civil War 
era different? 
 There are a few possible explanations for the era’s unprecedented federal and 
state constitutional instability. Federal amendment rates are easily explained. Between 
1850 and 1859, Democrats, Whigs, and Republicans split Congress, with no party 
garnering the two-thirds supermajority needed to affirm a proposed amendment. 
Congressmen proposed only twenty-four amendments in these years, all of which failed. 
But in 1861, aided by the withdrawal of Southern Democrats, Republicans captured over 
two-thirds of both congressional houses and by 1864 controlled twenty of the twenty-five 
Union state legislatures,
866
 clearing the Article V amendment threshold. The Republican 
Congress subsequently proposed 421 amendments between 1864 and 1870, passing three 
which dramatically transformed federal civil rights. 
 In contrast, state constitutions’ flexibility, specificity, or unpopularity may partly 
explain this unprecedented state constitutional revision. Compared to the federal 
Constitution, the state constitutions had fairly low thresholds on amendment or 
replacement. But these thresholds were consistently low throughout the nineteenth 
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 Dubin, Party Affiliations in the State Legislatures, 10. 
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century, and cannot alone explain the sudden uptick in state constitutional revision in the 
1860s.
867
 Alternately, over-specificity may explain state constitutional revision. 
Jacksonian state legislators encouraged bank speculation, spurring the panic of 1837 and 
subsequent lengthy, technical state constitutional clauses closely constraining banks, 
corporations, and state legislators. These specific, particularistic provisions may have 
eventually grown outmoded, requiring replacement.
868
  But again, this cannot explain the 
abrupt revision increase in the 1860s. Alternately, this legislative corruption, economic 
panic, and regular constitutional reform may have dulled Americans’ respect for or 
interest in their states and constitutions, encouraging further state constitutional reform. 
But antebellum Americans likely venerated their state governments and constitutions,
869
 
suggesting they would be hesitant to reform the state documents. 
 More generally, explaining state and federal constitutional revision in isolation is 
misguided, for the two were inextricably tied. In the 1850s, Stephen Douglas and Lewis 
Cass promoted popular sovereignty, deferring the slavery question to the states and 
territories, just as prior congressmen had in 1787 and 1820. But this familiar tactic 
backfired in the 1850s as Western state framers rejected slavery, increasing free state 
dominance Congress and the Electoral College. State constitutional revision suddenly 
failed as a venting mechanism, now exacerbating the slavery crisis. When antislavery 
Republicans seized Congress and the White House in 1860, Southerners rebelled by 
                                                 
867
 Note that some states failed to specify a revision procedure, and at least twenty-seven nineteenth-century 
state constitutions were drafted without explicit legal authority.  
868
 In general, specific, lengthy state constitutions tend to have more contentious provisions and shorter 
lives. May, “Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited,” 164–70; Lutz, “Toward a Theory of 
Constitutional Amendment,” 357–59. 
869
 As Tocqueville explained, an individual American state “represents a definite number of familiar things 
which are dear to those living there. It is identified with the soil, with the right to property, the family, 
memories of the past, activities of the present, dreams for the future. Patriotism, which is most often 
nothing but an extension of individual egoism, therefore remains attached to the state.”  Tocqueville, 
Democracy in America, 367. 
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drafting new state constitutions, which granted Republicans an overwhelming majority in 
the Union, allowing the Reconstruction Amendments and the Reconstruction Acts which 
forced the drafting of new antislavery Southern state constitutions. These postwar state 
constitutional framers worked in cooperation with Congress to build the Reconstruction 
constitutional order that endures to this day. 
 This chapter explains the era’s constitutional tumult through the interplay of state 
and national constitutional politics. The two move in tandem, suggesting Congress and 
the state conventions together addressed the era’s constitutional crises. For example, note 
that state revision rates spiked during moments of congressional contention in this era.
870
 
The chapter first recounts the constitutional controversies of the 1850s, explaining how 
the federal deference to the states unexpectedly exacerbated these issues. Then the 
chapter recounts how Southerners attempted to resolve these issues through secession and 
consequent state constitutional reform. The chapter’s last section shows how 
Reconstruction state constitutions established abolition, equal protection, and universal 
male enfranchisement, often prior to and in more detail than did the federal 
Reconstruction amendments. These state constitutional conventions formally resolved the 
era’s major questions. The Reconstruction constitutional order was drafted not just by 
Congress, but also by the states. 
                                                 
870
 See Figure 8. Note also attempted state constitutional replacement exceeded both the 1791-1877 yearly 
mean by at least a standard deviation in 1850, 1851, 1857, 1861, 1864-5, 1868, and 1875 – all significant 
junctures in congressional and Supreme Court constitutional politics. In 1861, every Confederate State 
replaced its constitution in order to reject the federal Constitution. These states revised their constitutions 
again between 1864 and 1865 under Lincoln’s and Johnson’s terms for Reconstruction. States exceeded 
their yearly mean in 1868, many revising their constitutions under the terms of the 1867 Reconstruction 
Act. Finally, state constitutional revision increased again in 1875, as some Southern states repealed their 
Reconstruction reforms.  
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II. Constitutional Controversies at 1850 
 
 Between 1850 and 1877, proposed federal constitutional amendments clustered 
around several issues.
871
 Of the 834 amendment proposals, most dealt with slavery (199), 
including proposals abolishing slavery (59), and addressing fugitive slaves (44), 
territorial slavery (36), and slavery in the District of Columbia (31). Postwar proposals 
focused on congressional design (131), including postwar reapportionment (113), on 
suffrage expansions for African Americans and exclusions for ex-Confederates (89), and 
on extension of civil rights (37) and citizenship (21). Executive design and powers 
remained a perennial topic (71).
872
 See Table 11 in the appendix for counts of proposals 
by topic.
873
 Note also that many of the era’s proposed amendments concerned concurrent 
powers subject to state constitutional reform, including amendments regulating slavery 
and suffrage and apportioning congressional districts, which alone account for half of the 
era’s proposals. In short, during the mid-nineteenth century the states were poised to 
resolve the nation’s main constitutional controversies. 
 Between 1850 and 1860, Congress used statutes to address controversies over 
territorial slavery and blacks’ interstate movement and citizenship. Territorial slavery was 
a longstanding issue. Statutory compromises in 1787 and 1820 balanced the House and 
                                                 
871
 To generate a list of the most common proposed amendment topics for 1850-77, this dissertation first 
identifies policy-related words to appear at least twenty times across descriptions of all 834 proposed 
amendments for 1850-77 in the NARA dataset, excluding duplicate words and words like “of” and “the” 
not related to policy issues. A second list of common terms is created by skimming descriptions the 834 
proposals in this era compiled by Ames. These two are then merged and checked against Vile’s list of most 
common topics by year. See Ames, The Proposed Amendments, 324–53; Vile, Encyclopedia of 
Constitutional Amendments, Appendix D. 
872
 Note however that only twenty-two dealt with the selection of the executive, a substantial decrease after 
states largely resolved the issue in the antebellum era. See the previous chapter. Note also this figure is a 
minimum. 
873
 Note these are approximate counts. Some individual amendments may match for multiple search terms 
and be included in multiple topic counts. Note also these counts are minimums, as they do not include 
amendments that do not match the search terms but may still be relevant to the topic. For example, in 1850 
David Disney proposed an amendment protecting the local governments’ sovereignty. Although not 
explicit, this amendment was intended to protect slavery. Ames, The Proposed Amendments, 353. 
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Electoral College between free and slave states, such that Northerners and Southerners 
alike accepted the pact. Between 1836 and 1856, each party nominated a president from 
one section and a vice president from the other, in hopes of capturing and representing 
both regions.
874
 Thus in an 1833 open letter to the London Patriot, Massachusetts 
abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison grudgingly affirmed the Constitution’s legitimacy, 
declaring the slavery question was “not a constitutional controversy, but one affecting 
conscience.” Even the radical Garrison was willing to “recognise the compact” of the 
Constitution.
875
 And as a South Carolina congressman, John C. Calhoun trusted that these 
compromises would maintain Southern control of the presidency and the House, 
championing a powerful national Congress and Union in order to preserve slavery.
876
 
Jackson obliged, impounding abolitionist mailings in 1835, and the following year the 
House implemented a gag rule tabling antislavery petitions. 
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 In 1787, a near-unanimous coalition of Northern and Southern delegates to the Continental Congress 
passed the Northwest Ordinance, mandating Congress form free states north of the Ohio River and 
implicitly allowing slave states to the south. This promised that congressional seats and subsequent slavery 
legislation would be balanced between the two regions. The Missouri Compromise extended the line across 
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 But antislavery delegates to California’s 1849 Constitutional Convention refused 
to split the state into a free northern and proslavery southern half,
877
 potentially 
increasing the Senate free-state majority to six seats, threatening the compromise. 
Further, early industrialization and rising immigration had inflated the population of 
Northern cities, and canals, turnpikes, roads, and railways funneled settlers into the free 
territories of the Old Northwest, which quickly reached the 60,000 inhabitants required to 
apply for statehood. By 1850, free states in total controlled 169 of the 290 Electoral 
College votes, enough to unilaterally select the president, and held 147 of the 237 House 
seats.
878
 That same year, New Mexico proposed an antislavery state constitution, a wall 
against southwestern expansion of slavery threatening to cordon slavery to the 
southeastern states and block Southern recapture of the Electoral College and House.
879
 
 Congress tilted not only Northern, but also toward a Free Soil platform, which 
included prohibitions on slavery in the District of Columbia and the territories, on the 
interstate transportation of slaves, and on federal officials from recapturing fugitives.
880
 
After Polk pushed Congress to admit Texas as a slave state, in 1846 Pennsylvania 
representative and later Free Soiler David Wilmot proposed using the Territories Clause 
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to ban slavery in all territories seized during the Mexican-American War.
881
 The Wilmot 
Proviso passed the Northern-dominated House with no concessions to slaveholding 
states, threatening the bisection accord, before failing in the more balanced Senate.
882
 
 The territorial slavery controversy pushed some to secessionism. Calhoun 
answered the Wilmot Proviso with resolutions requiring territorial slavery, but these 
failed against free-state majorities in both houses.
883
 In a March 1850 Senate speech, he 
declared the result of Northern population growth was to give the “Northern section a 
predominance in every department of the government.” Hence, “as it now stands, one 
section has the exclusive power of controlling the government, which leaves the other 
without any adequate means of protecting itself against its encroachment and 
oppression.”
884
 Southerners considered secession, and Southern legislators ordered the 
burning, impounding and censoring of antislavery literature.
885
 In response to this and the 
lynching of abolitionists,
886
 Northern antislavery advocates also radicalized, recognizing 
they could not talk Southern citizens or congressmen into abolition. In 1844, Garrison 
rejected the Constitution’s legitimacy,
887
 explaining his change of heart in an 1845 letter 
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damning the Constitution as a “covenant with death and an agreement with hell.”
888
 He 
repeated this phrase in a Framingham rally of the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society 
that same year, brandishing a burning copy of the Constitution. 
 Democratic Party leaders tried to quiet the territorial slavery issue by pushing it 
from Congress back on the territories. In 1848, Lewis Cass, the Democratic presidential 
nominee, proposed that the Territories Clause let Congress regulate only the territories’ 
public lands, requiring Western territorial legislatures and state constitutional conventions 
to address slavery without congressional oversight. Cass promised Northern audiences 
that the territorial constitutional conventions would ban slavery, and convinced Southern 
audiences that the conventions would preserve it, satisfying both crowds. On losing the 
1848 election, Cass passed the platform to fellow Democrat Stephen A. Douglas who, 
with the aid of Daniel Webster, shepherded through the House and Senate a series of bills 
together dubbed the Compromise of 1850. Congress admitted California as a free state 
and allowed the legislatures and constitutional conventions of New Mexico and Utah to 
regulate slavery as they wished.
889
  
 Douglas’ “popular sovereignty” plan for devolution initially satisfied both 
sections. In the same bill, Northerners and Southerners saw divergent outcomes in the 
territories.
890
 Proslavery congressmen trusted that southwesterners would adopt 
                                                 
888
 William Lloyd Garrison, “Letter to Samuel J. May, July 17, 1845,” in Letters of William Lloyd 
Garrison: 1841-1849, ed. Walter McIntosh Merrill, vol. III (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1845), 
303; Mason, Slavery and Politics in the Early American Republic, 228–32. 
889
 With the stipulation that a legal challenge to these regulations could be appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court 
890
 Southerners supported the plan for reasons beyond territorial slavery. For example, Southern legislatures 
cited the plan, which expanded states’ authority over slavery, to silence local abolitionist petitions. The 
Maryland legislature resolved “That Congress has no power under the Constitution to interfere with or 
control the domestic institutions of the several States, and that such States are the proper and sole judges of 
every thing appertain-ing to their own affairs,” to the exclusion of the “Abolitionists and others… [whose 
petitions] are calculated to lead to the most alarming and dangerous consequences.” These resolutions were 
232 
 
plantation and mining slavery and would elect proslavery congressmen. North Carolina 
representative Thomas Lanier Clingman, recalling newspaper articles and conversations 
with Westerners, expected the Colorado River would “produce sugar, cotton, rice, and 
tropical fruits &c.” In describing California, he added “Gold mines are known to exist 
there… Wherever gold mines exist, especially surface, alluvial, or deposit mines, slave 
labor can be employed to greatest advantage.”
891
 Northerners and some abolitionists 
backed popular sovereignty, predicting slavery would not flourish in the dry southwest. 
The Democrat John McClernand of Illinois supported the Compromise, claiming “God 
and nature have traced an immutable material law in the lofty mountains and arid deserts 
of that Territory, forever prohibiting African slavery within its limits… Slavery does not, 
nor can it, as I think, exist in Utah or New Mexico.”
892
 Moreover, antislavery 
congressmen trusted that southwesterners would maintain Mexican laws abolishing local 
slavery.
893
 Douglas’ plan passed the House and Senate with bisectional support, partly 
because it did not require antislavery or proslavery congressmen to abandon their position 
and compromise. 
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 This devolution temporarily quieted the territorial slavery question, preserving the 
Constitution. As Representative Boyd of Kentucky argued, this was the plan’s strength: 
“I am earnestly and in good faith seeking to test the sense of the House upon the doctrine 
of non-intervention. I want to see that principle carried out – I want to see it carried out in 
good faith. I wish to see peace restored to the country. I am for the Union. I am for the 
Constitution as it is – I want no amendment to it.”
894
 Boyd got his wish. Between 1850 
and 1859, Congress, divided by section and united for popular sovereignty, proposed 
only twenty-four federal constitutional amendments, only two of which would have 
directly regulated territorial slavery, none of which passed.
895
 Devolution solved the 
short-term dispute in Congress, but let both sections maintain irreconcilable platforms on 
Western slavery, promising eventual conflict.
896
 
 The rights of fugitive slaves presented a second controversy. The brief federal 
Constitution’s Fugitive Slave Clause allowed the return of fugitive slaves,
897
 but failed to 
charge federal or state actors with enforcement. Moreover, the Clause stated people could 
be held in servitude in a state, “under the laws thereof,” but not under a uniform federal 
law. Rather than placing the Clause with Article I congressional powers or Article II 
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executive powers, the federal framers placed it among the state powers and 
responsibilities of Article IV, acknowledging the states’ traditional authority over fugitive 
law.
898
 
 States quickly diverged by section. New England state legislatures, courts, and 
constitutional conventions promised life and liberty to all persons within their borders, 
free and slave. Similarly, Northern states passed personal liberty laws punishing 
slavecatchers who seized free blacks,
899
 and Northern congressmen defeated an 1801 bill 
to limit these personal liberty laws and an 1817 bill compelling Northern governors and 
judges to enforce the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act.
900
 In contrast, Louisiana’s antebellum 
territorial governor William C. C. Claiborne had coerced Mexico to agree to return slaves 
who fled to Texas.
901
 
 This divergence opened national controversies under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. Beginning in the 1820s, slave state legislatures, fearing slave 
insurrection, stripped visiting free-state blacks of the liberties they enjoyed through their 
home state’s constitution.
902
 This created an interstate conflict of laws and likely violated 
the federal Privileges and Immunities Clause, which required a state grant a visitor at 
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least the basic rights he enjoyed in his home state.
903
 Conversely, free states that had 
allowed whites to travel with slaves under “sojourner laws” began repealing these laws in 
the late antebellum era, arguably violating slaveholders’ federal Privileges and 
Immunities rights.
904
 For example, in Commonwealth v. Aves, the Massachusetts’ 
Supreme Court held visiting slaves could appeal for their freedom under the state’s 
Constitution.
905
 Connecticut quickly followed suit, citing Aves in a decision freeing a 
slave brought from Georgia.
906
 Between the 1836 Aves ruling and 1860, courts in every 
state considered the Aves precedent, and all but five Northern states accepted it.
907
 
 These state violations of federal Privileges and Immunities rights spurred two 
cases in which the Supreme Court partly maintained state authority. In Groves v. 
Slaughter (1841), Justice Smith Thompson implicitly limited the Court’s authority over 
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the interstate movement of slaves,
908
 and in a concurring opinion Roger B. Taney 
explicitly stripped this power from the Court and Congress,
909
 leaving the matter to the 
states. This let proslavery and antislavery state legislators to continue to regulate blacks’ 
interstate movement as they pleased.
910
 
 In Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842),
 911
 Justice Joseph Story struck down a 
Pennsylvania personal liberty law, ruling that the federal government, not the states, 
regulated and enforced the return of fugitives under the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act. 
Accordingly, free states could not impede federal enforcement of the Act.
912
 The case 
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was on balance an important doctrinal victory for advocates of slavery and broad national 
powers.
913
 
 But despite Story’s bold nationalist rhetoric, the collective Prigg opinions 
deferred much to the states. Story’s ruling left Congress to enact fugitive slave policy, 
and in the absence of congressional action, states were likely to continue their divergent 
courses.
914
 Further, Story ruled free-state citizens and officials could not be compelled to 
recapture slaves. He reasoned the Fugitive Slave Clause: 
does not point out any state functionaries, or any state action, to carry its 
provisions into effect . The States cannot, therefore, be compelled to enforce 
them, and it might well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise of the power of 
interpretation to insist that the States are bound to provide means to carry into 
effect the duties of the National Government, nowhere delegated or entrusted to 
them by the Constitution.
915
 
 
The antislavery Justice McClean argued that slave law was a police power reserved to the 
states, recognizing “in the State a power to guard and protect its own jurisdiction and the 
peace of its citizens.”
916
 Even Taney’s proslavery concurrence, clashing with Story, 
devolved enforcement to the states, noting that by placing the Fugitive Slave Clause in 
Article IV, the federal framers intended it as a state power, rather than an Article I 
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congressional power.
917
 Antislavery and proslavery justices agreed on non-
intervention,
918
 and McClean and Taney’s concurrences paved the way for Northern 
states’ rights arguments. This mix of nationalist and states-rights opinions, and 
consequent congressional inaction, let the states reinterpret the decision to allow non-
enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Clause and the 1793 Fugitive Act and boldly pass new 
personal liberty laws. 
 In response congressional Democrats proposed the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act 
forcing federal and state officials and citizens to return runaways.
919
 A united South 
passed the Act over piecemeal Northern resistance,
920
 gutting Northern personal liberty 
laws. Assuming the power granted by Story’s Prigg ruling, Congress then laid the issue 
to rest. Between 1850 and 1859, Congress proposed only one federal amendment 
touching on slave mobility, recognizing a right to property in slaves.
921
 The question 
remained whether Northern officials and citizens would cooperate. 
 These disputes over blacks’ movement rights fit in a broader dispute over black 
citizenship. While egalitarians like William Lloyd Garrison, Frederick Douglass, and 
Martin Delany argued for black citizenship,
922
 biological racists challenged this claim. 
Caving to white students’ demands, Harvard expelled Delany and two other black 
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medical students, and hired Louis Agassiz, whose embryology studies concluded that 
blacks’ and Native Americans’ fetal development halted too early to allow the mental 
capacity for citizenship.
923
 And in 1839, Agassiz’s Philadelphia colleague Samuel George 
Morton first published Crania Americana, asserting that blacks’ and Native Americans’ 
lower cranial volumes indicated weaker mental faculties. The work, expanded by 
coauthor and fellow University of Pennsylvania graduate Josiah T. Nott, received wide 
circulation through the country,
924
 affirming state-level prohibitions on blacks’ 
citizenship, suffrage, and education rights. These clashed with somewhat more egalitarian 
Northern citizenship laws, creating more national Privileges and Immunities conflicts. 
 In Strader v. Graham (1851), the federal Supreme Court refused to intervene in 
this state regulation. Jacob Strader owned a steamboat that transported three of 
Christopher Graham’s slaves from Kentucky to Ohio, where they escaped for Canada. 
Graham sued to recover the cost of his loss property, and won in the Kentucky judicial 
system.
925
 Though Strader appealed under interstate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court 
unanimously declined that it had jurisdiction over the case, deferring to the state 
courts.
926
 Additionally, the defendants had claimed that the slaves had gained their 
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Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Brooks Atkinson (New York: Modern Library, 1854), 872; Ralph 
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(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 74, 84, 393. 
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 Strader’s appeal noted his steamboat had transported the slaves across state lines, placing the case in 
federal jurisdiction. 
240 
 
freedom on entering Ohio, under Article VI of the Northwest Ordinance. In his majority 
opinion, Taney rejected this too, asserting that on granting statehood, Congress 
relinquished authority to regulate slavery within a state,
927
 leaving the states to regulate 
blacks’ freedom and citizenship rights.
928
 
 Finally, slavery disputes reignited the nullification controversy. When 
California’s admission tipped the Senate to a six seat free state majority, Southerners lost 
hope of regaining the Senate, and so considered alternate means to block Free Soil 
legislation. Calhoun and others revived compact theory, arguing the states were 
temporally and legally prior to the Union and could negate national law by nullification, 
constitutional convention, and even secession. Similarly, Northern legislatures, courts, 
and governors passed and upheld new personal liberty laws to expressly nullify the 1850 
Fugitive Slave Act. These alienated congressional moderates like Representative David 
Disney of Ohio, who in 1850 proposed a federal amendment allowing states and 
territories to pass slave laws, only “when they do not conflict with the Constitution.”
929
 
 In sum, in 1850, Congress faced crises over territorial slavery and fugitive slaves. 
As it had in 1820 and 1837, Congress deferred the territorial slavery issue to the states 
and territories. But now this backfired, so that by the mid-1850s, the states had 
established clashing proslavery and antislavery constitutional orders. Rather than 
authorizing only one order, Congress and the federal courts read the national 
                                                 
927
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Constitution’s ambiguous slavery and citizenship clauses to allow both.
930
 The 
Constitution and courts had failed their role as neutral arbiter in interstate disputes. 
III. Escalation and the Civil War, 1850-65 
 
A. State Constitutionalism and the Slavery Crisis 
 
 Devolution worsened the era’s conflicts. Southwesterners rejected slavery, 
inflating the free state majority and exacerbating the territorial slavery controversy. 
Utahans did not legalize slavery in their 1849 or 1856 territorial constitutions, and New 
Mexicans, burdened with the Mexican-Indian Taos Uprising of 1847 and a border dispute 
with Texas, failed to recognize slavery in their 1848 and 1849 territorial constitutions.
 931
 
An 1850 New Mexico Constitution outlawing slavery failed to be adopted.
932
 Laws aside, 
plantation slavery never succeeded in these vast, dry territories.
933
 In 1860, Utah and New 
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242 
 
Mexico held twenty-nine and zero slaves respectively, blocking slavery’s westward 
roll.
934
 
 Nor did slavery find a foothold on the west coast. Miners’ advocates from 
California’s northern half dominated the territory’s 1849 Convention. Fearing slavery 
would undercut miners’ wages and allow racial intermixing, delegates banned the 
institution with little debate,
935
 preempting slave labor in California’s northern mines and 
southern farms. Morton McCarver, Oliver M. Wozencraft, and James McHall Jones, all 
born or adopted Kentuckians, proposed outlawing the immigration of free and enslaved 
blacks, but the Convention dropped the clause, worrying egalitarian congressmen would 
block California’s admission to the Union.
936
 California would be free. The Convention’s 
Committee on Boundaries then proposed pushing California’s eastern border across the 
Sierra Nevada to the Utah Territory, and the northern border to the Oregon Territory, 
excluding slavery from much of the west. Winfield S. Sherwood, an immigrant from New 
York, predicted these expansive borders would end the national slavery controversy, 
declaring: 
“if the Union is to be cut asunder by this one question, we shall regret it for years, 
that having it in our power, with no cost to ourselves, we did not settle it forever. 
It is this that governs my vote, and not any desire that I have to embrace that 
territory within our limits as a State. I want to see [the territorial slavery debate] 
forever kept out of the halls of Congress.”
937
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The Virginian Charles T. Botts, better attuned to the Southern mind, presciently warned 
Sherwood of opposition from “the extreme faction of the South, headed by Mr. Calhoun,” 
but also from “the wise and moderate men of the North” who feared so provoking 
Southern firebrands.
938
 Like Sherwood, Botts hoped to frame a state constitution to 
resolve national tensions. The Convention settled on Sherwood’s expansive borders, and 
on September 9, 1850, Congress brought a free California into the Union under Douglas’ 
Compromise.
939
 To the north, Oregon’s 1843 and 1845 Organic Laws banned slavery, 
and legislative statutes penned by Morton McCarver threatened whipping for any African 
American, free or slave, who attempted to enter the territory.
940
 The 1850 Compromise’s 
deference to local custom had yielded an anti-black, antislavery West, halting the spread 
of slavery, worrying Southerners. 
 Southern hopes that the northern Great Plains were too frigid for white settlement 
too were dashed.
941
 White settlers flooded Iowa, abolishing slavery in their 1846 and 
1857 Constitutions by drawing on the Northwest Ordinance’s abolition clause.
942
 The 
1848 Convention in neighboring Wisconsin banned slavery and enfranchised African 
Americans, but only given voters’ and legislators’ eventual approval.
943
 And in the Old 
Northwest where slavery had lingered since colonial days, an 1848 constitutional 
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convention cemented abolition in Illinois, as did one in Michigan two years later, and one 
in Indiana the year after that.
944
 
 Still, popular sovereignty was so rhetorically vague and palatable that both 
Northern and Southern congressmen supported it again, now through the 1854 Kansas-
Nebraska Act. The Act, promoted by Douglas and the Missouri senator David Atchison, 
repealed the Missouri Compromise’s prohibition on slavery above 36º 30’ parallel. 
Atchison hoped this would draw new settlers from the slaveholding counties of western 
Missouri into eastern Kansas, while Congress’ Northern Democrats expected Kansas to 
be inhospitable to slavery and to become a free state.
945
 With the 36º 30’ line repealed, 
slavery in the all territories would be decided by territorial voters, legislatures, and 
constitutional conventions. 
 Again, devolution backfired. Northerners rejected the Act. The House Committee 
on the Territories received petitions against the Act from all but three of the free states, 
and from only two slave states.
946
 Northern Whigs, persuaded against slavery by the 
recent trial of the fugitive Anthony Burns and the publication of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, 
abandoned their party’s Southern wing, joining Free Soilers and rebranding themselves as 
Republicans. In 1856 they nominated the free state antislavery candidates John C. 
Fremont of California and William Dayton of New Jersey, rejecting the tradition of 
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bisectional presidential tickets.
947
 Seventy percent of Northern Democratic congressmen 
supporting the Kansas-Nebraska Act lost their seats in 1854, decimating the Party’s 
Northern wing.
948
 Republicans were now largely antislavery Northerners and Democrats 
largely proslavery Southerners, deadlocked over the slavery question.
949
 
 Kansans, faced with resolving this national question, wrangled over the state’s 
constitution and future. The politics were dirty, then violent. Missouri Senator David 
Atchison led his constituents across the Mississippi on Kansas’ election day, where their 
votes installed a proslavery territorial legislature.
950
 Excluded from the legislature, 
abolitionists Kansas formed a shadow government under the antislavery Topeka 
Constitution of 1855.
951
 Proslavery forces then sacked the abolitionist stronghold of 
Lawrence, for which John Brown executed local slaveholders.
952
 The conflagration 
spread to the Unites States Senate where the South Carolinian Preston Brooks caned 
Charles Sumner of Massachusetts for a lurid speech implicating Atchison and Brooks’ 
cousin in the Kansas crisis. The Northern-leaning House answered by accepting the 
antislavery Topeka Constitution, but Southern senators blocked the measure. Kansas’ 
proslavery legislature and voters, backed by President James Buchanan, instead proposed 
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the 1857 Lecompton Constitution, legalizing Kansas slavery.
953
 To appease their riled 
constituents, surviving Northern Democrats made a stand, rejecting the Lecompton bill 
and a slave code for the territories, splitting with the Party’s Southern majority.
954
 
Quarantining the free soil issue in Kansas had not cured the controversy, but rather 
incubated it and then spread it back to Congress.
955
 
 Other Westerners and Midwesterners also rejected slavery. In 1855, New England 
transplants established Minnesota’s antislavery Republican Party, and two years later, the 
state’s first constitutional convention abolished slavery.
956
 Of the sixty delegates to 1857 
Oregon Constitutional Convention, roughly forty-five were Democrats and twenty-seven 
hailed from slave states, submitting to voters proposed clauses establishing slavery and 
prohibiting black immigration. Voters approved the Constitution and the clause limiting 
black immigration, but rejected the proslavery clause 7,727 to 2,645. Oregon would have 
no black citizens, free or slave. Over Southern opposition, a free soil Oregon entered the 
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Union in 1859.
957
 And in April 1860, thirty-two settlers of the New Mexico Territory met 
in Tucson to draft a constitution for the separatist provisional government of Arizona, but 
failed to establish slavery.
958
 
 Douglas’ 1850 and 1854 Acts briefly united congressmen around the palatable, 
familiar rhetoric of democracy, localism, and bisectional compromise. While this 
balancing tactic worked in 1787 and 1820, in the 1850s it backfired. Of the twenty-nine 
constitutions proposed between 1850 and 1859, only three endorsing slavery were 
ratified,
959
 increasing the free state majority and Southern anxieties. This happened for 
several reasons. Westerners rejected slavery, fearing black immigration and knowing 
plantation slavery would fail on arid southwestern land. Additionally, federal land claims 
had reached the Pacific, preventing Southerners from retaking Congress by claiming new 
proslavery territories.
960
 Finally, Northern voters and representatives turned against 
slavery. Controlling both the House and Senate, after 1854 these free state congressmen 
had little reason to broker another costly compromise and risk voter backlash.
961
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Immediate electoral worries eclipsed long-term concerns over Union and constitutional 
consensus. 
 State constitutional reform and reinterpretation also worsened the national 
fugitive slave controversy. Northern state officials reinterpreted Prigg to allow state 
noncompliance with federal fugitive law. New York’s governor and courts took this 
reading of Prigg,
962
 as did Pennsylvania’s legislature.
963
 Pennsylvania’s courts quickly 
affirmed that the state’s personal liberty law did not violate Prigg,
964
 and allowed the 
state to emancipate visiting slaves.
965
 Vermont immediately answered Prigg with an 1843 
law fining and imprisoning any state official who detained a fugitive, Rhode Island in 
1842 constitutionally forbade slavery and the following year let expire a 1774 sojourner 
law,
966
 and Connecticut’s legislature in 1848 abolished all slavery and slave sales.
967
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 After the 1850 Compromise, free state legislatures and courts protected their 
personal liberty laws by nullifying the new Fugitive Slave Act. Massachusetts led the 
charge with personal liberty law proposals in 1851 and 1852. In 1854 Bostonians mobbed 
federal marshals to free the alleged fugitive Anthony Burns, and the following year, the 
state legislature passed a comprehensive personal liberty law. Still unsatisfied, Worcester 
citizens rallied to a disunion convention in 1857.
968
 Similarly, within weeks of the 
passage of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act, Vermont’s legislature let state attorneys appeal 
for a writ of habeas corpus for alleged fugitives,
969
 passed two resolutions rejecting 
federal authority over slavery, and sent these to Congress and every governor. President 
Millard Fillmore reportedly threatened military intervention against Vermont, but 
recanted,
970
 and Vermont passed additional personal liberty laws in 1854 and 1858.
971
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 A slew of personal liberty laws followed. Illinois’ Supreme Court in 1852 ruled 
that in disputed cases fugitives should be presumed free,
972
 Connecticut passed an 1855 
liberty law, and in 1857 freed all slaves entering the state.
973
 That same year, the New 
Hampshire and Maine legislatures freed any slave involuntarily entering the state, the 
Michigan and Ohio legislatures adopted personal liberty laws, and Ohio’s Supreme Court 
freed any slave entering the state by citing Somerset.
974
 Finally, Wisconsin’s courts 
bullishly abrogated the 1850 Fugitive Act.
975
 In In re Booth and Rycraft, Wisconsin 
Justice Abram Smith repeatedly cited Jefferson to explain that the “respective states and 
the people thereof were the source from which the federal government has derived all its 
powers, and remain sovereign and independent only in so far as they have delegated or 
relinquished powers an attributes incident to complete sovereignty.” Since the state’s 
Constitution guaranteed Wisconsinites’ liberty and habeas corpus rights, Smith freed 
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Sherman Booth and John Rycraft, who had been imprisoned under the 1850 Act for 
aiding a fugitive.
976
 
 Southerners threatened secession. Southern state courts rejected Somerset and its 
Northern progeny protecting fugitives.
977
 The secessionist Georgia senator Robert 
Toombs saw in the liberty laws a plan to void Southerners’ constitutional property rights 
and “to exterminate slavery by abrogating by State laws that portion of the Constitution 
which provides for the return of fugitive slaves.”
978
 James Buchanan appealed to the 
Northern “State legislatures [to] repeal their unconstitutional and obnoxious enactments. 
Unless this shall be done without unnecessary delay, it is impossible for any human 
power to save the Union.”
979
 Chief Justice Taney overruled the Wisconsin courts in 1859, 
and in 1860 Unionist presidential candidates Abraham Lincoln and John Bell pushed for 
repeal of the liberty laws, but with little success, as Northern Republican governors held 
the line.
980
 
 The blame for this dissensus lay with Northerners’ assertive reinterpretation of the 
Prigg decision, which disempowered and riled Southern slaveholders. Appeasing 
Southerners and bringing stability required a firm, nationalized approach to fugitive law. 
But Prigg, backed by Strader, created a patchwork of clashing state statutes and 
constitutional provisions, destabilizing national constitutional politics. The 1850 Fugitive 
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Act came too late, only affirmed Northerners’ commitment to their reactionary liberty 
laws, inflaming the controversy. 
 Across the Union, Northern and Southern legislatures together restricted black 
citizenship, resolving this national question. All Southern legislatures, worried free 
blacks might foment slave revolt, limited free blacks’ citizenship, often legally treating 
them as slaves.
981
 To thwart integration, Southern legislatures and governors largely 
ignored state constitutional promises requiring they fund public education,
982
 and every 
Southern state except Tennessee outlawed the instruction of slaves.
983
 Northern states 
forced blacks into segregated, underfunded charity schools,
984
 which the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court upheld in Roberts v. City of Boston.
985
 Similarly, almost all Northern 
legislatures excluded blacks from voting or holding higher office.
986
 Frontier legislatures 
were no better. Oregonian and Californian legislators stripped black citizenship rights to 
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discourage black immigration,
987
 despite congressional objections.
988
 Similarly, Illinois’ 
and Indiana’s Constitutions outlawed black immigration to the state, and Indiana fined 
resident blacks, using these funds to resettle blacks elsewhere.
989
 
 State courts settled on a patchwork of decisions withdrawing some or all 
citizenship rights for blacks. While New England courts extended equality and due 
process clause protections to African Americans, Connecticut and Pennsylvania courts 
denied that blacks held federal birthright citizenship.
990
 But North Carolina, one of the 
last Southern states to allow black voting, granted free blacks birthright citizenship in 
State v. Manuel in 1838.
 991
 Kentucky, Virginia, and Alabama courts also granted 
birthright citizenship to the children of slaves in the process of gaining their freedom, as 
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did the Louisiana Supreme Court, which added that long-term residence in a free territory 
freed a plaintiff not born in a slave state or territory. Free blacks now existed neither as 
aliens nor full citizens, but as an intermediate “degraded race” or “third class” in the 
state. Tennessee’s Chief Justice John Catron similarly asserted that the state’s 
manumission policy affirmed blacks’ partially inferior citizenship status.
992
 And in 
Kentucky, the Court of Appeals justified free black’s partial citizenship by noting that 
free black men, removed by statute from the privileges and immunities granted to white 
men, could not be full citizens.
993
  
 Federal courts repeatedly rebuffed blacks’ challenges to these laws, sequestering 
the issue at the state level. The federal Attorneys General usually accepted Attorney 
General William Wirt’s 1821 instruction that blacks not receive federal Privileges and 
Immunities citizenship. Affirming the states’ policy of intermediate citizenship, Attorney 
General Hugh Legare deemed blacks mere “denizens” in 1843.
994
 In Strader v. Graham 
the Supreme Court rejected appeals under the Commerce Clause, signaling it had little 
interest in interfering with the states’ traditional prerogative to regulate citizenship. And 
since state legislatures often mirrored the citizenship law of neighboring states, cross-
border tensions were rare, giving fewer opportunities for suits. In minimizing interstate 
disputes and settling on nationwide restrictions on black citizenship, the states kept this 
national issue quiet.
995
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 In May 1856, Democratic Party leaders asked the Supreme Court to silence Free-
Soil Republicans by affirming popular sovereignty.
996
 The Court took the issues of black 
citizenship and territorial slavery in Dred Scott.
997
 Dred Scott, a slave, appealed for his 
freedom to the Supreme Court. Taney dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, not by 
citing Missouri’s prior rejection of Scott’s citizenship and standing under the widely-
accepted Strader v. Graham ruling, but rather by controversially asserted that no black 
person, free or slave, held federal birthright citizenship and according judicial standing. 
Taney claimed birthright citizenship came to those granted the civic privileges limited to 
whites or to those descended from the nation’s white founders, and that federal 
naturalization citizenship could not apply to native-born blacks.
998
 This preempted free 
black litigants from appealing state laws on federal Privileges and Immunities grounds, 
affirming the states’ diverse schemes for partial citizenship for free blacks.
999
 This could 
                                                                                                                                                 
personal liberty laws. That is, the fugitive slave crisis was for Northerners primarily an issue over states’ 
rights, not blacks’ rights. It seems that many Northerners were content with stripping blacks’ rights, so long 
as it was on Northern terms. Thus many Northerners happily accepted a national regime limiting black 
citizenship. 
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have settled that case, but Taney added that the Territories Clause extended congressional 
authority only to territory under federal jurisdiction at the 1787 ratification of the 
Constitution, invalidating the later Compromises of 1820 and 1850, reopening all 
Western territories to slavery.
1000
 Further still, he declared congressional abolition would 
violate the Fifth Amendment due process rights of slaveholders to claim property in 
slaves.
1001
 
 In ruling against black federal citizenship, Taney effectively overrode the stable 
status quo of diverse state-level laws for partial black citizenship. Specifically, Taney 
affirmed slaveholders’ Fifth Amendment right to travel the nation with their slaves, 
voiding all Northern personal liberty laws and state constitutional due process and 
equality protections for slaves.
1002
 Free states considered nullifying Taney’s decisions. 
New Hampshire replied by freeing visiting slaves and Maine by granting fugitives a 
defense attorney.
1003
 Some newspapers warned the Taney Court would expand 
slaveholders’ Fifth Amendment rights to allow slavery in Northern states. Citing the 
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, the New York legislature invoked its right to nullify 
such a federal law. Moderate Republicans voided Taney’s ruling on the territories, 
suggesting that since Scott lacked citizenship and standing to sue, the Court had no 
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jurisdiction over his case, making the decision a nonbinding obiter dictum.
1004
 Similarly, 
Wisconsin courts ignored Taney’s Ableman v. Booth decision to re-imprison the 
abolitionist Sherman Booth and Wisconsinites freed Booth and elected his attorney, 
Byron Paine, to the state Supreme Court.
1005
 Few of these Northern states granted blacks 
full citizenship, suggesting their objection was not over Taney’s repeal of black 
citizenship, but rather his overriding Northern state statutes. That is, the controversy was 
more over states’ rights to abolition than blacks’ rights to equality.
1006
 
 As Northern states radicalized, in November 1860 Republicans captured thirty-
one of fifty Senate seats and 108 of 183 House seats, bringing the antislavery 
congressional majority Southerners had long feared. With Democrats divided between 
candidates, Lincoln took the White House with only forty percent of the popular vote, 
drawing on antislavery voters and Northerners exasperated with the Buchanan 
administration’s corruption, proslavery Kansas platform, and mismanagement in the face 
of an economic panic.
1007
 Proslavery Southerners saw they had little chance of regaining 
the Congress or presidency. They seceded and readied for war.  
B. State Constitutionalism during the Civil War 
 
 Congressmen scrambled to save the Union. Congress had long used statutes to 
devolve slave law, but in the 1850s the states failed to resolve the nation’s slavery 
question, so Congress now sought resolution through federal constitutional amendment. 
The number of proposed federal amendments skyrocketed, jumping from twenty-four 
total between 1850 and 1859 to seventy-two in 1860, to 167 the following year. This 
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included dozens of proposals on abolition, fugitive slaves, territorial slavery, the rights to 
own and travel with slaves, and on the slave trade.
1008
 For the first time, Congress 
seriously considered answering the slavery question by amending the federal 
Constitution. 
 Most amendments proposed in the winter of 1860-1 attempted reconciliation with 
the South. On November 9,
, 
1860 President Buchanan considered a second federal 
convention, and on the 3
rd
 of the following month he suggested constitutional 
amendments overturning Northern personal liberty laws and protecting slavery in the 
states and territories. Ten days later, Georgia’s Robert Toombs urged Southern 
congressman to back a similar amendment overriding the liberty laws. As Buchanan and 
Toombs’ proposals failed, John Crittenden offered amendments allowing popular 
sovereignty, compensated emancipation for runaways, and prohibiting Congress from 
abolishing slavery. These too were rejected. Of the hundreds of proposals offered in the 
coming months, a few others gained traction, but ultimately all failed.
1009
  
 On December 20
th
, South Carolina seceded and withdrew from Congress, 
exaggerating Congress’ Northern majority. The other six deep South states followed in 
January and February, sending delegates to Montgomery, Alabama to draft a provisional 
constitution, which was replaced by a permanent constitution the next month. Following 
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the April attack on Fort Sumter, the six border states joined the Confederacy, ratifying the 
Confederate Constitution over the summer. Lincoln, now president, rejected peace by 
federal amendment, and federal congressmen, burdened with the War and unwilling to 
reconcile with rebels, proposed only nine constitutional amendments between 1862 and 
1863, a precipitous decline given that congressmen had proposed nearly that many on a 
single December day in 1860.
1010
 Federal troops now shouldered the Union’s fate.
1011
 
 The new Confederate Constitution gave the Confederate states broad power to 
elaborate their nascent constitutional order.
1012
 Delegates convened in each state to ratify 
the Confederate Constitution, and while waiting on ratification, began legislating and 
raising funds, troops, and supplies.
1013
 Most ratified new state constitutions within a 
year,
1014
 maintaining provisions for slavery and disenfranchising women and nonwhites. 
Some framers, no longer obligated by free blacks’ federal Privileges and Immunities 
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rights, now constitutionally restricted the immigration of free and enslaved blacks.
1015
 
And state framers for the first time declared their states sovereign nations, with attendant 
explicit rights to nullification, interposition, and secession.
1016
 
 The documents did not last long. The historian Frank Owsley asserted that this 
constitutional decentralization doomed the Confederate war effort and national and state 
constitutions.
1017
 But even a centralized constitutional system might have died in infancy 
against overwhelming and fast-advancing Union armies.
1018
 Given the Confederate 
Constitution lasted merely four years, one can only speculate how this decentralization 
might have affected its endurance in peacetime. 
 As Northern armies toppled Confederate governments, Lincoln began 
Reconstruction through state constitutional revision. He tested early Reconstruction plans 
by moving to readmit any Confederate state that drafted an antislavery constitution 
backed by ten percent of the state’s 1860 voting population. Under the plan, Lincoln 
pushed Louisiana’s Union Governor Michael Hahn to admit blacks to the state’s 1864 
convention. Delegates, all backcountry and working white men, made New Orleans the 
capital and thanks to reapportionment, the new seat of power, weakening planter 
counties. Public workers won a nine-hour day and a minimum wage, slavery was 
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abolished, and progressive taxes supported public schools, though blacks got no vote.
1019
 
Arkansas called a convention under the ten percent plan, and within a day of meeting, a 
committee of thirteen passed a new constitution abolishing slavery and protecting blacks’ 
property rights.
1020
 Across the Mississippi, Tennessee’s military governor Andrew 
Johnson called a loyalist convention to propose amendments outlawing slavery and 
property in humans and allowing the legislature to disenfranchise ex-Confederates, which 
pro-Union voters ratified in 1865.
1021
 
 Congress also initially experimented with Reconstruction through state 
constitutional design on the Confederacy’s periphery. When western Virginia farmers 
assembled and drafted a proslavery constitution for the new loyalist state of West 
Virginia, Senator Charles Sumner conditioned the state’s admission on abolition, and 
West Virginians capitulated.
1022
 Prodded by Union occupation, in 1864 Marylanders 
representing western farm counties narrowly ratified a new constitution freeing slaves 
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without compensation and enfranchising Union soldiers. Reapportionment shifted 
legislative power away from Chesapeake planters, and provisions for debt forgiveness 
and tax-funded public education supported poor whites. But blacks remained 
disenfranchised in the state, precluding interracial organizing.
1023
 In 1864 Congress 
prepared for Southern reconstruction by forcing the new Nevada Territory to draft a 
constitution, including clauses rejecting slavery and Mormonism. But suffrage was 
reserved to whites and subject to a poll tax.
1024
 Soon Congress turned its efforts to the 
Confederacy. In late 1864, Union troops advancing across Georgia and Virginia 
dismembered the remaining Confederate state governments, closing the Southern 
constitutional experiment. 
IV. Reconstruction through State Constitutional Revision, 1865-77 
 
 Federal armies marched on Atlanta and Richmond, pillaging plantations and 
freeing slaves. Weary Confederates accepted abolition, ending debates over fugitive 
slaves and territorial slavery. The Union survived, now disburdened of slavery, thanks 
not to legislators’ reflection and choice but to accident and force on the fields at 
Antietam, Gettysburg, and Vicksburg.
1025
 
 Yet other controversies remained. Abolition, once the states’ prerogative, now fell 
to separate, untested plans posed by Lincoln and Congress. Congress also debated 
whether to readmit ex-Confederate states as equal states in the Union or as conquered 
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alien nations to be dissolved into new congressionally-administered territories.
1026
 Also 
unclear was whether to allow ex-Confederates to vote and hold office. And as four 
million Southern blacks earned freedom, old questions of black citizenship resurfaced. 
Early Reconstruction constitutions prohibited black voting, office-holding, and jury 
service, frustrating Lincoln and the radical Republicans from expanding their voting base. 
Freemen’s economic and social rights, still undefined, were similarly contentious.
1027
 
 With Union troops pressing south and ex-Confederates excluded from Congress, 
emboldened Northern congressmen addressed Reconstruction’s controversies with 
hundreds of amendment proposals. The federal Constitution entered a period of 
unprecedented instability. Congress, which had proposed only twenty-four amendments 
in the decade before the War, now proposed 421 amendments between 1864 and 1870. 
Congressmen proposed dozens of amendments for emancipation, reapportioning 
Congress, payment of rebel debt, and for expanding blacks’ citizenship, suffrage, and 
civil rights while limiting ex-Confederates’ rights.
1028
 Seven proposals passed at least one 
house, including the three revolutionary Reconstruction Amendments.
1029
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 Abolition came first. In January of 1864 Senator Charles Sumner proposed an 
amendment granting slaves freedom and equal protection before the law.
1030
 The 
following month the Senate Judiciary Committee accepted Sumner’s proposal but 
redacted the equality provision, leaving blacks’ citizenship unresolved. Debate resumed 
on April 5
th
 when Kentucky’s senators offered opposed amendments for compensated 
emancipation and prohibiting black citizenship and office-holding.
1031
 Other amendments 
against black citizenship and for gradual compensated emancipation threatened to delay 
abolition for generations.
1032
 On April 8
th
 the Senate passed the Thirteenth Amendment, a 
brief two-sentence amendment clarifying little. The first section required abolition 
without compensation. The Amendment’s novel and contentious second section let 
Congress back the Amendment with legislation protecting black citizenship, potentially 
overriding state law.
1033
 States’ rights Democrats in the House blocked the Amendment, 
which failed passage by thirteen votes, and South Carolinian and Alabamian state 
legislators soon attacked the proposal. After the House vote, little was clear. In April 
1864 Congress had not answered whether emancipation would come immediately, with 
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compensation, or through the states, or whether free blacks in the North and South could 
expect federal citizenship.
1034
 
 As the War closed, an overwhelmed Congress deferred much of Reconstruction to 
Southern state constitutional conventions. There were several reasons for this. First, in 
early May of 1864 Congress, later backed by the Supreme Court, decided not to dissolve 
the ex-Confederate states, but to readmit them to the Union.
1035
 Consequently, ratification 
of the Thirteenth Amendment, requiring three-fourths of the Union’s states, waited on the 
readmission of the Southern states through new constitutional conventions.
1036
 
Additionally, through readmission the Southern states regained nearly exclusive Tenth 
Amendment authority over blacks’ citizenship, education, marriage, and suffrage. 
Republican congressmen, hoping to cement freemen’s social, economic, and educational 
rights, now relied on state constitutional framers.
1037
 Finally, Lincoln’s ten percent plan 
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showed congressmen that Unionist state constitutional framers could exclude ex-
Confederates and decisively settle disputes over citizenship, states’ rights, and slavery in 
favor of blacks and Republicans.
1038
 
 Two weeks after the Senate passed the Thirteenth Amendment, both houses 
passed the Wade-Davis Bill, deferring the bulk of constitutional Reconstruction to 
Unionist state constitutional conventions. These congressional requirements were more 
demanding than Lincoln’s ten percent plan.
1039
 Worried his tenuous Louisiana 
government would not meet the Bill’s requirements, Lincoln quietly pocket-vetoed the 
Bill.
1040
 
 After the House rejected abolition, Congress moved on to hundreds of other 
amendment proposals, leaving unchallenged Southern Republicans to quickly reform 
their state constitutions to abolish slavery without compensation. West Virginia’s 
Constitution outlawed slavery in 1863, and Arkansas, Nevada, Louisiana, and Maryland 
did so the following year. In 1865 Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, Missouri, South 
Carolina, and Florida’s constitutions emancipated slaves. Georgia’s required the 
legislature grant people of color special protection by law, and Florida’s granted blacks 
an ostensibly full complement of rights, including the right to testify in trials.
1041
 Most of 
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the South had settled on immediate uncompensated emancipation through state 
constitutional revision. 
 These state clauses quieted House debate over abolition and compensation. In 
January 1865, the House’s newly-elected Republican supermajority pushed a vote on the 
proposed Thirteenth Amendment. States’ rights Democrats now praised the 
Amendment’s first section for upholding the state abolition clauses. Moreover, these state 
clauses preempted Congress from aggressively implementing abolition under the 
Amendment’s second section, assuaging Democrats’ worries. Democrats who earlier 
opposed the Amendment now supported it. As Pennsylvania Democrat Alexander 
Coffroth put it: 
 “In June last my objection to this amendment was that it was taking away the 
property of people of the States that remained true to the Union… Since that time 
Missouri and Maryland have abolished slavery by their own action, and the 
Governor of Kentucky in his message recommends to the Legislature of that State 
gradual emancipation. The same objection which was then urged against this 
amendment cannot now be urged.”
1042
 
 
States’ rights Democrats now appeased, they joined House Republicans to pass the 
Amendment, sending it to the states for ratification. Congressmen largely stopped 
proposing amendments on abolition and compensation emancipation.
1043
 
 The state abolition clauses also preempted controversies during the ratification of 
the Thirteenth Amendment. By the Amendment’s ratification, nearly every state had 
already voluntarily abolished slavery,
1044
 such that state legislators accepted the 
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redundant, uncontroversial federal Amendment.
1045
 Seventeen legislatures ratified the 
Amendment in the first month alone. Longstanding New England abolition provisions 
“kept the amendment from emerging there as a controversial issue,” securing immediate 
ratification in New England, per Michael Vorenberg.
1046
 The federal abolition clause 
reaffirmed the newer state clauses.
1047
 For example, Unionist governments in Louisiana, 
Tennessee, Arkansas, Missouri, Maryland, Virginia, and Nevada, having recently 
abolished slavery, ratified the Amendment within weeks, many unanimously. Framers in 
the unreconstructed deep South postponed ratification votes until their states formed 
permanent legislatures in late 1865.
1048
 Across the Union, state constitutional revision 
quieted debate over immediate uncompensated abolition, easing the Amendment’s 
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ratification.
1049
 In sum, the Amendment did not expressly require Congress force 
abolition on the states, as some scholars claim,
1050
 but rather deferred to the states’ 
existing abolition clauses.
1051
 
 Oddly, the Thirteenth Amendment helped preserve a type of slavery some states 
had banned. Prior to the Amendment, only half of Southern states allowed convict 
slavery.
1052
 But in February 1864 Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Lyman 
Trumbull proposed a clause allowing slavery “as a punishment for crime whereof the 
party shall have been duly convicted,” and the clause passed the Senate with little 
debate.
1053
 Subsequently and perhaps thanks to the Amendment, four more Southern 
states passed clauses for convict slavery,
1054
 much to the frustration of antislavery 
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congressmen.
1055
 In affirming these state clauses, Trumbull widened the convict slavery 
loophole, closed by a few previous state framers,
1056
 letting Southern prisons lease 
convict laborers to private parties. The state and federal provisions harmonized, likely 
preempting controversy over convict slavery, with the unanticipated and likely 
unintended consequence of retrenching agricultural slavery. Thus to study the federal 
Amendment without the accompanying state clauses is to misunderstand the federal 
clause’s enforcement. 
 Following Lincoln’s assassination in April 1865, Andrew Johnson assumed the 
presidency. Johnson, a repentant former slaveholder and Tennessee Democrat and a strict 
constructionist, found no explicit justification for federal interference in state 
constitutionalism.
1057
 A provision re-enfranchising ex-Confederates holding less than 
$20,000 in taxable property sent a mix of moderate ex-Confederate and Unionist white 
yeomen to state conventions in Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and the Carolinas 
in the summer of 1865. These delegates repealed property qualifications on office-
holding and reapportioned legislative seats away from lowland planter counties, but 
maintained antebellum prohibitions on black voting and citizenship. That autumn deep 
South states elected ex-Confederates to Congress and the state legislatures, which in 
Mississippi and South Carolina forced free blacks into contracted plantation labor under 
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punishment of jailing or fine.
1058
 Other Southern states soon switched to facially race-
neutral laws coercing blacks into agricultural apprenticeships and labor.
1059
 
 Dissatisfied with these six deep South constitutions of 1865, congressional 
Republicans first refused to seat Southern representatives and then proposed the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866. The Act expanded blacks’ rights to litigate and negotiate labor 
contracts in the North and South, but did not expand their broader political and electoral 
privileges, which remained the states’ prerogative.
 1060
 As Lyman Trumbull explained, 
“the granting of civil rights does not, and never did in this country, carry with it rights, or, 
more properly speaking, political privileges…The right to vote and hold office in the 
States depends upon the legislation of the various States.”
1061
 Even so, congressional 
Democrats took the Act as federal overreach, replying that Dred Scott outlawed black 
birthright citizenship, and Johnson vetoed the Act, which survived only thanks to a 
congressional override. However, Johnson successfully vetoed an appropriations bill 
supporting free blacks through the Freedmen’s Bureau.
1062
 
 In June 1866 Congress’ Joint Committee on Reconstruction circumvented 
Johnson’s veto by calling for a second round of state constitutional conventions. The 
Committee, led by Thaddeus Stevens and William Pitt Fessenden, had several aims. First, 
in deferring black enfranchisement to new state constitutional conventions, Republicans 
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avoided direct conflict with Democrats and Johnson’s yeoman state governments.
1063
 
Johnson, bound to a states’ rights platform, had been outmaneuvered, and in his 1866 
annual message to Congress praised the plan for promising Southern states eventual 
congressional representation. Second, waiting on these conventions, congressional 
Republicans could keep refusing to seat Southerners, perhaps in the meantime passing a 
federal amendment for black citizenship.
1064
 Finally, some radical Republican 
congressmen wanted to protect blacks’ state citizenship, voting rights, education, and 
economic and marriage rights. All of these fell under the states’ police powers, a 
centuries-old authority that most Republicans, including Trumbull, placed beyond the 
reach of Congress and the 1866 Civil Rights Act.
1065
 Protecting a full complement of 
black social rights required deference to the states. 
 The Joint Committee also proposed the Fourteenth Amendment to entrench their 
federal civil rights platform and to complement these state reforms. Thaddeus Stevens 
revived successful House amendment proposals to repudiate Confederate War debt and 
reapportion representatives,
1066
 bundling these with provisions promising birthright 
federal and state citizenship and forbidding compensated emancipation, office-holding by 
ex-Confederates, and state infringement on federal due process, equal protection, and 
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privileges and immunities rights.
1067
 Congressmen had already proposed dozens of 
amendments on each of these issues,
1068
 which Stevens united into a single omnibus 
proposal. This Amendment carried nearly the whole Republican’s constitutional agenda. 
 Stevens’ amendment was designed to work in tandem with state constitutional 
reform. Southern state framers had already repudiated Confederate War debt, forbade 
compensated emancipation and office-holding by ex-Confederates, and were extending 
equal protection and suffrage rights.
1069
 Further, the Joint Committee hesitated to 
interfere in state constitutionalism. The Committee’s Majority Report clarified that 
Fourteenth Amendment’s reapportionment provision “would be gentle and persuasive” 
on the states, as committee members doubted “whether Congress had power, even under 
the amended Constitution, to prescribe the qualifications of voters in a State, or could act 
directly on the subject.” Further, the Committee was skeptical that “the States would 
consent to surrender a power they had always exercised, and to which they were 
attached.”
1070
 Finally, in exchange for Southerners’ ratification, the Committee 
considered an enabling act immediately recognizing each Southern state, but instead 
settled on piecemeal restoration through the state conventions.
1071
 If the Committee’s 
Majority Report and the Amendment’s Section 2, promising compliant Southerners 
statehood and congressional representation, was a carrot, the rest of the Fourteenth 
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Amendment was the stick.
1072
 Deference to the states and the Fourteenth Amendment 
were drafted jointly, so that neither worked without the other. 
 The Amendment passed the House on May 11, 1866 after only three days’ debate, 
and passed the Senate three weeks later after revisions to the first section. Johnson replied 
that Congress, in excluding Southerners, had failed quorum, invalidating the Amendment. 
Unable to veto the proposal, he urged states to reject it.
1073
 Delaware, Maryland, and 
Kentucky obliged, and in the winter of 1866-7, all eleven ex-Confederate states, save 
Tennessee, refused ratification. Republicans were incensed. Charles Sumner proposed 
coercing the states into ratification and state constitutional reform under the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s Section 2 and the Guarantee Clause.
1074
 But Northern states ratified the 
Amendment, and when critics replied that Sumner’s plan and a broad reading of the 
Guarantee Clause allowed enfranchising women and children across the Union, moderate 
Republicans balked.
1075
 Instead Congress intervened only in the South. The 
Reconstruction Acts of 1867 enfranchised Southern blacks, disenfranchised ex-
Confederates, and imposed military rule on Southern states until they ratified the 
Fourteenth Amendment and accompanying new state constitutions.
1076
 In mid-1867, the 
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 In floor debates in 1871, John Bingham, one of the Amendment’s authors, suggested he intended the 
Amendment’s first section to incorporate the full Bill of Rights against the states. However, other 
Republicans argued the Amendment only applied temporarily to noncompliant states, leaving the framers’ 
intent unclear. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts, 168; Smith, Civic Ideals, 310–11; Beaumont, The Civic 
Constitution, 159. 
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 According to Sumner, “There is no clause which gives to Congress such supreme power over the States 
as that clause” The Congressional Globe: Fortieth Congress, First Session (Washington, 1867), 614. 
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 Pennsylvania’s Republican Representative John Broomall made this argument. The Congressional 
Globe: Thirty-Ninth Congress, Second Session, vol. I (Washington, 1867), 350–51. 
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likely illegitimate under a narrow reading of Article V. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts, 174–75; 
Ackerman, We the People, II:110–13. 
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Army organized voter registration, elections, state constitutional and ratification 
conventions.
1077
 
 Congress’ Joint Committee Report and Reconstruction Acts pushed on the states 
controversies over black citizenship and ex-Confederate debt and rights. This destabilized 
state constitutionalism, prompting a second set of Southern constitutions which now 
granted blacks citizenship and equal protection, often exceeding the minimum mandated 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.
1078
 For example, under Army coercion,
1079
 Georgians in 
1865 incorporated the text of the Fourteenth Amendment into Georgia’s bill of rights and 
additionally granted blacks the vote and free public schooling.
1080
 Other Southern states 
elected blacks and Northern carpetbaggers, mainly Republicans, to so-called “black and 
tan” conventions, over the protestations and boycotts of unreconstructed whites. African 
Americans comprised about a third of the delegates across the South.
1081
 Of the forty-six 
delegates to Florida’s 1868 Convention, eighteen were African Americans and forty-three 
were Republicans, who together designed a new government that quickly ratified the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
1082
 Arkansas’ 1868 Convention of seventy-five delegates 
included sixty Republicans, of whom eight were African Americans, and established 
universal male suffrage, free and unsegregated public schools, and equal protection for all 
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 For example, states could confer state citizenship on resident aliens not granted citizenship by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Smith, Civic Ideals, 308. 
1079
 When Georgians refused to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment in late 1866, Army officers repudiated 
the state’s 1865 Constitution and arranged the election of Northerners to the state’s 1867 constitutional 
convention. 
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 See the Georgia Constitution of 1868, Article I, Section 2, Article II, Section 2, and Article VI, Section 
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races.
1083
 Louisiana’s radical convention, held the same year, awarded state citizenship by 
birthright and naturalization regardless of race or previous servitude, required 
officeholders by oath publicly affirm racial equality, and forbade racial discrimination in 
state, parish or municipally-licensed public places, including schools, and the 1879 
Convention funded a university in New Orleans for black students.
1084
 Conventions in 
Mississippi, Alabama, North Carolina, and Virginia ratified similarly egalitarian state 
constitutions.
1085
 
 These state conventions, prompting the election of new legislators and the 
drafting of new egalitarian clauses, eased the Fourteenth Amendment’s passage. Before 
ratification of the Amendment, at least ten of the sixteen ex-Confederate or slaveholding 
states had already ratified similar state constitutional equality clauses, and two more 
followed in the next two years.
1086
 Since many Southerners already lived under an 
equality clause, they likely had fewer grounds to challenge the proposed federal Equal 
Protection Clause. 
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1084
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under the Louisiana Constitution of 1898, Article 248. Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 97; 
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 Further, these state clauses helped elaborate the federal one. Like most Southern 
constitutional provisions, the state equality clauses were long and detailed, and unlike 
prior Revolutionary-era state declarations of individuals’ natural equality, the new 
equality clauses obligated state enforcement.
1087
 For example, following Congress’ 
instructions, Georgia’s 1868 Convention drafted a constitution mandating birthright 
citizenship and equal protection, to be backed by legislation, as did Alabama’s.
1088
 
Moreover, these provisions complemented other clauses that drew on states’ exclusive 
police powers to allow blacks state citizenship, fair working hours, fair wages, free 
integrated schooling, interracial marriage, voting privileges, office-holding rights, and 
militia service.
1089
 For example, through the state’s police powers, Louisiana’s 1864 
Convention granted workers limited hours and a minimum wage, an authority unavailable 
to Congress. Many Southern state constitutions also stripped ex-Confederates’ citizenship 
and voting rights,
1090
 affirming the Fourteenth Amendment’s Section 3. Congress could 
not have expounded the contentious Fourteenth Amendment or built a black, Republican 
Southern coalition without accompanying state constitutional revision. 
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 Consider Virginia’s original, Lockean equality clause, first drafted by George Mason in the 1776 
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independent.” In contrast, the second equal protection clause drafted in 1870 guaranteed equality as an 
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 See the Georgia Constitution of 1865, Article II, Section 5, the Georgia Constitution of 1868, Article I 
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 Unionist state constitutional framers did not extend their police powers so far as 
to advocate compact theory or nullification. Lincoln and Congress rejected compact 
theory’s claim that the states predated the Union,
1091
 as did Reconstruction state framers. 
North Carolina’s 1868 Convention recognized the supremacy of the federal Constitution 
and rejected a right to secession.
1092
 Similarly, Louisiana’s 1868 Constitution voided the 
state’s secession act and constitution, declared “citizens of this State owe allegiance to 
the United States; and this allegiance is paramount to that which they owe to the State,” 
and required state officeholders swear allegiance to the federal Constitution and laws.
1093
 
These clauses helped quiet the old nullification question. 
 While most Southern constitutions expressly enfranchised blacks by 1868,
1094
 the 
federal Constitution did not.
1095
 This undermined the constitutionality of Congress’ 
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 In his July 4, 1861 address, Lincoln reimagined the Declaration of Independence not as a compact 
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1094
 Note that these Southern states were the exception, as other states had already disenfranchised blacks. 
In 1865 only six states in the Union, five of them in New England, allowed blacks to vote, and only five on 
equal terms, leaving only six percent of the nation’s black population enfranchised. Beaumont, The Civic 
Constitution, 159. 
1095
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Reconstruction Acts enfranchising Southern blacks.
1096
 Further, abolition vacated the 
Three-Fifths Clause, granting Southern blacks and states even greater representation in 
the House and Electoral College and greater national importance. Republicans therefore 
offered federal amendments to legitimize and entrench the Reconstruction Acts and 
Southern state franchise clauses. Prior to the War, congressmen did not propose a single 
franchise amendment, but between 1866 and 1869, they offered at least seventy-eight.
1097
 
In 1868 Republicans renewed their congressional majority, offering more suffrage 
amendment proposals, one of which passed the House. The Senate proposed an alternate 
provision, spurring a protracted reconciliation battle, ending with a bare-bones 
compromise in the last days of the final session of the Fortieth Congress. The brief 
Fifteenth Amendment only protected American citizens’ rights to vote regardless of race 
or previous enslavement, as enforced by Congress. Unlike other proposals, it did not 
prohibit restrictions based on property, origin, intelligence or literacy, gender, or ones on 
office-holding.
1098
  
 State constitutional revision paved the way for ratification, preempting 
controversies over the Amendment. When the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified, every 
Southern state had reformed their franchise laws and at least eleven of the sixteen ex-
                                                                                                                                                 
law. Note also that on the eve of war in 1861 Steven Douglas, John Crittenden, and George Pugh proposed 
five amendments to appease Southerners by disenfranchising blacks, the first major congressional foray 
into a suffrage amendment. Ames, The Proposed Amendments, 226. 
1096
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1097
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Confederate and ex-slave states had already enfranchised black men, almost all through 
constitutional reform.
1099
 Universal manhood suffrage was already the constitutional 
status quo in the South.
 1100
 Some Northern states repealed racial franchise restrictions 
just before the Amendment’s passage, while others did so by ratifying the federal 
Amendment.
1101
 A dozen states across the North and deep South approved the 
Amendment within a month, with another five following that spring.
1102
 Serious legal 
controversies were limited to the border states like West Virginia,
 1103
 which had avoided 
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See the West Virginia Constitution of 1872, Article III, Section11, Article 
IV, Section 5, and Article VI, Section 43. Bastress, The West Virginia State Constitution, 15–21; DiClerico, 
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constitutional reconstruction.
1104
 Delegates to Tennessee’s 1870 Convention, many of 
them ex-Confederates, opposed the Fifteenth Amendment and black suffrage, but 
capitulated as other states moved the Amendment to ratification.
1105
 As delegate Henry R. 
Gibson put it: “universal suffrage will be the supreme law of the land, whether Tennessee 
participates in such ratification or not.”
1106
 
 The Fifteenth Amendment was Congress’ last attempt at constitutional 
reconstruction. In 1870 Congress proposed only six amendments, and yearly number of 
amendment proposals would stay within a few dozen until the Great Depression and New 
Deal. Federal troops largely withdrew from the South in 1877, depriving Congress of a 
means of enforcement against intransigent Southerners, closing this chapter of the 
Reconstruction. The fate of Reconstruction, and the Southern black vote, fell to the new 
state governments.
1107
 
 Some Reconstruction scholars assert Lincoln and the Thirty-Eight and Thirty-
Ninth Congresses forced a civil rights agenda on intransigent ex-Confederate states.
1108
 
But this misses how black and Republican state framers paved the way for 
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Reconstruction. After 1865, almost every Southern and ex-Confederate state constitution 
included clauses for abolition, equal protection, and universal male suffrage, and almost 
all of these clauses passed before or with their federal counterparts. These provisions 
aided the passage and ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments, and after 
ratification, elaborated these poorly-defined new amendments. In cooperating with 
Lincoln and congressional Republicans, state framers harmonized state and national 
constitutional law on abolition and black citizenship, quieting controversies around 
Reconstruction. The Union-imposed state governments helped form and stabilize the new 
postwar constitutional order. This closed the first era of American constitutional 
development. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
“Turn the eyes upside down, by looking at the landscape through your legs, and how 
agreeable is the picture, though you have seen it any time these twenty years!” 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1836
1109
 
 
 
 Scholars of American constitutionalism myopically focus on the federal 
Constitution, overlooking the states. But almost all American constitutional revision and 
amendment happens at the state level. This state revision resolves national constitutional 
controversies, preventing national inter-branch conflict and constitutional amendment. 
One cannot understand the development of national institutions or the Constitution 
without studying the states. This inverts the old and familiar picture of American 
constitutionalism, revealing how the states drive national constitutional development. 
 This dissertation develops this claim in two parts. The first part theorizes that the 
states guide and stabilize national constitutionalism. The first chapter recounts the 
common, separate explanations of national constitutional stability and state constitutional 
instability. The second chapter revises these by proposing that state constitutional 
instability secures national stability, and the third chapter explains how to observe state 
and federal constitutional reform. 
 The second part of the dissertation defends the contention that state constitutional 
revision stabilizes the federal Constitution. The fourth chapter shows that Revolutionary-
era state constitutional framing settled national debates over slavery, frontier regulation, 
and legislative sovereignty and unicameralism, quieting these issues at the federal 
Convention. And in imitating the state constitutions, these federal delegates made the 
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proposed Constitution palatable to state legislatures and ratifying conventions, easing its 
passage. 
 The states stabilized the young Constitution. As the fifth chapter shows, Northern 
state framers abolished slavery and Southern ones protected it, maintaining a peaceful 
bisectional compromise and preventing congressional intervention or a national 
amendment on slavery. Similarly, while Jeffersonian congressmen proposed national 
amendments regulating elections, state framers enfranchised almost all adult white males 
and selected House members by single districts and presidential electors by popularly-
selected general ticket, shaping the election and subsequent incentives of presidents and 
House members. Congress accepted this outcome and stopped proposing amendments on 
electoral regulation. And after the states passed comprehensive constitutional provisions 
regulating local banks, the antebellum Congress too abandoned proposals for a federal 
amendment to establish a national bank. 
 The sixth chapter recounts the collapse of the bisectional slavery compromise, the 
Civil War, and consequent federal and state constitutional reform. Reconstruction state 
constitutional conventions resolved national debates over abolition and black citizenship 
and enfranchisement, helping congressmen design and pass the later Reconstruction 
Amendments and ensuring swift ratification by the states. These many detailed state 
clauses elaborated, buttressed, and harmonized with the brief and ambiguous federal 
Reconstruction Amendments. State constitutionalism guided America through the 
Reconstruction and into the postwar order. 
 There are a few limitations to this dissertation and directions for future work. The 
study ends with Reconstruction, when Confederate states ceded the power to nullify and 
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interpret the federal Constitution. One might object that subsequent states lost the legal 
authority to mediate national constitutional development. While the states did lose some 
legal authority to nullify national constitutional provisions, they still maintain their more 
subtle political role in resolving national controversies. Continuing this study from the 
Reconstruction to the present can demonstrate this. Similarly, ending in 1877, this 
dissertation is limited in the constitutional issues it covers. An extension can explain how 
subsequent state constitutional framing resolved national questions over female suffrage, 
polygamy, prohibition, economic and labor rights, the New Deal, the equal rights 
amendment, and same sex marriage. Finally, while this dissertation disaggregates 
proposed federal amendments by topic area, it does not collect and catalogue the state 
amendments or provisions. A later study can fill this gap. 
 In conclusion, there are three lessons from this dissertation. The first is for 
political scientists and public law scholars. Most American constitutional reform happens 
at the state level. The states have proposed hundreds of constitutions and ratified 
thousands of amendments, while the federal government has ratified a single constitution 
with only twenty-seven amendments. Yet scholars focus on the federal document to the 
exclusion of the states, and so miss almost all of American constitutional reform. More 
importantly, state constitutionalism often quiets national constitutional debates. 
Accordingly, national constitutional conflict or stability that scholars trace to the national 
institutions or actors may instead be caused by the states. To understand how an 
individual branch relates to the Constitution, one must study the state constitutions. 
Relatedly, since branches strategically defer issues to the states to prevent or to force 
inter-branch conflict, one cannot understand interaction between the national branches 
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without studying the states. Finally, states help determine timing and scope of national 
partisan and constitutional realignments and keep some issues from reaching the national 
branches. To study only the national branches is to systematically miss major issues in 
American constitutionalism. In sum, since most accounts ignore the states, they cannot 
explain what they claim to explain. As a field, American constitutional development is 
fundamentally flawed. This dissertation offers a provisional, partial solution. 
 The second lesson is for political and constitutional theorists. Constitutions face a 
dilemma. Many constitutions claim popular authorization, but also impose supermajority 
requirements for amendment, blocking some democratically authorized reforms. 
Similarly, America’s federal Constitution claims authorization by the American people, 
but only members of Congress, state legislators, and constitutional convention delegates 
can vote on proposed amendments, excluding almost all Americans from the reform 
process. Moreover, ratification deadlines and Article V’s supermajority requirements 
block almost all proposed federal amendments, including many with broad, democratic 
support. The Constitution lacks popular legitimacy. 
 But the state constitutions respond to democratic reforms. Americans revise their 
state constitutions through initiatives, referenda, legislative amendments, legislative 
conventions, popular conventions, and extralegal popular tactics. Conventions, for 
example, have ranged from summits between august former presidents and federal 
framers to nighttime meetings of farmers and pioneers in frontier taverns. Further, all 
contemporary state constitutions and most previous ones set lower bars to reform than 
does the federal constitution. The state constitutions are more legitimate than their 
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inflexible federal counterpart, and so improve the democratic legitimacy of the American 
constitutional system. 
 The last lesson is for citizens. Visit the National Archives. The original 
Constitution stands in an altar in the Archives’ rotunda, surrounded by a press of bodies – 
boy scouts, schoolchildren, and tourists, arms extended to touch the altar. For many 
visitors, this is humbling. It should not be. The American Constitution blocks the 
democratic will. But the state constitutions invite popular reform. Through the states, 
Americans can achieve their democratic aspirations. The challenge to citizens is to realize 
this through state constitutional reform. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Attempted State Constitutional Replacement 
 
St Year P O R V Dr S St Year P O R V Dr S St Year P O R V Dr S 
AK 1956 1 1 1 1 60  LA 1898 1 8 1 0 3  NY 1846 1 3 1 1 48  
AL 1819 1 1 1 0 42  LA 1913 1 9 1 0 8  NY 1867 1 4 0 1  1 
AL 1861 1 2 1 0 4  LA 1921 1 10 1 0 24  NY 1872 2 4 0 1  1 
AL 1865 1 3 1 0 3  LA 1974 1 11 1 1 41  NY 1875 2 4 0 4  1 
AL 1868 1 4 1 1 7  LA 1992 1 12 0 2  4 NY 1894 1 4 1 1 122  
AL 1875 1 5 1 1 26  MA 1778 1 1 0 2  1 NY 1915 1 5 0 2  1 
AL 1901 1 6 1 1 114  MA 1780 1 1 1 1 236  NY 1921 1 5 0 2  1 
AL 1969 2 7 0 4  1 MA 1820 1 2 0 1  1 NY 1938 1 5 0 1  1 
AR 1836 1 1 1 0 25  MA 1853 1 2 0 2  1 NY 1957 2 5 0 4  3 
AR 1861 1 2 1 0 3  MA 1917 1 2 0 4  1 NY 1958 2 5 0 4  3 
AR 1864 1 3 1 1 4  MD 1776 1 1 1 0 74  NY 1959 2 5 0 4  3 
AR 1868 1 4 1 1 6  MD 1792 3 2 0 4  3 NY 1967 1 5 0 4  5 
AR 1874 1 5 1 1 142  MD 1850 1 2 1 1 14  OH 1802 1 1 1 0 49  
AR 1917 1 6 0 2  3 MD 1864 1 3 1 1 3  OH 1851 1 2 1 1 165  
AR 1967 2 6 0 3  1 MD 1867 1 4 1 1 149  OH 1873 1 3 0 2  1 
AR 1969 1 6 0 2  3 MD 1965 2 5 0 4  5 OH 1912 1 3 0 1  1 
AR 1979 1 6 0 2  3 MD 1967 1 5 0 2  1 OK 1907 1 1 1 1 109  
AZ 1860 1 1 0 4  2 ME 1819 1 1 1 1 197  OK 1968 2 2 0 4  5 
AZ 1891 1 1 0 1  3 ME 1949 3 2 0 4  1 OR 1843 3 1 0 4  4 
AZ 1911 1 1 1 1 105  ME 1961 2 2 0 4  1 OR 1845 3 1 0 4  4 
CA 1849 1 1 1 1 30  ME 1965 3 2 0 4  1 OR 1857 1 1 1 1 159  
CA 1853 3 2 0 4  3 MI 1835 1 1 1 1 15  OR 1955 2 2 0 4  3 
CA 1857 3 2 0 4  3 MI 1850 1 2 1 1 58  OR 1962 2 2 0 4  3 
CA 1874 3 4 0 4  3 MI 1867 1 3 0 2  1 OR 1969 2 2 0 2  4 
CA 1879 1 2 1 1 137  MI 1873 2 3 0 2  1 PA 1776 1 1 1 0 14  
CA 1893 3 3 0 4  3 MI 1908 1 3 1 1 55  PA 1790 1 2 1 0 48  
CA 1930 2 3 0 3  3 MI 1938 2 4 0 3  1 PA 1833 3 3 0 4  3 
CA 1933 3 3 0 3  1 MI 1942 2 4 0 3  1 PA 1838 1 3 1 1 35  
CA 1947 3 3 0 4  3 MI 1963 1 4 1 1 53  PA 1873 1 4 1 1 95  
CA 1959 2 3 0 4  5 MN 1857 1 1 1 1 159  PA 1920 2 5 0 4  3 
CA 1963 2 3 0 4  5 MN 1948 2 2 0 3  5 PA 1963 2 5 0 4  5 
CA 1976 2 3 0 1  1 MN 1948 2 2 0 4  3 PA 1968 1 5 1 1 48  
CO 1859 1 1 0 2  1 MN 1971 2 2 0 4  1 RI 1663 3 1 1 1 179  
CO 1859 1 1 0 1  1 MO 1820 1 1 1 0 45  RI 1824 1 2 0 2  1 
CO 1864 1 1 0 2  1 MO 1845 1 2 0 2  3 RI 1841 1 2 0 1  1 
CO 1865 1 1 0 1  1 MO 1861 1 2 0 4  3 RI 1841 1 2 0 4  1 
CO 1876 1 1 1 1 140  MO 1865 1 2 1 1 10  RI 1842 1 2 1 1 144  
CT 1662 3 1 1 0 156  MO 1875 1 3 1 1 70  RI 1882 3 3 0 3  1 
CT 1818 1 2 1 1 147  MO 1922 1 4 0 2  3 RI 1898 2 3 0 2  1 
CT 1902 1 3 0 2  1 MO 1945 1 4 1 1 71  RI 1915 2 3 0 3  1 
CT 1965 1 3 1 1 51  MS 1817 1 1 1 0 15  RI 1962 2 3 0 4  1 
DE 1776 1 1 1 0 16  MS 1832 1 2 1 0 37  RI 1964 1 3 0 2  1 
DE 1792 1 2 1 0 39  MS 1851 1 3 0 4  4 RI 1986 1 3 1 1 30  
DE 1831 1 3 1 0 66  MS 1861 1 3 0 4  3 SC 1776 3 1 1 0 2  
DE 1852 1 4 0 2  1 MS 1865 1 3 0 4  3 SC 1778 3 2 1 0 12  
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St Year P O R V Dr S St Year P O R V Dr S St Year P O R V Dr S 
DE 1897 1 4 1 0 119  MS 1868 1 3 0 2  1 SC 1790 1 3 1 0 71  
DE 1969 2 5 0 3  1 MS 1869 1 3 1 1 21  SC 1861 1 4 1 0 4  
FL 1839 1 1 1 1 22  MS 1890 1 4 1 0 126  SC 1865 1 5 1 0 3  
FL 1861 1 2 1 0 4  MS 1986 2 5 0 3  1 SC 1868 1 6 1 1 1  
FL 1865 1 3 1 0 3  MT 1866 1 1 0 0  1 SC 1895 1 7 1 0 120  
FL 1868 1 4 1 1 18  MT 1884 1 1 0 1  1 SC 1948 2 8 0 4  5 
FL 1886 1 5 1 1 82  MT 1889 1 1 1 1 83  SC 1966 2 8 0 1  1 
FL 1957 3 6 0 4  3 MT 1967 3 2 0 3  1 SC 1969 2 8 0 1  5 
FL 1958 2 6 0 4  3 MT 1969 2 2 0 3  1 SD 1883 1 1 0 1  1 
FL 1965 2 6 0 4  5 MT 1972 1 2 1 1 44  SD 1885 1 1 0 1  1 
FL 1968 2 6 1 1 47  NC 1776 1 1 1 0 92  SD 1889 1 1 1 1 127  
GA 1777 1 1 1 0 12  NC 1823 1 2 0 4  4 SD 1969 2 2 0 3  1 
GA 1788 1 2 0 4  4 NC 1833 3 2 0 4  4 TN 1796 1 1 1 0 39  
GA 1789 1 2 1 0 9  NC 1835 1 2 0 1  1 TN 1835 1 2 1 1 35  
GA 1789 1 2 0 1  1 NC 1861 1 2 0 4  4 TN 1870 1 3 1 1 146  
GA 1795 1 3 0 1  1 NC 1865 1 2 0 2  1 TN 1945 2 4 0 4  5 
GA 1798 1 3 1 0 63  NC 1868 1 2 1 1 102  TN  1861 1 3 0 4  3 
GA 1833 1 4 0 4  3 NC 1875 1 3 0 3  1 TX 1836 1 1 0 1  1 
GA 1839 1 4 0 4  3 NC 1932 2 3 0 4  3 TX 1845 1 1 1 1 16  
GA 1861 1 4 1 1 4  NC 1959 2 3 0 4  3 TX 1861 1 2 1 1 5  
GA 1865 1 5 1 0 3  NC 1968 2 3 0 4  4 TX 1866 1 3 1 1 3  
GA 1868 1 6 1 1 0  NC 1970 3 3 1 1 46  TX 1869 1 4 1 1 7  
GA 1877 1 7 1 1 2  ND 1889 1 1 1 1 127  TX 1876 1 5 1 1 140  
GA 1945 2 8 1 1 2  ND 1971 1 2 0 2  4 TX 1959 2 6 0 3  1 
GA 1964 2 9 0 3  1 NE 1864 1 1 0 3  1 TX 1968 2 6 0 1  1 
GA 1969 2 9 0 3  1 NE 1866 3 1 1 1 9  TX 1973 3 6 0 3  5 
GA 1976 2 9 1 1 6  NE 1871 1 2 0 2  1 TX 1974 1 6 0 2  1 
GA 1982 3 10 1 1 33  NE 1875 1 2 1 1 141  UT 1849 1 1 0 4  1 
HI 1950 1 1 1 1 66  NE 1919 1 3 0 1  1 UT 1856 1 1 0 4  1 
HI 1968 1 2 0 1  1 NE 1995 2 4 0 3  1 UT 1862 1 1 0 4  1 
HI 1978 1 2 0 1  1 NH 1776 1 1 1 0 8  UT 1872 1 1 0 4  1 
IA 1844 1 1 0 2  1 NH 1778 1 2 0 1  1 UT 1882 1 1 0 4  1 
IA 1846 1 1 1 1 11  NH 1784 1 2 1 1 232  UT 1887 1 1 0 3  1 
IA 1857 1 2 1 1 159  NH 1791 1 3 0 1  1 UT 1895 1 1 1 1 121  
ID 1889 1 1 1 1 127  NH 1850 1 3 0 1  1 VA 1776 1 1 1 0 54  
ID 1918 3 2 0 2  1 NH 1876 1 3 0 1  1 VA 1816 1 2 0 1  1 
ID 1965 2 2 0 4  5 NH 1889 1 3 0 1  1 VA 1830 1 2 1 1 21  
ID 1968 3 2 0 2  1 NH 1902 1 3 0 1  1 VA 1851 1 3 1 1 18  
IL 1818 1 1 1 0 30  NH 1912 1 3 0 1  1 VA 1861 1 4 0 2  1 
IL 1848 1 2 1 1 22  NH 1918 1 3 0 1  1 VA 1864 1 4 0 1  1 
IL 1862 1 3 0 2  1 NH 1930 1 3 0 1  1 VA 1869 1 4 1 1 33  
IL 1870 1 3 1 1 100  NH 1938 1 3 0 1  1 VA 1902 1 5 1 0 68  
IL 1920 1 4 0 2  1 NH 1948 1 3 0 1  1 VA 1970 2 6 1 1 45  
IL 1934 3 4 0 3  1 NH 1956 1 3 0 1  1 VT 1777 1 1 1 0 9  
IL 1967 2 4 0 4  5 NH 1964 1 3 0 1  1 VT 1786 1 2 1 0 7  
IL 1970 1 4 1 1 46  NH 1974 1 3 0 1  1 VT 1793 1 3 1 0 223  
IN 1816 1 1 1 0 35  NH 1984 1 3 0 1  1 VT 1814 1 4 0 4  3 
IN 1851 1 2 1 1 165  NJ 1776 1 1 1 0 68  VT 1822 1 4 0 4  3 
IN 1967 2 3 0 4  5 NJ 1844 1 2 1 1 103  VT 1828 1 4 0 4  3 
KS 1855 1 1 0 4  1 NJ 1873 2 3 0 3  1 VT 1836 1 4 0 4  3 
KS 1857 1 1 0 4  1 NJ 1882 2 3 0 3  1 VT 1843 1 4 0 4  3 
KS 1858 1 1 0 4  1 NJ 1942 2 3 0 3  1 VT 1850 1 4 0 4  3 
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St Year P O R V Dr S St Year P O R V Dr S St Year P O R V Dr S 
KS 1859 1 1 1 1 157  NJ 1944 3 3 0 3  1 VT 1857 1 4 0 4  3 
KS 1957 2 2 0 3  1 NJ 1947 1 3 1 1 69  VT 1870 1 4 0 4  3 
KS 1961 2 2 0 1  1 NJ 1947 2 3 0 2  5 VT 1910 2 4 0 4  3 
KS 1968 2 2 0 1  1 NM 1848 1 1 0 4  4 VT 1920 2 4 0 4  3 
KY 1792 1 1 1 0 7  NM 1849 1 1 0 4  4 VT 1931 2 4 0 4  3 
KY 1794 1 2 0 4  3 NM 1850 1 1 0 1  1 VT 1940 2 4 0 4  3 
KY 1799 1 2 1 0 51  NM 1872 1 1 0 2  4 WA 1878 1 1 0 4  3 
KY 1850 1 3 1 1 41  NM 1889 1 1 0 2  1 WA 1889 1 1 1 1 127  
KY 1861 1 4 0 4  3 NM 1907 1 1 0 4  4 WA 1935 2 2 0 4  3 
KY 1891 1 4 1 1 125  NM 1911 1 1 1 1 105  WA 1968 2 2 0 3  4 
KY 1950 2 5 0 4  5 NM 1963 2 2 0 4  5 WI 1846 1 1 0 2  1 
KY 1960 2 5 0 4  5 NM 1969 1 2 0 1  1 WI 1848 1 1 1 1 168  
KY 1966 2 5 0 2  1 NM 1969 2 2 0 1  5 WI 1960 2 2 0 4  5 
KY 1987 2 5 0 1  1 NV 1851 1 1 0 3  1 WI 1964 2 2 0 3  1 
LA 1812 1 1 1 0 33  NV 1854 1 1 0 3  1 WV 1861 1 1 0 3  1 
LA 1845 1 2 1 1 7  NV 1859 1 1 0 3  1 WV 1861 1 1 0 1  1 
LA 1852 1 3 1 1 9  NV 1863 1 1 0 2  1 WV 1863 1 1 1 1 9  
LA 1861 1 4 1 0 3  NV 1864 1 1 1 1 152  WV 1872 1 2 1 1 144  
LA 1864 1 5 1 1 4  NY 1777 1 1 1 0 45  WV 1929 2 3 0 4  1 
LA 1868 1 6 1 1 0  NY 1801 1 2 0 0  1 WV 1957 2 3 0 4  5 
LA 1879 1 7 1 1 7  NY 1822 1 2 1 1 24  WY 1889 1 1 1 1 127  
Table 8: Proposals for State Constitutions, 1776-2017. 
 
State Year Pro. Order Source State Year Pro. Order Source State Year Pro. Order Source 
CT 1965 2 3 5 NH 1963 2 3 5 TN 1959 1 4 1 
CT 1968 2 3 5 NJ 1966 1 4 4 TN 1965 1 4 1 
FL 1955 2 6 5 NY 1837 2 3 1 TN 1971 1 4 1 
IL 1965 2 4 5 NY 1890 2 4 3 TN 1977 1 4 1 
IL 1969 1 4 5 OH 1969 2 3 5 UT 1969 2 2 5 
KS 1963 2 2 3 OK 1969 2 2 5 VA 1927 2 6 1 
MA 1967 2 2 1 PA 1959 2 5 3 VA 1945 1 6 1 
MI 1960 2 4 5 PA 1967 2 5 5 VA 1956 1 6 4 
MI 1961 2 4 5 RI 1944 1 3 1 VT 1950 2 4 3 
MI 1961 2 4 5 RI 1951 1 3 1 VT 1959 2 2 5 
MN 1962 2 2 5 RI 1955 1 3 1 VT 1968 2 2 5 
MO 1961 2 5 5 RI 1958 1 3 1 WA 1965 2 2 5 
NC 1913 2 3 3 RI 1973 1 3 1 WI 1973 2 2 1 
NE 1969 2 4 1 TN 1953 1 4 1      
Table 9: Excluded State Constitutional Conventions and Committees, 1776-2017. 
 
For Procedure (P/Pro.), 1 indicates proposal by convention, 2, by commission, and 3, by legislature. 
For Order (O), 1 indicates the proposal was the state’s first, 2, the second, etc. 
For Ratification (R), 0 indicates the proposal was not fully ratified, and 1, that it was fully ratified. 
For Vote (V), 0 indicates ratification without vote, 1, voters approve ratification, 2, voters reject 
ratification, 3, no ratification and no ratification vote, 4, source does not specify. 
Duration (Dr) is the duration of a ratified constitution in years. 
For Source (S), 1 indicates source was the Reference Guides to the State Constitutions of the United States, 
2, a primary source, 3, Cynthia E. Browne, ed., State Constitutional Conventions from Independence to the 
Completion of the Present Union, 1776-1959: A Bibliography (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973)., 4, 
another source, and 5, from Albert L. Sturm, Thirty Years of State Constitution-Making, 1938-1968: With 
an Epilogue: Developments During 1969 (National Municipal League, 1970). 
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Appendix B: Time Series Plots 
 
 
Figure 9: Rates of Proposals for Federal Amendments and State Constitutions, 1775-2017. 
 
 
Figure 10: Proposed Federal Amendments, Unratified and Ratified State Constitutions, 1775-2017. 
 
 
Figure 11: Proposed Federal Amendments and Ratified State Amendments, 1775-2017. 
 
 
Figure 12: Congressional Polarization and State Constitutional Revision by Two-Year Bins, 1879-2013. 
Polarization data from Poole and Rosenthal. 
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Figure 13: State Constitutional Replacement and U.S. Supreme Court Caseload, 1859-2013. 
Data from Federal Judiciary Center. Caseload in number of cases. 
 
 
Figure 14: State Constitutional Amendments Ratified, 1789-1877. 
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Figure 15: Trends in State Constitutional Revision by Region, 1776-2017. 
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Appendix C: Maps 
 
 
Figure 16: Geographic Distribution State Constitutions, 1776-2017. 
 
 
 
The above map indicates the number of ratified state constitutions and the below map indicates the 
number of proposed constitutions per state. Darker shading indicates a greater number of ratified 
proposals. 
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Figure 17: Geographic Distribution of Attempts to Draft New State Constitutions, 1776-1877. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Top left: 
1776-1799 
Top right: 
1800-49 
Bottom: 
1850-77 
 
Note that for 
some Western 
territories, this 
map uses 
modern state 
borders. Darker 
shading 
indicates a 
greater number 
of ratified 
proposals. 
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Appendix D: Proposed Federal and State Constitutional Provisions by Topic 
 
Topic Search Term(s) Count Concurrent Power? 
Judicial Design/Powers “Jud”, “Court” 689 No 
Congressional Design/Powers “Congress”, “Senat”, “Representatives” 2274 No 
Executive Selection/Powers “Elector”, “President”, “Executive” 1800 No 
Federal Office Term Limits “Term” 1060 No 
Slavery “Slave” 213 Yes 
Treaties “Treat” 221 No 
War Powers “War” 168 No 
Suffrage “Suffrage”, “Franchise”, “Right to Vote” 549 Yes 
Equal Rights “Equal Rights” 1137 Yes 
Religious (Dis)establishment/Prayer “Relig”, “God”, “Christ”, “Prayer” 838 Yes 
Item Veto “Item” 304 No 
Prohibition “Alcohol”, “Liquor”, “Eighteenth Amendment” 210 Yes 
Marriage “Marriage”, “Polygamy” 151 Yes 
Taxes “Tax” 584 Yes 
Child Labor “Child Labor”, “Employment” 73 Yes 
Legislative Apportionment “Apportionment” 385 Yes 
Regulation of D.C. “Columbia” 232 No 
School Busing “Busing”, “Assignment”, “ Freedom of Choice”, “School” 235 Yes 
Abortion “Abortion”, “Life” 336 Yes 
Flag Desecration “Flag” 106 Yes 
Balanced Budget “Budget” 644 No 
Campaign Finance “Expenditure”, “Contribution” 99 Yes 
Table 10: Proposed Federal Amendments by Topic Area, 1788-2014. 
Note: “Count” indicates count of proposals matching search term(s). These are approximate counts. An 
individual amendment can match for multiple search terms and thus topics, such that these categories are 
not exclusive of each other. Because of the coding method used, these are minimum counts. 
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Issue Years Search Terms Count 
1800-49 
Congress 1800-40s “Congress”, “Senat”, “Representatives” 142 
 Representatives Chosen by District 1800-20s “District” 34 
 Apportionment 1800s, 1840s “Apportion” 7 
 Exclusion from Executive Office 1810-30s “Exclude” 23 
 Term Limits 1810s Term 9 
 Recall of Congressmen 1800s “Recall” 4 
 Compensation 1810s “Compen” 7 
Executive 1800-40s “Elector”, “President”, “Executive” 83 
 Choice of President/Executive 1810-30s “Choice” 65 
 Selecting Electors 1810-30s “Elector” 48 
 Direct Election 1820s “Direct” 6 
 Term Limits 1820-40s “Term” 5 
 Veto 1830s “Veto” 12 
 Election not to Devolve on Congress 1820s “Congress” 5 
Judiciary 1800-40s “Jud”, “Court” 25 
 Removal 1810s “Removal” 11 
 Term Limits 1830-40s “Term” 8 
Finance 1800-40s  57 
 Banks 1810-30s “Bank” 21 
 Internal Improvements 1810-20s “Improvements” 22 
 Tax 1810s, 1840s “Tax” 9 
 Embargo 1810s “Embargo” 5 
Slavery 1800-40s “Slave”, “Color” 19 
1850-77 
Congress  “Congress”, “Senat”, “Representatives” 131 
 Apportionment 1864-9 “Apportion” 113 
 Election of Senators by the People 1850-2, 72-4 “People” 22 
Executive  “Elector”, “President”, “Executive” 71 
 Choice of President/Executive 1864-77 “Choice” 22 
 Term Limits 1864-7, 71-7 “Term” 16 
 Veto 1872-7 “Veto” 10 
Judiciary  “Jud”, “Court” 22 
 Term Limits 1851-2, 67-9 “Term Limits” 9 
Slavery  “Slave” 199 
 Slavery Prohibited 1860-7 “Prohibit” 59 
 Fugitive Slaves 1860-4 “Fugitive” 44 
 Territorial Slavery 1860-4 “Territor” 36 
 Property in Slaves Protected 1860-1 “Property” 7 
 Slave Trade 1860-1, 64 “Trade” 31 
 Slavery in District of Columbia  1860-1, 64 “District” 17 
 Compensated Emancipation 1861, 64-6 “Compen” 19 
 Free-Slave State Division Line 1861 “Division” 4 
 Travel with Slaves 1860-1, 64 “Travel” 6 
Admission of Territories 1860-1, 64 “Admission” 19 
Citizenship 1867 “Citizen” 21 
Civil Rights 1865-9 “Civil” 37 
Suffrage 1866-70 “Suffrage”, “Franchise”, “Right to Vote” 89 
Payment of Rebel Debt 1865-73 “Debt” 28 
Taxes 1861-76 “Tax” 21 
Religious (Dis)establishment 1876 “Relig”, “God”, “Christ”, “Prayer” 7 
Table 11: Proposed Federal Amendments by Topic Area, 1800-77.  
Note that “Count” 
indicates the 
number of proposed 
amendments 
matching the search 
term(s). Proposed 
amendments 
matching general 
topics are then 
sorted by matching 
subtopic search 
terms. An 
individual 
amendment can 
match for multiple 
search terms and 
thus topics, such 
that these categories 
are not exclusive of 
each other. Because 
of the coding 
method used, these 
are minimum 
counts. 
 
298 
 
Year Sponsor State Amendment Topic Year Sponsor State Amendment Topic 
1788   Limit US credit 1819 Lowrie PA Establishing a national bank 
1788   No congressional law on state currency 1820 Noble IN Establishing a national bank 
1788   Limit US credit 1820 Baldwin PA Establishing a national bank 
1793   Bankers ineligible for Congress 1820 Trimble OH Establishing a national bank 
1793   Bankers ineligible for Congress 1821 Dickerson NJ Establishing a national bank 
1793   Bankers ineligible for Congress 1822 Walworth NY Bankruptcy, effect of State acts 
1806 Jefferson Internal improvements 1822 Monroe Internal improvements 
1813 Jackson VA Establishing a national bank 1822 Talbot KY Internal improvements 
1813   Establishing a national bank 1823 Reid GA Internal improvements 
1813   Internal improvements, roads 1823 Smith MD Internal improvements 
1813   Internal improvements, roads 1824 Van Buren NY Internal improvements 
1813   Internal improvements, canals 1825 Bailey MA Internal improvements 
1814 Jackson VA Establishing a national bank 1825 Van Buren NY Internal improvements 
1814   Internal improvements, roads 1832   Chartering of bank 
1814 Jackson VA Internal improvements, canals 1832   Internal improvements 
1814 Jackson VA Establishing a national bank 1832   Internal improvements 
1815 Madison Internal improvements 1832   Internal improvements 
1816 Madison Internal improvements 1836   Issuing of bank notes 
1817   Internal improvements 1837   State bank paper 
1817 Barbour VA Internal improvements 1838 Garland LA State bank notes 
1819   Establishing a national bank 1840 Buchanan PA State bank notes prohibited 
Table 12: Proposed Federal Amendments to Regulate Banking and Internal Improvements, 1788-1860. 
 
Year Sponsor State Amendment Topic 
1788   Abolition of the slave trade 
1803   Importation of slaves prohibited 
1804   Importation of slaves prohibited 
1805 Varnum MA Importation of slaves prohibited 
1805   Importation of slaves prohibited 
1806 Oliver VT Importation of slaves prohibited 
1806 Tennoy NH Importation of slaves prohibited 
1806 Wright MD Importation of slaves prohibited 
1808 Maclay PA Importation of slaves punishable 
1818 Livermore NH Slavery prohibited 
1839   Hereditary slavery abolished after 1842 
1839   No slave state to be admitted 
1839 Adams MA Slavery abolished after 1845 in D.C. 
1850 Daniel NC  To prevent the abolition of slavery 
1858   Recognition of the right of property in slaves 
1858   Territorial slavery protected 
Table 13: Proposed Federal Amendments to Regulate Slavery, 1788-1859. 
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Document NH SC VA1 VA2 NJ US1 S2 
  Preamble 
Law of nature and nature’s God      X X 
Natural equality    1  X X 
Rights to life, liberty, happiness, and/or property X X  1  X X 
Government by consent    2 X X X 
Right to alter and abolish government    3 X X X 
Right to institute new government X   3 X X X 
Abolition after long train of abuses     X X X 
Grievances against the Crown 
Refused assent to laws      X X 
Forbade governors to pass laws X  X X  X X 
Refused legislative representation   X 6, X  X X 
Called colonial legislatures at inconvenient times and places       X 
Dissolved colonial legislatures X X X X  X X 
Refused elections; legislative power for the people; colonies vulnerable   X X X X X 
Refused colonies’ authority over naturalization and land   X X  X X 
Refused laws establishing judiciary powers      X X 
Controlled judges’ salaries and tenure X     X X 
Established new officers      X X 
Established standing armies without colonial legislative consent X X X 13, X  X X 
Rendered military power superior to civil power  X X 13, X  X X 
Subjected colonists to foreign law   X X  X X 
Quartered troops among colonists   X X  X X 
Protected troops and officers from colonial trial      X X 
Cut colonial trade with foreign nations or each other X X X 6, X  X X 
Imposed taxes without consent  X X X  X X 
Refused colonists trial by jury   X 8, 11, X  X X 
Required trial in Britain for colonists  X X 8, X  X X 
Passed Quebec Act of 1774  X     X 
Abolished or altered colonial charters  X    X X 
Suspended colonial legislatures   X X  X X 
Abdicated government by declaring war against colonists    X  X X 
Made war against colonists’ seas, coasts, and towns X X X X X X X 
Hired foreign mercenaries against colonists   X X  X X 
Imprisoned or impressed colonists into military service  X     X 
Incited domestic insurrection and Indian revolt  X X X  X X 
Incited domestic insurrection by promising reward   X X  X  
Prohibited abolition of slavery and encouraged slave revolt  X X X  X  
Conclusion 
Petitions to the Crown unanswered  X X X  X X 
Petitions to the British people unanswered  X    X X 
Necessity of rebellion  X    X X 
Colonies declared independent   X X  X X 
Colonists never accepted Parliamentary supremacy      X  
Renunciation of ties to the British   X X X X  
Not Included in US Declaration 
Suspension of laws requires popular consent    7    
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles    15    
Appeal to English constitutional rights X    X   
Appeal to reconciliation with Britain X X   X   
Objection to George III’s asserting Parliamentary supremacy     X   
Objection to the Boston Port Act of 1774  X      
Objection to governors’ withdrawing civil officers  X      
Objection to royal judges refusing to hear suits  X      
Total Provisions 10 20 22 30 10 39 38 
Number of Provisions Reiterated in US Declaration 8 15 19 27 6 35 38 
Table 14: State and National Declarations of Independence 
Note: 
The interpretation of 
some provisions is 
ambiguous, so this 
categorization 
necessarily partly 
reflects the author’s own 
interpretation of the 
provisions’ meanings. 
The table is not a 
comprehensive list of 
rights listed under these 
state constitutions, but 
only those rights that 
the constitutions 
explicitly claim were 
violated under British 
rule. Provisions are 
listed by the order they 
appear in the 
Declaration, with the 
section number when 
applicable. 
 
Note on Abbreviations:  
NH – 1776 New 
Hampshire Constitution 
(drafted Dec. 21 1775 
– Jan. 5, 1776) 
SC – 1776 South 
Carolina Constitution 
(drafted Feb. – May 26, 
1776) 
VA1 and VA2 – first 
two drafts of the 1776 
Virginia Constitution 
(drafted May 6 – June 
29, 1776) 
NJ – 1776 New Jersey 
Constitution (drafted 
May 26 – July 2, 1776) 
USD1 and USD2 –  first 
two drafts of the United 
States Declaration of 
Independence (June 11 
– July 2, 1776) 
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Year St. Rat Bank 
Reserves 
Limits on 
Incorporation 
Currency 
Regulation 
Limits on State 
Debt 
Liability & 
Loss 
Debtors' 
Rights 
Bankers in 
Office 
Oversight for 
Banks 
1819 AL Yes Bank Art., 
Sec. 1 
Bank Art., Sec. 1 Bank Art., 
Sec. 1 
 Bank Art., 
Sec. 1 
   
1836 AR Yes  Bank Art., Sec. 1   Bank Art., 
Sec. 1 
Art. VII, 
Sec. 1 
  
1860 AZ No         
1849 CA Yes  Art. IV, Sec. 34 Art. IV, Sec. 
34, 35 
Art. VIII, Art. 
XI, Sec. 10 
Art. IV, Sec. 
36 
Art. I, Sec. 
15 
  
1818 CT Yes         
1776 DE Yes         
1792 DE Yes      Art. VI, 
Sec. 10 
  
1831 DE Yes  Art. II, Sec. 17    Art VI., 
Sec. 17 
  
1776 DE Yes         
1817 FL No         
1812 FL No         
1810 FL No      Art. VII. 
Sec. 14 
  
1839 FL Yes Art. XIII, 
Sec. 6 
Art. XIII, Sec. 1-
5, 12-3 
Art. XIII, 
Sec. 8 
 Art. XIII, Sec. 
7, 10 
 Art. V, Sec. 3 Art. XII, Sec. 
11, 14 
1776 GA No         
1777 GA Yes         
1789 GA Yes      Art. IV, 
Sec. 7 
  
1798 GA Yes      Art. IV, 
Sec. 7 
  
1844 IA No  Art. IX, Sec. 1-6  Art. VII, Sec.1, 
Art. IX, Sec. 7 
Art. IX, Sec. 1, 
7 
Art. II, Sec. 
18 
Art. IV, Sec. 
23 
Art. IX, Sec. 1 
1846 IA Yes  Art. IX, Sec. 2 Art. IX, Sec. 
1 
Art. VIII, sec. 1, 
Art. IX, Sec. 2 
Art. IX, Sec. 2 Art. II, Sec. 
19 
Art. IV, Sec. 
23 
 
1857 IA Yes Art. VII, 
Sec. 8 
Art. VIII, Sec. 1, 
5 
Art. VIII, 
Sec. 7-8, 11 
Art. VI, Art. 
VIII, Sec. 3-4 
Art. VIII, Sec. 
3, 9 
  Art. XVII, Sec. 
12 
1818 IL Yes  Art. VII, Sec. 21    Art. VIII, 
Sec. 15 
  
1848 IL Yes  Art. III, Sec. 35, 
Art. X, Sec. 1, 5 
Art. X, Sec. 
4 
Art. III, Sec. 37, 
Art. X, Sec. 3 
Art. X, Sec.2-
4 
   
1816 IN Yes Art. X, 
Sec. 1 
Art. X, Sec. 1    Art. I, Sec. 
17 
  
1851 IN Yes Art. XI, 
Sec. 7 
Art. XI, Sec. 1-4, 
13 
Art. XI, Sec. 
3, 5 
Art. X, Sec. 5-6, 
Art. XI, Sec. 12 
Art. XI, Sec. 
5-6 
Art. I, Sec. 
22 
 Art. XI, Sec. 11 
1858 KS No  Art. XIV, Sec. 1, 
Art. XVII, Sec. 1 
Art. XVII, 
Sec. 2-5, 7 
Art. X, Art. XI, 
Sec. 5, Art. XIV, 
Sec. 5-6 
Art XIV, Sec. 
2, Art. XVII, 
Sec. 5 
Art. I Sec. 
15 
 Art. XVII, Sec. 
9 
1857 KS No  Art. XII, Sec. 1, 4 Art. XII, Sec. 
4 
Art. IX, Sec. 3-
4, Art. XII, Sec. 
3, 7 
Art. XII, Sec. 
6 
  Art. XII, Sec. 5 
1855 KS No Art. XVII, 
Sec. 2, 4 
Art. XIII, Art. 
XVII, Sec. 1 
Art. XVII, 
Sec. 4-5 
Art. IX, Art. 
XVII, Sec. 8 
Art. XVII, Sec. 
3 
Art. I Sec. 
15 
 Art. XVII, Sec. 
7, 9 
1859 KS Yes Art. XIII, 
Sec. 2-4 
Art. XIII, Sec. 1 Art. XIII, 
Sec. 2, 4, 6-
7 
Art. X, Finance, 
Sec. 7, Art. XIII, 
Sec. 5 
   Art. XIII, Sec. 
8-9 
1792 KY Yes      Art. XI, 
Sec. 17 
  
1799 KY Yes      Art. X, Sec. 
17 
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Year St. Rat Bank 
Reserves 
Limits on 
Incorporation 
Currency 
Regulation 
Limits on State 
Debt 
Liability & 
Loss 
Debtors' 
Rights 
Bankers in 
Office 
Oversight for 
Banks 
1850 KY Yes         
1812 LA Yes         
1845 LA Yes  Art. 122-5  Art. 113-4, 121     
1852 LA Yes Art. 119 Art. 109 Art. 118-9 Art. 108-11 Art. 120-1    
1778 MA No  Art. XII, Sec. 2       
1780 MA Yes         
1792 MD No         
1776 MD Yes         
1851 MD Yes  Art. III, Sec. 45, 
47 
 Art. III, Sec. 22 Art. III, Sec. 
45 
Art. III, 
Sec. 39, 
44 
 Art. III, Sec. 45 
1776 MD Yes         
1780 ME No      Art. XIV   
1819 ME Yes         
1835 MI Yes         
1850 MI Yes Art. XV, 
Sec. 4 
Art. XV, Sec. 1, 8 Art. XV, Sec. 
4 
Art. XIV Art. XV, Sec. 
3, 7 
Art. VI, 
Sec. 33 
Art. III, 
Legislative, 
Sec. 30 
Art. XV, Sec. 
10 
1857 MN Yes Art. IX, 
Sec. 13 
Art. X, Sec. 2 Art. IX, Sec. 
13 
Art. IX, Sec. 5-
7, 10 
Art. IX, Sec. 8, 
13, Art. X, 
Sec. 1, 3 
Art. I, Sec. 
12 
 Art. IX, Sec. 11 
1846 MO No  Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Art. VIII, 
Sec. 1, 3 
Art. III, Sec. 31, 
Art. VIII, Sec. 2 
Art. VIII, Sec. 
2 
Art. XI, 
Sec. 17 
 Art. VIII, Sec. 
2, 4 
1820 MO Yes Art. VIII Art. VIII    Art. XIII, 
Sec. 17 
  
1817 MS Yes  Art. VI, Gen., 
Sec. 9 
   Art. I, Sec. 
18 
  
1831 MS Yes    Art. VII, Sec. 9  Art. I, Sec. 
18 
  
1823 NC No      Sec. 34   
1835 NC No         
1776 NC No         
1776 NC Yes      Sec. 39   
1779 NH No         
1781 NH No      Part II, 
House 
  
1782 NH No      Part II, 
House 
  
1851 NH No  Part II, Art. 41  Part II, Art. 11-
2 
 Part II, Art. 
25 
 Part II, Art. 41, 
80 
1832 NH No         
1776 NH Yes         
1784 NH Yes      Part II, 
House 
  
1792 NH Yes      Part II, 
House 
  
1776 NJ Yes         
1844 NJ Yes  Art. IV, Sec. 7, 
Cl. 8 
 Art. IV, Sec. 6, 
Cl. 3-4 
 Art. I, Sec. 
17 
 Art. IV, Sec. 6, 
Cl. 3-4, Sec. 7, 
Cl. 8 
1846 NM No         
1849 NM No         
1850 NM No  Art. IX, Sec. 8-  Art. IX, Sec. 11,    Art. IX, Sec. 10 
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Year St. Rat Bank 
Reserves 
Limits on 
Incorporation 
Currency 
Regulation 
Limits on State 
Debt 
Liability & 
Loss 
Debtors' 
Rights 
Bankers in 
Office 
Oversight for 
Banks 
10 22 
1777 NY Yes         
1821 NY Yes  Art. VII, Sec. 9       
1846 NY Yes  Art. VII, Sec. 1, 
4, 9 
Art. VII, Sec. 
4-7 
Art. VII Art. VII, Art. 
VII, Sec. 2, 8 
   
1802 OH Yes      Art. VIII, 
Sec. 15 
  
1851 OH Yes  Art. XIII, Sec. 1-
2 
 Art. VIII, Art. 
XII, Sec. 3, 6 
Art. XIII, Sec. 
3 
Art. I, Sec. 
15 
 Art. XIII, Sec. 
2, 7 
1843 OR No         
1845 OR No         
1857 OR Yes  Art. XI, Sec. 1-2 Art. XI, Sec. 
1 
Art. IX, Sec. 2, 
Art. XI, Sec. 6-
10 
Art. XI, Sec. 3, 
5 
Art. I, Sec. 
19 
  
1776 PA Yes      Ch. II, Sec. 
28 
  
1790 PA Yes      Art. IX, 
Sec. 16 
  
1838 PA Yes  Art. I, Sec. 25    Art. VIII, 
Sec. 16 
 Art. I, Sec. 25 
1824 RI No         
1841 RI No         
1842 RI No    Art. IV, Sec. 13  Art. I, Sec. 
7 
 Art. IV, Sec. 10 
1841 RI No  Art. IX, Sec. 9  Art. IX, Sec. 7    Art. IX, Sec. 9, 
11 
1790 RI No         
1842 RI Yes  Art. IV, Sec. 17  Art. IV, Sec. 13  Art. I, Sec. 
16 
  
1776 SC Yes         
1778 SC Yes      Art. 41   
1790 SC Yes         
1785 TN No      Sec. 30   
1784 TN No      Dec. of 
Rights, 
Sec. 39 
  
1796 TN Yes        Art. XI, Sec. 18 
1834 TN Yes        Art. I, Sec. 18 
1833 TX No  Art. 30      Art. 15 
1827 TX No         
1835 TX No    Art. 3     
1836 TX No        Art. VI, Dec. of 
Rights, Sec. 12 
1840 TX No         
1845 TX Yes  Art. VII, Sec. 30-
2 
Art. VII, Sec. 
32 
Art. VII, Sec. 
31, 3 
   Art. I, Sec. 14, 
Art. VII, Sec. 
22 
1849 UT No         
1856 UT No         
1776 VA No         
1776 VA Yes         
1830 VA Yes         
1850 VA Yes    Art. IV, Sec. 26- Art. IV, Sec.  Art. IV, Sec. 7 Art. IV, Sec. 
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Year St. Rat Bank 
Reserves 
Limits on 
Incorporation 
Currency 
Regulation 
Limits on State 
Debt 
Liability & 
Loss 
Debtors' 
Rights 
Bankers in 
Office 
Oversight for 
Banks 
31 28 26-7 
1777 VT Yes        Ch. 2, Sec. 25 
1786 VT Yes        Ch. 2, Sec. 30 
1793 VT Yes        Ch. 2, Sec. 33 
1846 WI No  Art. X, Sec. 1-2, 
5, Art. XI, Sec. 1 
Art. X, Sec. 
3, 6 
Art. XI, Sec. 2, 
Art. XII 
Art. XII Art. XVI, 
Sec. 16 
 Art. X, Sec. 7 
1848 WI Yes Art. I, Sec. 
1, 4 
  Art. VIII, Sec. 3-
4, 6-10, Art. XI, 
Sec. 3 
 Art. I, Sec. 
16-7 
 Art. I, Sec. 5 
Total Regulations 12 38 19 31 22 45 5 30 
Pct. of Documents with 
Regulation 
11.2 35.5 17.8 29.0 20.6 42.1 4.7 28.0 
Table 15: State Constitutional Banking, Corporate, and Debt Regulations, 1776-1860. 
This table lists regulations to state constitutions prior to any amendment, and does not include regulations 
made by amendment. Similar clauses in the same document are classed as a single regulation. For 
“Ratified,” “Yes” indicates the document was ratified as a new state constitution, and “No,” that it was not. 
Note on abbreviations: DE 1776 is the 1776 Delaware Declaration of Rights, FL 1810 and 1812 are 
respectively the 1810 Constitution of East Florida and 1812 Constitution of West Florida, GA 1776 is a 
colonial statute, MD 1776 is the 1776 Maryland Declaration of Rights, ME 1780 is the 1780 constitution of 
the failed state of New Ireland in modern Maine, NC 1776 is the 1776 North Carolina Declaration of 
Rights, NH 1832 is the 1832 constitution of the failed state of the Indian Stream Republic in modern New 
Hampshire, RI 1790 is the 1790 Rhode Island Declaration of Rights, TX 1827 and TX 1840 respectively 
refer to the constitutions of the failed states of Coahuila & Texas and Rio Grande in modern Texas, TN 
1784 and TN 1785 respectively refer to the constitutions of the failed states of Franklin and Frankland in 
modern Tennessee, and VA 1776 is the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights. 
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Year St. Rat. No Forced 
Emancipation 
Slaves’ Jury 
Rights 
Outlawing 
Harming Slaves 
Taxing and 
Representing Slaves 
Slave Immigration Abolishing Slavery 
1819 AL Yes Slavery 
Article, Sec.1 
Slavery Article, 
Sec.2 
Slavery Art., Sec. 
3 
   
1836 AR Yes Eman. Art., 
Sec. 1 
Art. IV, Sec. 
25 
Art. IV, Sec. 25  Art. IV, Sec. 23, Art. 
VII, Eman., Sec. 1 
 
1860 AZ No    Cen. Art. Sec. 1   
1849 CA Yes      Art. I, Sec. 18 
1776 DE Yes     Art. 26 Art. 26 
1839 FL Yes Art. XVI, Sec. 
1 
  Art. IX, Sec. 1 Art. XVI, Sec. 2-4  
1810 FL No Art. V, Sec. 1 Art. V, Sec. 2 Art. V, Sec. 1  Art. V, Sec. 1  
1789 GA Yes Art. IV, Sec. 
11 
 Art. IV, Sec. 12  Art. IV, Sec. 11  
1798 GA Yes   Art. IV, Sec. 12  Art. IV, Sec. 11  
1844 IA No      Art. II, Sec. 22 
1846 IA Yes      Art. II, Sec. 23 
1857 IA Yes      Art. I, Sec. 23 
1818 IL Yes     Art. VI, Sec. 2 Art. VI, Sec. 1, 3 
1848 IL Yes     Art. XIV Art. XIII, Sec. 16 
1816 IN Yes      Art. VIII, Art. XI, Sec. 7 
1851 IN Yes     Art. XIII, Sec. 1 Art. I, Sec. 37 
1858 KS No      Art. I, Sec. 6 
1857 KS No Art. VII, Sec. 
2, Art. XV, 
Sched., Sec. 
14 
Art. VII, Sec. 3 Art. VII, Sec. 4  Art. VII, Sec. 2  
1855 KS No     Art. I, Sec. 21 Art. I, Sec. 6 
1859 KS Yes      Art. I, Sec. 6 
1792 KY Yes Art. VII, Sec. 
1 
 Art. VII, Sec. 1  Art. VII, Sec. 1  
1799 KY Yes Art. VII, Sec. 
1 
Art. VII, Sec. 2 Art. VII, Sec. 1  Art. VII, Sec. 1  
1850 KY Yes Art. X, Sec. 1 Art. X, Sec. 3 Art. X, Sec. 1  Art. X, Sec. 1  
1851 MD Yes Art. III, Sec. 
42 
     
1780 ME No      Dec. of Rights, Art. I 
1835 MI Yes      Art. XI, Sec. 1 
1850 MI Yes      Art. XVIII, Sec. 11 
1857 MN Yes      Art. I, Sec. 2 
1820 MO Yes Art. III, Sec. 
26 
Art. III, Sec. 
27 
Art. III, Sec. 26, 
28 
 Art. III, Sec. 26  
1846 MO No Art. III, Sec. 
26 
Art. III, Sec. 
29 
Art. III, Sec. 28, 
30 
 Art. III, Sec. 26-8  
1817 MS Yes Art. VI, 
Slaves, Sec. 
1 
Art. V, Sec. 7, 
Art. VI, Slaves, 
Sec. 2 
Art. VI, Slaves, 
Sec. 1 
 Art. VI, Slaves, Sec. 
1 
 
1831 MS Yes Art. IX, Sec. 
1 
Art. IX, Sec. 3 Art. IX, Sec. 1  Art. IX, Sec. 1-2  
1850 NM No      Art. I, Sec. 1 
1802 OH Yes      Art. VII, Sec. 5, Art. 
VIII, Sec. 2 
1857 OR Yes      Art. I, Sec. 4 
1845 OR No      Art. I, Sec. 4 
1842 RI Yes      Art. I., Sec. 4 
1842 RI No      Art. I, Sec. 19 
1796 TN Yes    Art. I, Sec. 26   
1834 TN Yes Art. II, Sec. 
31 
  Art. II, Sec. 28   
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Year St. Rat. No Forced 
Emancipation 
Slaves’ Jury 
Rights 
Outlawing 
Harming Slaves 
Taxing and 
Representing Slaves 
Slave Immigration Abolishing Slavery 
1845 TX Yes Art. VIII, Sec. 
1 
Art. VIII, Sec. 
2 
Art. VIII, Sec. 1, 3  Art. VIII, Sec. 1  
1836 TX No Art. VI, 
General, Sec. 
9 
   Art. VI, General, 
Sec. 9 
 
1850 VA Yes Art. IV, Sec. 
21 
  Art. IV, Sec. 2-3, 36 Art. IV, Sec. 19  
1777 VT Yes      Ch. 1, Sec. 1 
1786 VT Yes      Ch. 1, Sec. 1 
1793 VT Yes      Ch. 1, Art. 1 
1846 WI No      Art. XVI, Sec. 2 
1848 WI Yes      Art. I, Sec. 2 
Total Regulations 18 11 14 5 21 27 
Table 16: State Constitutional Slavery Regulations, 1776-1860. 
This table lists regulations to state constitutions prior to any amendment, and does not include regulations 
made by amendment. Similar clauses in the same document are classed as a single regulation. For 
“Ratified,” “Yes” indicates the document was ratified as a new state constitution, and “No,” that it was not. 
Note on abbreviations: FL 1810 is the 1810 Constitution of East Florida, ME 1780 is the 1780 constitution 
of the failed state of New Ireland in modern Maine, and TX 1836 is Texas’ interim 1836 Constitution. 
 
State Slavery Abolished Year Convict Slavery Legal Year Equality/Equal Protection Year Universal Male Franchise Year 
AL Art. I, Sec. 34 1865 Art. I, Sec. 34 1865 Art. I, Sec. 1-2 1867 Art VII, Sec. 2 1867 
AR Art. V, Sec. I 1864 Art. V, Sec. I 1864 Art. I, Sec. 3 1868 Art. VIII, Sec. 2 1868 
DE         
FL Art. XVI, Sec. 1 1865 Art. XVI, Sec. 1 1865 Dec. of Rights, Sec. 1 1868 Ordinance, Sec. 6 1868 
GA Art. I, Sec. 20 1865 Art. I, Sec. 20 1865 Art. I, Sec. 2 1868 Art. II, Sec. 1 1868 
KY     Art. XIII, Section 1 1850   
LA Title I, Art. 1 1864 Title I, Art. 1 1864 Title I, Art. 1-2 1868 Title VI, Art. 98 1868 
MD Dec. of Rights, Art. 24 1864 Dec. of Rights, Art. 24 1864 Dec. of Rights, Art. 1 1864   
MO Art. I, Sec. 2 1865 Art. I, Sec. 2 1865     
MS Art. I, Sec, 19 1869 Art. I, Sec, 19 1869 Art. VII, Sec. 3 1869 Art. VII, Sec. 2 1869 
NC Art. I, Sec. 33 1868 Art. I, Sec. 33 1868 Art. I, Sec. 1 1868 Art. VI, Sec. 1 1868 
SC Art. IV, Sec. 11 1865 Art. IV, Sec. 11 1865 Art. I, Sec 39 1868 Art. VIII, Sec. 8 1868 
TN Art. I, Sec. 33 1870 Art. I, Sec. 33 1870   Art. I, Sec. 5, Art. IV, Sec. 1 1870 
TX Art. VIII, Sec, 1 1866 Art. VIII, Sec, 1 1866 Art. I, Sec. 2 1866 Art. I, Sec. 16 1866 
VA Art. I, Sec. 19 1870 Art. I, Sec. 19 1870 Art. I, Sec. 1, 20 1870 Art. III, Sec. 1 1870 
WV Art. XI, Sec. 7 1863       
Table 17: Abolition, Equal Protection, and Enfranchisement in Ex-Confederate and Slaveholding States, 
1865-70. 
Note: Tennessee's 1866 amendment to Art. I, Sec. 1 abolished slavery except for convict slavery. 
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Appendix E: Miscellaneous 
 
State 1: Fed. 
Pro. 1yr 
2: Fed. 
Pro. 1yr 
3: Fed. 
Pro. 1yr 
4: Fed. 
Pro. 1yr 
5: Fed. 
Pro. 5yr 
6: Fed. 
Pro. 5yr 
7: Fed. 
Pro. 5yr 
8: Fed. 
Pro. 5yr 
Total Const. Proposals 0.29    0.43    
Unratified Const. Proposals  0.44    0.64   
Ratified Const. Proposals   -0.038    -0.062  
Ratified Amendments    0.36    0.76 
Observations 228 228 228 196 50 50 50 42 
Table 18: Correlation between Proposed Federal Amendments and State Constitutions, 1791-2014. 
 
 
 
Figure 18: State Age and Constitutional Turnover, 1776-2017. 
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Figure 19: State Constitutional Approval and Stability, by State. 
For approval data, see Stephanopoulos and Versteeg. State constitutional approval is measured on a ten-
point scale, which is clustered around the national mean (6.7) because the study’s authors use a multilevel 
regression and poststratification technique. See Nicholas Stephanopoulos and Mila Versteeg, “The 
Contours of Constitutional Approval,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research 
Network, August 18, 2015), 21–22, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2646773. For each state, 
Stephanopoulos and Versteeg give an average approval range of 0.1, which in this figure is rounded down 
to the nearest tenth of a point (i.e. Mississippi’s score is rounded down from 6.4 – 6.5 to 6.4). Data 
excludes Alaska and Hawaii. 
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State Year Rat Upper 
House 
D/DR Party:  
F/NR/W 
Party: 
Other 
Lower 
House 
Party:  
D/DR 
Party:  
F/NR/W 
Party: 
Other 
CT 1818 Yes 1817 T 0 F 12  1816 T 90 F 111  
   1818 T 7 F 5  1817 T 105 F 96  
DE 1831 Yes             
GA 1833 No ND      ND      
 1839 No 1838 U 50 SR 37  1837 U 88 SR 103  
   1839 U 28 SR 46 1 1838 U 96 SR 76  
IL 1848 Yes       1852 D 56 W 18 1 
         1854 D 34 W 41  
LA 1845 Yes 1842 D 8 W 9  1844 D 26 W 34  
   1844 D 9 W 8  1846 D 55 W 43  
MA 1820 No 1822 DR 9 F 31  1819 DR 161 F 231 16 
   1823 DR 24 F 16  1820 DR 64 F 87 42 
MO 1845 No             
MS 1832 Yes ND      ND      
NC 1823 No ND      ND      
 1833 No ND      ND      
 1835 No 1835 D 33 W 30 2 1836 D 62 W 58  
   1836 D 24 W 26  1840 D 54 W 66  
NJ 1844 Yes 1843 D 12 W 6  1843 D 35 W 23  
   1844 D 6 W 13  1844 D 18 W 40  
NY 1801 No 1801 DR 21 F 22  1799 DR 34 F 43 31 
   1802 DR 21 F 11  1800 DR 67 F 39 1 
 1822 Yes 1821 BK 13 CL 18 1 1819 BK 58 CL 30 34 
   1822 BK 32 CL 0  1820 BK 71 CL 33 22 
 1837 No 1838 D 18 W 14  1836 D 90 W 38  
   1839 D 12 W 20  1837 D 28 W 100  
 1846 Yes 1846 D 21 W 10 1 1845 D 74 W 51 2 
   1847 D 8 W 24  1846 D 52 W 76  
PA 1833 No       1834 D 62 W 11 27 
         1835 D 28 AM 72  
 1838 Yes 1838 D 15 W 18  1835 D 28 W 72  
   1839 D 17 W 16  1836 D 72 W 7 21 
RI 1824 No ND      ND      
 1841 (x2) No             
 1842 Yes             
TN 1835 Yes 1835 D 7 W 18  1835 D 25 W 46 4 
   1837 D 14 W 11  1837 D 42 W 33  
VA 1816 No ND      ND      
 1830 Yes ND      ND      
VT 1814 No N/A      1812 DR 124 F 85  
         1813 DR 104 F 108  
 1822 No N/A      ND      
 1828 No N/A      ND      
 1836 No             
 1843 No             
Table 19: State Constitutional Replacement and Change in Partisan Control of State Legislatures, 1800-49. 
Note: This figure lists all thirty-one attempts to replace a standing state constitution between 1800 and 1840. The figure 
also lists whether the state legislature shifted control three sessions before or after an attempted constitutional 
replacement, and if so, the figure lists the years and magnitude of that shift.  Control of the legislature shifts when a 
party or inter-party coalition loses a simple majority. Columns list the vote share of the Democratic-Republican Party, 
its successor, the Democratic Party, measured against the Federalists, National Republicans, Whigs, or an allied local 
party. Note on coding: For “Order,” 1 indicates the proposal was the state’s first, 2, the second, and so on. “ND” 
indicates the data for these years is not available from the data compiled by Michael Dubin. “N/A” indicates the state 
was unicameral. All proposals were made by constitutional conventions, save for legislative proposals by Pennsylvania 
and North Carolina in 1833. 
 
Note on 
Abbreviations:  
“DR” – 
Democratic-
Republicans 
“D” – 
Democrats 
“F” – 
Federalists 
“NR” – 
National 
Republicans 
“W” –  
Whigs 
“T” – 
Toleration 
Party 
“U” –  
Union Party 
“SR” – 
Southern 
Rights Party 
“BK” – 
Bucktail 
“CL” – 
Clintonian 
“AM” –  
Anti-Masonic 
“O” – Other.  
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State Stability of Constitutional Politics around and after Constitutional Convention(s) or Amendments(s) 
AL 1819, stable: sparse settlement by whites and little party organization at state’s founding 
AR 1836, stable: sparse settlement by whites and little conflict at the state’s founding 
CA 1849, unstable: in 1836 and 1845, separatist Californians elect extralegal governments to secede from Mexico; a balance of de legates from the state’s diverse 
regions and ethnic groups assures a moderate convention and constitution 
CT 1818, 1845(A), stable: the Republican-aligned Toleration Party captures the legislature from Federalists in 1818 on a platform of religious disestablishment and 
franchise expansion; Connecticut is a single party state from 1776 until the 1830s 
DE 1831, stable: Federalist control 1796-1820 and peaceful elections and power sharing through the Jacksonian era  
FL 1838, stable: state has a dispersed, unorganized population of only 50,000, of which 20,000 are slaves excluded from political participation 
GA 1833(F), 1838(F), stable: legislature calls two failed conventions, but otherwise little agitation for constitutional reform 
IA 1844(F), 1846, stable: Iowans push for constitutional reform peacefully, resulting in a convention in 1857 
IL 1818, 1848, stable: tension between French slaveholders and recent, antislavery settlers is resolved by allowing limited de facto slavery 
IN 1816, stable: tension between French slaveholders and recent, antislavery settlers dissipates as slaveholders free slaves or move to neighboring Illinois  
KY 1850, stable: legislature regularly submits constitutional questions to voters via referenda 
LA 1812, 1845 stable: French planters disenfranchise white small farmers at the 1812 Convention, but after increased settlement by small farmers, the 1845 
Convention repeals these restrictions 
MA 1821(F, A), stable: tension between western small farmers and eastern towns is largely resolved by aggregating the opinions of town meetings and by a series of 
constitutional amendments  
MD 1802(A), unstable: malapportionment over-represents eastern shore planters, underrepresenting Baltimore, and the state approaches revolution, forcing reform 
in 1837; renewed discord forces the legislature to call a convention in 1850 
ME 1819, stable: separation from Massachusetts appeases Maine separatists, and subsequent intrastate political conflict does not implicate the Maine Constitution  
MI 1835, 1850(F), stable: state is sparsely populated by farmers, who make up a majority of the state’s fairly inclusive convention 
MO 1820, 1845(F), stable: Jacksonians quickly organize the state; by 1840, a stable two-party system has emerged 
MS 1817, 1832, stable: after movements for repeal for suffrage expansion and judicial elections, the legislature capitulates and calls a peaceful convention 
NC 1823(F), 1833(L), 1835 (F, A), stable: reapportionment appeases dissatisfied western voters 
NH 1847(S), 1850(F), stable: conflict is channeled by parties into elections; Jacksonians control the state from 1827 until the 1850s 
NJ 1807(S), 1844, stable: the state is small and homogenous, avoiding the tension between easterners and frontiersmen that upset other states 
NM 1848(F), 1849(F), 1850(F), unstable: state is divided between Anglo-American settlers, Spanish-Mexicans, and Indians; the latter two rebel against the former 
in the failed 1847 Taos Revolt 
NY 1801(F), 1804(S), 1821, 1826(A), 1837(F), 1846, stable/unstable: small western farmers and New York City workingmen organize, but are appeased by 
ongoing statutory and constitutional reform; along the Hudson, tenant farmers rebel in 1839, leading to the 1846 Convention  
OH 1802, stable: class divisions in Ohio’s frontier society are weak and are resolved through political and legal means 
OR 1843(F), 1845(F), stable: the federal government resolves border disputes with Great Britain; most intrastate conflict is co-opted by parties 
PA 1833(F), 1838, unstable: tax policies result in the Whiskey Rebellion (1794) and Frie’s Rebellion (1800), and a disputed election leads to armed mobilizing and 
the Buckshot War (1838); otherwise, state mobilizing occurs through mass parties 
RI 1824(F), 1834(F), 1841(F), 1842, unstable: longstanding resentment over malapportionment and suffrage restriction lead to a separatist “People’s 
Constitution” and legislature in the Dorr War 
SC 1810(A), stable: tensions between costal planters and upcountry small farmers are resolved when the former take the legislature in 1800 and reform suffrage 
and apportionment law 
TN 1835, stable: main constitutional contention is over judicial design, which seems not to align with class or race  tensions 
TX 1836(F), 1845: in 1836 Anglo-American Texans revolt and secede from Mexico, joining the Union in 1845 
VA 1804(S), 1816(F), 1829, 1850: token reforms appease Blue Ridge farmers, keeping the state legislature under the control of eastern counties 
VT 1814(F), 1822(F), 1828(F), 1836(F), 1843(F), 1850(F): constitutional revision comes through the combination of meetings of the state Council of Censors 
and state conventions 
WI 1846(F), 1848, stable: conventions are the main site of constitutional change in early Wisconsin 
Table 20: State Constitutional Politics and Instability, 1800-50. 
Note: Years indicate a successful convention, unless designated as the year of an amendment (A) or of a failed 
convention (F) or legislative committee (L) that did not ratify an entirely new constitution. A state’s constitutional 
politics is considered unstable if it saw regular constitutional agitation by white males via extralegal riots, militia 
mobilizing, or illegal constitutional conventions. Sources: Oxford Commentaries on the State Constitutions of the 
United States, Paul Goodman, “The First American Party System,” in The American Party System: Stages of Political 
Development, ed. William N. Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); 
Richard P. McCormick, “Political Development and the Second Party System,” in The American Party System: Stages 
of Political Development, ed. William N. Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1967).  
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